

INTRODUCTORY LECTURES

ON

MODERN HISTORY,

DELIVERED IN LENT TERM, MDCCCXLII.

WITH

THE INAUGURAL LECTURE

DELIVERED IN DECEMBER, MDCCCXLI.

BY

✓
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TO THE REVEREND
EDWARD HAWKINS, D.D.,
PROVOST OF ORIEL COLLEGE,
ETC., ETC., ETC.,

THESE LECTURES,
THE FIRST FRUITS OF A RENEWED CONNEXION
WITH THE UNIVERSITY AND ITS RESIDENT MEMBERS,
ARE INSCRIBED WITH TRUE RESPECT AND REGARD,
BY HIS SINCERELY ATTACHED FRIEND,
THE AUTHOR.

THE following Lectures are printed almost exactly as they were delivered. They were written with the expectation that they would be read in a room to a very limited audience; which may explain why the style in some instances is more colloquial than became the circumstances under which they were delivered actually.

Rugby, May 5th, 1842.

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INAUGURAL LECTURE.

It has been often remarked that when a stranger enters St. Peter's for the first time, the immediate impression is one of disappointment; the building looks smaller than he expected to find it. So it is with the first sight of mountains; their summits never seem so near the clouds as we had hoped to see them. But a closer acquaintance with these, and with other grand or beautiful objects, convinces us that our first impression arose not from the want of greatness in what we saw, but from a want of comprehensiveness in ourselves to grasp it. What we saw was not all that existed; but all that our untaught glance could master. As we know it better, it remains the same, but we rise more nearly to its level: our greater admiration is but the proof that we are become able to appreciate it more truly.

Something of this sort takes place I think in our uninstructed impressions of history. We are not inclined to rate very highly the qualifications required either in the student or in the writer of it. It seems

to demand little more than memory in the one, and honesty and diligence in the other. It is, we say, only a record of facts; and such a work seems to offer no field for the imagination, or for the judgment, or for our powers of reasoning. History is but time's follower; she does not pretend to discover, but merely to register what time has brought to light already. Eminent men have been known to hold this language; Johnson, whose fondness for biography might have taught him to judge more truly, entertained little respect for history. We cannot comprehend what we have never studied, and history must be content to share in the common portion of every thing great and good; it must be undervalued by a hasty observer.

If I were to attempt to institute a comparison between the excellencies of history and those of other studies, I should be falling into the very fault which I have been just noticing; I might be doing injustice to other branches of knowledge, only because I had no sufficient acquaintance with them. But I may be allowed to claim for history, not any particular rank, whether high or low, as compared with other studies, but simply that credit should be given it for containing more than a superficial view of it can appreciate, for having treasures, neither lying on the surface nor immediately below the surface,—treasures not to be obtained without much labour, yet rewarding the hardest labour amply.

To these treasures it is my business to endeavour to point out the way. A Professor of history, if I

understand his duties rightly, has two principal objects; he must try to acquaint his hearers with the nature and value of the treasure for which they are searching; and, secondly, he must try to shew them the best and speediest method of discovering and extracting it. The first of these two things may be done once for all; but the second must be his habitual employment, the business of his professorial life. I am now therefore not to attempt to enter upon the second, but to bestow my attention upon the first; I must try to state what is the treasure to be found by a search into the records of history; if we cannot be satisfied that it is abundant and most valuable, we shall care little to be instructed how to gain it.

In speaking of history generally, I may appear to be forgetting that my proper subject is more limited; that it is not history simply, but modern history. I am perfectly aware of this; and hope not to forget it in my practice: but still at the outset I must trace the stream from its source: I must ask you to remain with me awhile on the high ground, where the waters, which are hereafter to form the separate streams of ancient and modern history, lie as yet undistinguished in their common parent lake. I must speak of history in general, in order to understand the better the character of any one of its particular species.

The general idea of history seems to be, that it is the biography of a society. It does not appear to

me to be history at all, but simply biography, unless it finds in the persons who are its subject something of a common purpose, the accomplishment of which is the object of their common life. History is to this common life of many, what biography is to the life of an individual. Take for instance any common family, and its members are soon so scattered from one another, and are engaged in such different pursuits, that although it is possible to write the biography of each individual, yet there can be no such thing, properly speaking, as the history of the family. But suppose all the members to be thrown together in one place, amidst strangers or savages, and there immediately becomes a common life,—an unity of action,—interest, and purpose, distinct from others around them, which renders them at once a fit subject of history. Perhaps I ought not to press the word “purpose;” because purpose implies consciousness in the purposer, and a society may exist without being fully conscious of its own business as a society. But whether consciously or not, every society—so much is implied in the very word—must have in it something of community; and so far as the members of it are members, so far as they are each incomplete parts, but taken together form a whole, so far, it appears to me, their joint life is the proper subject of history.

Accordingly we find the term history often applied to small and subordinate societies. We speak of the history of literary or scientific societies; we have histories of commercial bodies; histories of religious

orders; histories of universities. In all these cases history has to do with that which the several members of each of these societies have in common: it is, as I said, the biography of their common life. And it seems to me that it could not perform its office, if it had no distinct notion in what this common life consisted.

But if the life of every society belongs to history, much more does the life of that highest and sovereign society which we call a state or a nation. And this in fact is considered the proper subject of history;—insomuch that if we speak of it simply, without any qualifying epithet, we understand by it not the biography of any subordinate society, but of some one or more of the great national societies of the human race, whatever political form their bond of connexion may assume. And thus we get a somewhat stricter definition of history properly so called; we may describe it not simply as the biography of a society, but as the biography of a political society or commonwealth.

Now in a commonwealth or state, that common life which I have ventured to call the proper subject of history, finds its natural expression in those who are invested with the state's government. Here we have the varied elements which exist in the body of a nation reduced as it were to an intelligible unity: the state appears to have a personal existence in its government. And where that government is lodged in the hands of a single individual, then biography and history seem to melt into one another, inasmuch

as one and the same person combines in himself his life as an individual, and the common life of his nation.

That common life then which we could not find represented by any private members of the state, is brought to a head, as it were, and exhibited intelligibly and visibly in the government. And thus history has generally taken governments as the proper representatives of nations; it has recorded the actions and fortunes of kings or national councils, and has so appeared to fulfil its appointed duty, that of recording the life of a commonwealth. Nor is this theoretically other than true; the idea of government is no doubt that it should represent the person of the state, desiring those ends, and contriving those means to compass them, which the state itself, if it could act for itself, ought to desire and to contrive. But practically and really this has not been so: governments have less represented the state than themselves: the individual life has so predominated in them over the common life, that what in theory is history, because it is recording the actions of a government, and the government represents the nation, becomes in fact no more than biography; it does but record the passions and actions of an individual, who is abusing the state's name for the purposes of selfish, rather than public good.

We see then in practice how history has been beguiled, so to speak, from its proper business, and has ceased to describe the life of a commonwealth. For

taking governments as the representatives of commonwealths, which in idea they are, history has watched their features, as if from them might be drawn the portrait of their respective nations. But as in this she has been deceived, so her portraits were necessarily unlike what they were intended to represent; they were not portraits of the commonwealth, but of individuals.

Again, the life of a commonwealth, like that of an individual, has two parts; it is partly external and partly internal. Its external life is seen in its dealings with other commonwealths; its internal life, in its dealings with itself. Now in the former of these, government must ever be in a certain degree the representative of the nation: there must here be a community of interest, at least up to a certain point, and something also of a community of feeling. If a government be overthrown by a foreign enemy, the nation shares in the evils of the conquest and in the shame of the defeat; if it be victorious, the nation, even if not enriched with the spoils, is yet proud to claim its portion of the glory. And thus in describing a government's external life, that is, its dealings with other governments, history has remained, and could not but remain, true to its proper subject: for in foreign war the government must represent more than its individual self; here it really must act and suffer, not altogether but yet to a considerable degree, for and with the nation.

I have assumed that the external life of a state is

seen in little else than in its wars; and this I fear is true, with scarcely any qualification. A state acting out of itself is mostly either repelling violence, or exercising it upon others; the friendly intercourse between nation and nation is for the most part negative. A nation's external life then is displayed in its wars, and here history has been sufficiently busy: the wars of the human race have been recorded, when the memory of every thing else has perished. Nor is this to be wondered at; for the external life of nations, as of individuals, is at once the most easily known and the most generally interesting. Action, in the common sense of the word, is intelligible to every one; its effects are visible and sensible; in itself, from its necessary connexion with outward nature, it is often highly picturesque, while the qualities displayed in it are some of those which by an irresistible instinct we are most led to admire. Ability in the adaptation of means to ends, courage, endurance, and perseverance, the complete conquest over some of the most universal weaknesses of our nature, the victory over some of its most powerful temptations, these are qualities displayed in action, and particularly in war. And it is our deep sympathy with these qualities, much more than any fondness for scenes of horror and blood, which has made descriptions of battles, whether in poetry or history, so generally attractive. He who can read these without interest, differs, I am inclined to think, from the mass of mankind rather for the

worse than for the better; he rather wants some noble qualities which other men have, than possesses some which other men want.

But still we have another life besides that of outward action; and it is this inward life after all, which determines the character of the actions and of the man. And how eagerly do we desire in those great men whose actions fill so large a space in history, to know not only what they did but what they were: how much do we prize their letters or their recorded words, and not least such words as are uttered in their most private moments, which enable us to look as it were into the very nature of that mind, whose distant effects we know to be so marvellous. But a nation has its inward life no less than an individual, and from this its outward life also is characterized. For what does a nation effect by war, but either the securing of its existence, or the increasing of its power? We honour the heroism shewn in accomplishing these objects; but power, nay even existence, are not ultimate ends; the question may be asked of every created being why he should live at all, and no satisfactory answer can be given, if his life does not, by doing God's will consciously or unconsciously, tend to God's glory and to the good of his brethren. And if a nation's annals contain the record of deeds ever so heroic, done in defence of the national freedom or existence, still we may require that the freedom or the life so bravely maintained should be also employed for worthy purposes; or else even the names of Thermopylæ and of Mor-

garten become in after years a reproach rather than a glory.

Turning then to regard the inner life of a nation, we cannot but see that here, as in the life of an individual, it is determined by the nature of its ultimate end. What is a nation's main object, is therefore a question which must be asked, before we can answer whether its inner life, and consequently its outward life also, which depends upon the inner life, is to be called good or evil. Now it does not seem easy to conceive that a nation can have any other object than that which is the highest object of every individual in it; if it can, then the attribute of sovereignty which is inseparable from nationality becomes the dominion of an evil principle. For suppose for instance that a nation as such is not cognizant of the notions of justice and humanity, but that its highest object is wealth or dominion or security. It then follows that the sovereign power in human life, which can influence the minds and compel the actions of us all, is a power altogether unmoral; and if unmoral, and yet commanding the actions of moral beings, then evil. Again, if being cognizant of the notions of justice and humanity it deliberately prefers other objects to them, then here is the dominion of an evil principle still more clearly. But if it be cognizant of them and appreciates them rightly, then it must see that they are more to be followed than any objects of outward advantage; then it acknowledges moral ends as a higher good than physical ends, and thus, as we said, agrees with

every good individual man in its estimate of the highest object of national no less than of individual life.

It is sometimes urged, that although this be true of individuals, yet it is not true of every society; that we constantly see instances of the contrary; that, for example, the highest object of the Royal Society as a society is the advancement of science, although to the individuals of that society a moral and religious object would be incomparably of higher value. Why then may not the highest object of a nation, as such, be self-defence, or wealth, or any other outward good, although every individual of the nation puts a moral object before any mere external benefits? The answer to this is simply because a nation is a sovereign society, and it is something monstrous that the ultimate power in human life should be destitute of a sense of right and wrong. For there being a right and a wrong in all or almost all our actions, the power which can command or forbid these actions without an appeal to any human tribunal higher than itself, must surely have a sense not only of the right or wrong of this particular action now commanded or forbidden, but generally of the comparative value of different ends, and thus of the highest end of all; lest perchance while commanding what is in itself good, it may command it at a time or in a degree to interfere with some higher good; and then it is in fact commanding evil. And that the power of government is thus extensive and sovereign seems admitted, not only

historically, inasmuch as no known limits to it have ever been affixed, nor indeed can be, without contradiction, but also by our common sense and language, which feels and expresses that government does, and may, and ought to interpose in a great variety of matters; various for instance, as education and the raising of a revenue, and the making of war or peace; matters which it would be very difficult to class together under any one common head, except such as I have assigned as the end of political society, the highest good, namely, of the whole society or nation. And our common notions of the difference between a government and a police, between a government and an army, are alone sufficient to shew the fallacy of the attempted comparison. It is the ultimate object of a police to provide for the security of our bodies and goods against violence at home, as it is the object of an army to secure them against violence from without. Policemen and soldiers have individually another and a higher object; but the societies, if I may so call them, the institutions of a police and an army, have not. And who does not see that for this very reason the police and the army are not sovereign societies, but essentially subordinate;—that because they are not cognizant of moral ends, therefore they are incapable of directing men's conduct in the last resort;—and that therefore they are themselves subject to a higher power, namely, that of the government, the representative of the national life? If neither is the government cognizant of moral ends, then it too must be subject to some

higher power, which is a contradiction in terms; or else, as I said before, it cannot surely be the ordinance of God; and if not, can it be otherwise than evil?

Perhaps it was hardly necessary to dwell so long on this point before my present hearers; yet the opposite doctrine to that which I have been asserting has been maintained, since Warburton, by names deserving of no common respect; and what seems to me the truth, was necessary to be stated, because on it depends our whole view of history, so far as history is more than a mere record of wars. In wars no doubt the end sought is no more than a nation's security or power; in other words, that she may develope her internal life at all, or develope it with vigour. But we must recognise some worthy end for the life thus preserved, or strengthened; otherwise it is but given in vain.

That end appears to be the promoting and securing a nation's highest happiness; so we must express it in its most general formula; but under the most favourable combination of circumstances, this same end is conceived and expressed more purely, as the setting forth God's glory by doing His appointed work. And that work for a nation seems to imply not only the greatest possible perfecting of the natures of its individual members, but also the perfecting of all those acts which are done, by the nation collectively, or by the government standing in its place, and faithfully representing it. For that conceivably a nation may have duties of vast im-

portance to perform in its national capacity, and which cannot be effected by its individual members, however excellent—duties of its external life of a very different sort from ordinary wars, even when justifiable, seems to follow at once from the consideration that every single state is but a member of a greater body; that is, immediately, of the great body of organized states throughout the world, and still farther, of the universal family of mankind, and that it is a member of both according to the will of God.

But perfection in outward life is the fruit of perfection in the life within us. And a nation's inner life consists in its action upon and within itself. Now in order to the perfecting of itself, it must follow certain principles, and acquire certain habits; in other words, it must have its laws and institutions adapted to the accomplishment of its great end. On these the characters of its people so mainly depend, that if these be faulty, the whole inner life is corrupted; if these be good, it is likely to go on healthfully. The history then of a nation's internal life, is the history of its institutions and of its laws, both of which are included under the term *laws*, in the comprehensive sense of that word, as used by the Greeks; but for us it is most convenient to distinguish them. Let us consider how much these two terms include.

I would first say that by institutions I wish to understand, such offices, orders of men, public bodies, settlements of property, customs, or regulations, concerning matters of general usage, as do not owe their

existence to any express law or laws, but having originated in various ways at a period of remote antiquity, are already parts of the national system, at the very beginning of our historical view of it, and are recognised by all actual laws, as being themselves a kind of primary condition on which all recorded legislation proceeds. And I would confine the term *laws* to the enactments of a known legislative power, at a certain known period.

Here then, in the institutions and legislation of a country, the principles and rules and influencing powers of its internal life, we have one of the noblest subjects of history. For by one or both of these, generally from institutions modified by laws, comes in the first place what we call the constitution of a country; that is, to speak generally, its peculiar arrangement of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of government. The bearing of the constitution of a country upon its internal life is twofold; direct and indirect. For example, the effect of any particular arrangement of the judicial power is seen directly in the greater or less purity with which justice is administered; but there is a farther effect, and one of the highest importance, in its furnishing to a greater or less portion of the nation one of the best means of moral and intellectual culture, the opportunity, namely, of exercising the functions of a judge. I mean, that to accustom a number of persons to the intellectual exercise of attending to, and weighing, and comparing evidence, and to the moral exercise of being placed in a high and responsible

situation, invested with one of God's own attributes, that of judgment, and having to determine with authority between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, is to furnish them with very high means of moral and intellectual culture, in other words, it is providing them with one of the highest kinds of education. And thus a judicial constitution may secure a pure administration of justice, and yet fail as an engine of national cultivation, when it is vested in the hands of a small body of professional men, like the old French parliaments. While, on the other hand, it may communicate the judicial office very widely, as by our system of juries, and thus may educate, if I may so speak, a very large portion of the nation, but yet may not succeed in obtaining the greatest certainty of just legal decisions. I do not mean that our jury system does not succeed, but it is conceivable that it should not. So in the same way different arrangements of the executive and legislative powers should be always regarded in this twofold aspect; as effecting their direct objects, good government and good legislation; and as educating the nation more or less extensively, by affording to a greater or less number of persons practical lessons in governing and legislating.

I have noticed the political constitution of a country, the first of all its institutions, because it is the one which from its prominence first attracts our notice. Others, however, although less conspicuous, have an influence not less important. Of these are all such institutions or laws as relate to public in-

struction in the widest sense, whether of the young, or of persons of all ages. There are certain principles which the State wishes to inculcate on all its members, certain habits which it wishes to form, a certain kind and degree of knowledge which it wishes to communicate; such, namely, as bear more or less immediately on its great end, its own intellectual and moral perfection, arising out of the perfection of its several members. Now as far as this instruction, using the term again in its widest sense, and including under it the formation of habits, as far as this instruction is applied to the young, it goes under the name of education; as far as it regards persons of all ages, it generally takes the form of religion. Even in heathen countries, where direct teaching was no part of the business of the ministers of religion, still the solemn festivals, the games, the sacrifices, the systems of divination, nay, the very temples themselves, had an undoubted moral effect on the people, whether for good or for evil, and were designed to have it; so that in the larger sense already claimed for the word, they may be called a sort of public instruction. In Christian countries, religion at once inculcates truths and forms habits; the first, by what I may be allowed to call prophesying or direct teaching; the second, by this also, and farther by the ritual and social agency of the Church. Nor need I add one word to my present audience to impress the vast importance of this one of a nation's institutions.

Neither let it be thought an abrupt or painful de-

scent, if from the mention of public instruction in its very highest form, I pass to another class of institutions and laws, which some may look upon as regarding only the lowest part of a state's external life; those institutions and laws, I mean, which affect the acquisition and the distribution of property. I grant that the way in which economical questions are sometimes discussed may create a prejudice against the study of them; excusably, it may be, yet not over reasonably. For in economical works the economical end alone is regarded, without taking account of its bearings upon the higher or political end to which it should minister. But surely this, as it would be very faulty in a statesman, is not at all faulty in one who professes only to be an economist; it does not seem to me that in discussing any subordinate science, its relations with the supreme or architectonical science fall properly under our consideration. We are but to send in our report of the facts within our special subject of enquiry; to legislate upon this report belongs to a higher department. It is very useful to consider economical questions in a purely economical point of view, in order to discover the truth respecting them merely as points of economy; although it by no means follows that what is expedient economically, is expedient also politically, because it may well be that another end rather than the economical may best further the attainment of the great end of the commonwealth. But no man who thinks seriously about it can doubt the vast moral importance of institutions and laws re-

lating to property. It has been said that the possession of property implies education; that is, that it calls forth and exercises so many valuable qualities, forethought, love of order, justice, beneficence, and wisdom in the use of power, that he who possesses it cannot live in the extreme of ignorance or brutality: he has learnt unavoidably some of the higher lessons of humanity. It is at least certain that the utter want of property offers obstacles to the moral and intellectual education of persons labouring under it, such as no book teaching can in ordinary circumstances overcome. Laws therefore which affect directly or indirectly the distribution of property, affect also a nation's internal life very deeply. It is not a matter of indifference whether the laws of inheritance direct the equal distribution of a man's property among all his children, or whether they establish a right of primogeniture; whether they fix the principle of succession independently of individual discretion, or whether they leave a man the power of disposing of his property by will according to his own pleasure. Nor again is it indifferent whether the law favours the stability of property or its rapid circulation; whether it encourages entails, or forbids them; whether it determines that land held in mortmain is an advantage or an evil. I might allude to the importance of commercial laws, whether for good or for evil; and to that fruitful source of political disputes in modern times, the amount and character of a country's taxation. But it is enough to have just noticed these points, in

order to shew that economical questions, or such as relate to wealth or property, demand the careful attention of the historian, inasmuch as they influence most powerfully a nation's moral and political condition, that is, in the highest sense of the terms, its welfare or its misery.

Hitherto we have considered the history of a nation's natural life as busied with its institutions and laws ; and as tracing their effects in their three great divisions of, 1st, politics, 2nd, instruction in the widest sense, and 3rd, economy. Yet life, whether individual or national, is subject to a variety of irregular influences, such as originate in no known law. Unless the national will, as at Sparta, attempt to absorb into itself the wills of individuals, so that they shall do nothing, suffer nothing, desire nothing, but according to the bidding of law, there must always exist along with the most vigorous positive institutions and laws, a great mass of independent individual action and feeling, which cannot be without its influence on the national virtue and happiness. To these spontaneous elements belong science, art, and literature, which may indeed be encouraged by institutions and laws, or discouraged, but yet on the whole their origin and growth in any given country has been owing to individuals rather than to the nation, or more properly perhaps to causes external to both, to those causes which have given genius and taste to some races of mankind in remarkable measure, and have denied them to others ; causes which have first prepared the fuel ready for kindling,

and then have sent the spark to light it up into a blaze. No man can say why the great discoveries of science were made only at the time and in the country when and where they were made actually: why the compass was withheld from the navigation of the Roman Empire, but was already in existence when it was needed to aid the genius of Columbus: why printing was invented in time to preserve that portion of Greek literature which still survived in the fifteenth century, but was not known early enough to prevent the irreparable mischiefs of the Latin storming of Constantinople in the thirteenth: why the steam engine, triumphing over time and space, was denied to the stirring spirit of the sixteenth century, and reserved to display its wonderful works only to the nineteenth.

Other influences may possibly be named which have their effect on the national character and happiness; but I may be pardoned if in so vast a field something should be omitted unconsciously, and something necessarily passed over, not to encroach too largely on your time and patience. But enough has been said I think to shew that history contains no mean treasures: that as being the biography of a nation, it partakes of the richness and variety of those elements which make up a nation's life. Whatever there is of greatness in the final cause of all human thought and action, God's glory and man's perfection, that is the measure of the greatness of history. Whatever there is of variety and intense interest in human nature, in its elevation, whether

proud as by nature or sanctified as by God's grace; in its suffering, whether blessed or unblessed, a martyrdom or a judgment; in its strange reverses, in its varied adventures, in its yet more varied powers, its courage and its patience, its genius and its wisdom, its justice and its love, that also is the measure of the interest and variety of history. The treasures indeed are ample, but we may more reasonably fear whether we may have strength and skill to win them.

I have thus far spoken of history in the abstract; at least of history so far as it relates to civilized nations, with no reference to any one time or country more than to another. But, as I said before, I must not forget that my particular business is not history generally, but modern history; and without going farther into details than is suitable to the present occasion, it may yet be proper, as we have considered what history in general has to offer, so now to see also whether there is any peculiar attraction in modern history: and whether ancient and modern history in the popular sense of the words differ only in this, that the one relates to events which took place before a certain period, and the other to events which have happened since that period; or whether there is a real distinction between them, grounded upon an essential difference in their nature. If they differ only chronologically, it is manifest that the line which separates them is purely arbitrary: and we might equally well fix the limit of ancient history at the fall of the Babylonian monarchy, and embrace the whole fortunes of Greece and Rome within what

we choose to call modern; or, on the other hand, we might carry on ancient history to the close of the fifteenth century, and place the beginning of modern history at that memorable period which witnessed the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the discovery of America, and, only a few years later, the Reformation.

It seems, however, that there is a real difference between ancient and modern history, which justifies the limit usually assigned to them; the fall, namely, of the western empire; that is to say, the fall of the western empire separates the subsequent period from that which preceded it by a broader line, so far as we are concerned, than can be found at any other point either earlier or later. For the state of things now in existence, dates its origin from the fall of the western empire; so far we can trace up the fortunes of nations which are still flourishing; history so far is the biography of the living; beyond, it is but the biography of the dead. In our own island we see this most clearly: our history clearly begins with the coming over of the Saxons; the Britons and Romans had lived in our country, but they are not our fathers; we are connected with them as men indeed, but nationally speaking, the history of Cæsar's invasion has no more to do with us, than the natural history of the animals which then inhabited our forests. We, this great English nation, whose race and language are now overrunning the earth from one end of it to the other,—we were born when the white horse of the Saxons had established his do-

minion from the Tweed to the Tamar. So far we can trace our blood, our language, the name and actual divisions of our country, the beginnings of some of our institutions. So far our national identity extends, so far history is modern, for it treats of a life which was then, and is not yet extinguished.

And if we cross the channel, what is the case with our great neighbour nation of France? Roman Gaul had existed since the Christian æra; the origin of Keltic Gaul is older than history: but France and Frenchmen came into being when the Franks established themselves west of the Rhine. Not that before that period the fathers of the majority of the actual French people were living on the Elbe or the Saal; for the Franks were numerically few, and throughout the south of France the population is predominantly, and much more than predominantly, of Gallo-Roman origin. But Clovis and his Germans struck root so deeply, and their institutions wrought such changes, that the identity of France cannot be carried back beyond their invasion; the older elements no doubt have helped greatly to characterize the existing nation; but they cannot be said by themselves to be that nation.

The essential character then of modern history appears to be this; that it treats of national life still in existence: it commences with that period when all the great elements of the existing state of things had met together; so that subsequent changes, great as they have been, have only combined or disposed

these same elements differently; they have added to them no new one. By the great elements of nationality, I mean race, language, institutions, and religion; and it will be seen that throughout Europe all these four may be traced up, if not actually in every case to the fall of the western empire, yet to the dark period which followed that fall, while in no case are all the four to be found united before it. Otherwise, if we allow the two first of these elements without the third and fourth to constitute national identity, especially when combined with sameness of place, we must then say that the northern countries of Europe have no ancient history, inasmuch as they have been inhabited from the earliest times by the same race speaking what is radically the same language. But it is better not to admit national identity, till the two elements of institutions and religion, or at any rate one of them, be added to those of blood and language. At all events it cannot be doubted, that as soon as the four are united, the national personality becomes complete.

It cannot be doubted then that modern history so defined is especially interesting to us, inasmuch as it treats only of national existence not yet extinct: it contains, so to speak, the first acts of a great drama now actually in the process of being represented, and of which the catastrophe is still future. But besides this personal interest, is there nothing in modern history of more essential difference from ancient—of difference such as would remain, even if we could

conceive ourselves living in some third period of history, when existing nations had passed away like those which we now call ancient, and when our modern history would have become what the history of Greece and Rome is to us?

Such a difference does characterize what we now call modern history, and must continue to characterize it for ever. Modern history exhibits a fuller developement of the human race, a richer combination of its most remarkable elements. We ourselves are one of the most striking examples of this. We derive scarcely one drop of our blood from Roman fathers; we are in our race strangers to Greece, and strangers to Israel. But morally how much do we derive from all three: in this respect their life is in a manner continued in ours; their influences, to say the least, have not perished.

Here then we have, if I may so speak, the ancient world still existing, but with a new element added, the element of our English race. And that this element is an important one, cannot be doubted for an instant. Our English race is the German race; for though our Norman fathers had learnt to speak a stranger's language, yet in blood, as we know, they were the Saxons' brethren: both alike belong to the Teutonic or German stock. Now the importance of this stock is plain from this, that its intermixture with the Keltic and Roman races at the fall of the western empire has changed the whole face of Europe. It is doubly remarkable, because the other elements of modern history are derived from the ancient world.

If we consider the Roman empire in the fourth century of the Christian æra, we shall find in it Christianity, we shall find in it all the intellectual treasures of Greece, all the social and political wisdom of Rome. What was not there, was simply the German race, and the peculiar qualities which characterize it. This one addition was of such power, that it changed the character of the whole mass: the peculiar stamp of the middle ages is undoubtedly German; the change manifested in the last three centuries has been owing to the revival of the older elements with greater power, so that the German element has been less manifestly predominant. But that element still preserves its force, and is felt for good or for evil in almost every country of the civilized world.

We will pause for a moment to observe over how large a portion of the earth this influence is now extended. It affects more or less the whole west of Europe, from the head of the Gulf of Bothnia to the most southern promontory of Sicily, from the Oder and the Adriatic to the Hebrides and to Lisbon. It is true that the language spoken over a large portion of this space is not predominantly German; but even in France and Italy and Spain, the influence of the Franks, Burgundians, Visigoths, Ostrogoths, and Lombards, while it has coloured even the language, has in blood and institutions left its mark legibly and indelibly. Germany, the Low Countries, Switzerland for the most part, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and our own islands, are all in language,

in blood, and in institutions, German most decidedly. But all South America is peopled with Spaniards and Portuguese, all North America and all Australia with Englishmen. I say nothing of the prospects and influence of the German race in Africa and in India:—it is enough to say that half of Europe, and all America and Australia, are German more or less completely, in race, in language, or in institutions, or in all.

Modern history then differs from ancient history in this, that while it preserves the elements of ancient history undestroyed, it has added others to them; and these, as we have seen, elements of no common power. But the German race is not the only one which has been thus added; the Slavonic race is another new element, which has overrun the east of Europe, as the German has overrun the west. And when we consider that the Slavonic race wields the mighty empire of Russia, we may believe that its future influence on the condition of Europe and of the world may be far greater than that which it exercises now.

This leads us to a view of modern history, which cannot indeed be confidently relied on, but which still impresses the mind with an imagination, if not with a conviction, of its reality. I mean, that modern history appears to be not only *a* step in advance of ancient history, but *the* last step; it appears to bear marks of the fulness of time, as if there would be no future history beyond it. For the last eighteen hundred years, Greece has fed the

human intellect ; Rome, taught by Greece and improving upon her teacher, has been the source of law and government and social civilization ; and what neither Greece nor Rome could furnish, the perfection of moral and spiritual truth, has been given by Christianity. The changes which have been wrought have arisen out of the reception of these elements by new races ; races endowed with such force of character that what was old in itself, when exhibited in them, seemed to become something new. But races so gifted are and have been from the beginning of the world few in number : the mass of mankind have no such power ; they either receive the impression of foreign elements so completely that their own individual character is absorbed, and they take their whole being from without ; or being incapable of taking in higher elements, they dwindle away when brought into the presence of a more powerful life, and become at last extinct altogether. Now looking anxiously round the world for any new races which may receive the seed (so to speak) of our present history into a kindly yet a vigorous soil, and may reproduce it, the same and yet new, for a future period, we know not where such ^aare to be found. Some appear exhausted, others incapable, and yet the surface of the whole globe is known to us. The Roman colonies

^a What may be done hereafter by the Slavonic nations, is not prejudged by this statement ; because the Slavonic nations are elements of our actual history, although their powers may be as yet only partially developed.

along the banks of the Rhine and Danube looked out on the country beyond those rivers as we look up at the stars, and actually see with our eyes a world of which we know nothing. The Romans knew that there was a vast portion of earth which they did not know; how vast it might be, was a part of its mysteries. But to us all is explored: imagination can hope for no new Atlantic island to realize the vision of Plato's Critias: no new continent peopled by youthful races, the destined restorers of our worn-out generations. Everywhere the search has been made, and the report has been received; we have the full amount of earth's resources before us, and they seem inadequate to supply life for a third period of human history.

I am well aware that to state this as a matter of positive belief would be the extreme of presumption; there may be nations reserved hereafter for great purposes of God's providence, whose fitness for their appointed work will not betray itself, till the work and the time for doing it be come. There was a period perhaps when the ancestors of the Athenians were to be no otherwise distinguished from their barbarian neighbours than by some finer taste in the decorations of their arms, and something of a loftier spirit in the songs which told of the exploits of their warriors; and when Aristotle heard that Rome had been taken by the Gauls, he knew not that its total destruction would have been a greater loss to mankind than the recent overthrow of Veii. But without any presumptuous confidence, if there be any

signs, however uncertain, that we are living in the latest period of the world's history, that no other races remain behind to perform what we have neglected or to restore what we have ruined, then indeed the interest of modern history does become intense, and the importance of not wasting the time still left to us may well be called incalculable. When an army's last reserve has been brought into action, every single soldier knows that he must do his duty to the utmost; that if he cannot win the battle now, he must lose it. So if our existing nations are the last reserve of the world, its fate may be said to be in their hands—God's work on earth will be left undone if they do not do it.

But our future course must be hesitating or mistaken, if we do not know what course has brought us to the point where we are at present. Otherwise, the simple fact that after so many years of trial the world has made no greater progress than it has, must impress our minds injuriously; either making us despair of doing what our fathers have not done, or if we do not despair, then it may make us unreasonably presumptuous, as if we could do more than had been done by other generations, because we were wiser than they or better. But history forbids despair without authorizing vanity: it explains why more has not been done by our forefathers: it shews the difficulties which beset them, rendering success impossible; while it records the greatness of their efforts which we cannot hope to surpass. But without surpassing, perhaps without equalling, their efforts, we

may learn by their experience to avoid their difficulties: Napoleon crossed the Alps with scarcely the loss of a man, while Hannibal left behind him nearly half his army; yet Napoleon was not a greater man than Hannibal, nor was his enterprise conducted with greater ability. Two things we ought to learn from history; one, that we are not in ourselves superior to our fathers; another, that we are shamefully and monstrously inferior to them, if we do not advance beyond them.

And now if the view here taken of the greatness, first of all history, and then especially of modern history, be correct, it will at once shew in what way the Professorship which I have the honour to hold, may be made productive of some benefit to the University. It is certainly no affected humility, but the very simple truth, to acknowledge, that of many large and fruitful districts in the vast territory of modern history I possess only the most superficial knowledge, of some I am all but totally ignorant. I could but ill pretend to guide others where I should be at a loss myself: and though many might possess a knowledge far surpassing mine, yet the mere ordinary length of human life renders it impossible for any one to have that profound acquaintance with every part of modern history in detail, which might enable him to impart a full understanding of it to others. But yet it may be possible, and this indeed is my hope, to encourage others to study it, to point out how much is to be done, and to suggest some rules for doing it. And if, in addition to this, I could

myself exemplify these rules in working at some one particular portion of history, I should have accomplished all that I can venture to anticipate. Meanwhile we have in this place an immense help towards the study of modern history, in our familiar acquaintance with the history of the ancient world, or at any rate with the works of its greatest historians. The importance of this preparation is continually brought to my mind by observing the bad effects of the want of it in those who have not enjoyed our advantages: on the other hand, here, as in other matters, advantages neglected are but our shame, and if we here are ignorant of modern history, we are I think especially inexcusable.

I have detained you I fear too long, and yet have left much unsaid, and have compressed some part of what I have said into limits which I am afraid have scarcely allowed it to be stated intelligibly. This defect however it may be possible to remedy on future occasions, when much that has been now put summarily may be developed more fully. For other defects not equally within my power to remedy, I have only in all sincerity to request your indulgence. Deeply as I value the privilege of addressing you as one of the Professors of this University,—and there is no privilege which I more value, no public reward or honour which could be to me so welcome,—I feel no less keenly the responsibility which it involves, and the impossibility of discharging its duties in any manner proportioned to its importance, or to my own sense of what it requires.

A P P E N D I X.

I HAVE alluded in my Inaugural Lecture to authorities deserving of all respect which maintain the doctrine of Warburton, that “the object of political society is the preservation of body and goods.” I alluded particularly to the Archbishop of Dublin, and to the author of a Review of Mr. Gladstone’s book, “The State in its Relations with the Church,” in the 139th number of the Edinburgh Review. It is due to such opponents not to pass by their arguments unnoticed; it is due to them, and still more to myself, lest I should be suspected of leaving them unanswered because I could not answer them.

It appears to me that the Reviewer is led to maintain Warburton’s doctrine, chiefly in consequence of certain practical difficulties which seem to result from the doctrine opposed to it. He does not wish to restrict the state from regarding religious and moral ends; but fearing that its regard for them will lead to practical mischief, he will only allow it to consider them in the second place, so far, that is, as they do not interfere with its primary object, the

protection of persons and property. The Warburtonian theory appears not to be the natural conclusion of enquiries into the object of governments, but an ingenious device to enable us to escape from some difficulties which we know not how to deal with. If the opposite theory can be freed from these difficulties, it may be believed that the Reviewer would gladly sacrifice the theory of Warburton.

I regard the theory of government, maintained in my Lecture, to be a theory which we can in practice only partially realize. This I quite allow, at least with regard either to the present, or to any future, which we can as yet venture to anticipate. It is a theory which, nowhere perfectly realized, is realized imperfectly in very different degrees in different times and countries. It must not be forced upon a state of things not ripe for it, and therefore its most zealous advocates must often be content to tolerate violations of it more or less flagrant. All this is true; but yet I believe it to be the true theory of government, and that by acknowledging it to be so, and keeping it therefore always in sight, we may be able at last to approach indefinitely near to it.

The moral character of government seems to follow necessarily from its sovereign power; this is the simple ground of what I will venture to call the moral theory of its objects. For as in each individual man there is a higher object than the preservation of his body and goods, so if he be subjected in the last

resort to a power incapable of appreciating this higher object, his social or political relations, instead of being the perfection of his being, must be its corruption; the voice of law can only agree accidentally with that of his conscience, and yet on this voice of law his life and death are to depend; for its sovereignty over him must be, by the nature of the case, absolute.

The Reviewer's distinction between primary and secondary ends, and his estimate of physical ends as primary and moral as secondary, may apply perfectly well to any society, except that which is sovereign over all human life; because so long as this sovereign society preserves the due order of objects, postponing the physical to the moral, other societies may safely in their subordinate sphere reverse it, the check upon them being always at hand; the confession theoretically, and the care practically, that the physical end shall take precedence of the moral only at certain times and in certain instances, but that the rule of life is the other way.

And again, that singleness of object which the Reviewer considers so great an excellence, "every contrivance of human wisdom being likely to answer its end best when it is constructed with a single view to that end," belongs it is true to subordinate societies or contrivances, but ceases to exist as we ascend from the subordinate to the supreme. This is the exact difference between teaching and education; a teacher, whether it be of Latin and Greek, or of French and German, or of geography and history,

or of drawing, or of gymnastics, has nothing to think of beyond his own immediate subject; it is not his concern if his pupil's tastes and abilities are more adapted to other studies, if that particular knowledge which he is communicating is claiming a portion of time more than in accordance with its value. He has one single object, to teach his own science effectually. But he who educates must take a higher view, and pursue an end accordingly far more complicated. He must adjust the respective claims of bodily and mental exercise, of different kinds of intellectual labour;—he must consider every part of his pupil's nature, physical, intellectual and moral; regarding the cultivation of the last, however, as paramount to that of either of the others. Now according to the Reviewer's theory, the state is like the subordinate teacher; according to mine it is like the educator, and for this very reason, because its part cannot be subordinate; if you make the state no more than a particular teacher, we must look for the educator elsewhere; for the sovereign authority over us must be like the educator, it must regulate our particular lessons, and determine that we shall study most what is of most value.

But I believe that the moral theory of the objects of a state, expressed as I have here expressed it, would in itself never have been disputed. It is considered to be objectionable and leading to great practical mischief, when stated somewhat differently; when it is said, that the great object of a state is to promote and propagate religious truth; a statement

which yet appears to be identical, or nearly so, with the moral theory; so that if it be false, the moral theory is thought to be overturned with it. But it has always appeared to me that here precisely we find the great confusions of the whole question; and that the substitution of the term "religious truth" in the place of "man's highest perfection" has given birth to the great difficulties of the case. For by "religious truth" we immediately understand certain dogmatical propositions on matters more or less connected with religion; these we connect with a certain creed and a certain sect or church, and then the theory comes to be that the great object of a state is to uphold some one particular church, conceived to be the true one, and to discountenance all who are not members of it; a form in which I do not wonder that the moral theory should be regarded as most objectionable.

All societies of men, whether we call them states or churches, should make their bond to consist in a common object and a common practice, rather than in a common belief; in other words, their end should be good rather than truth. We may consent to act together, but we cannot consent to believe together; many motives may persuade us to the one; we may like the object, or we may like our company, or we may think it safest to join them, or most convenient, and any one of these motives is quite sufficient to induce an unity of action, action being a thing in our own power. But no motives can persuade us to believe together; we may wish a statement to be true,

we may admire those who believe it, we may find it very inconvenient not to believe it; all this helps us nothing; unless our own mind is freely convinced that the statement or doctrine be true, we cannot by possibility believe it. That union in action will in the end lead very often to union of belief is most true; but we cannot ensure its doing so; and the social bond cannot directly require for its perfectness more than union of action. It cannot properly require more than it is in the power of men to give; and men can submit their actions to a common law at their own choice, but their internal convictions they cannot.

Such an union of action appears historically to have been the original bond of the Christian church. Whoever was willing to receive Christ as his master, to join His people, and to walk according to their rules, he was admitted to the Christian society. We know that in the earliest church there existed the strangest varieties of belief, some Christians not even believing that there would be a resurrection of the dead. Of course it was not intended that such varieties should be perpetual; a closer union of belief was gradually effected: but the point to observe is that the union of belief grew out of the union of action: it was the result of belonging to the society rather than a previous condition required for belonging to it. And it is true farther, that all union of action implies in one sense an union of belief; that is, they who agree to do a certain thing must believe that in some way or other, either as a positive good

or as the lesser evil, it is desirable for them to do it. But belief in the desirableness of an act differs greatly from belief in the truth of a proposition; even fear may give unity of action, and such unity of belief as is implied by it: a soldier is threatened with death if he does not fight, and so believing that to fight is now desirable for him, as a less evil than certain death, he stands his ground and fights accordingly. But fear, though it may make us wish with all our hearts that we could believe the truth of a proposition, yet cannot enable or compel us to believe it.

Now the state aiming at the highest perfection of its members, can require them to conform their conduct to a certain law; and it may exclude from its benefits those who dispute this law's authority. Nor does it in the least matter whether the law so enforced be of the state's own invention, or be borrowed from some other nation, as many countries have adopted the Roman law; or be received not from any human author at all, but from God. A state may as justly declare the New Testament to be its law, as it may choose the institutes and code of Justinian. In this manner the law of Christ's church may be made its law; and all the institutions which this law enjoins, whether in ritual or discipline, may be adopted as national institutions just as legitimately as any institutions of mere human origin.

The question then which is sometimes asked so indignantly,—Is the government to impose its religion upon the people? may be answered by asking again,

Is the government to impose its own laws upon the people? We speak of the government as distinct from the people, without thereby implying that it is in opposition to the people. In a corrupt state the government and people are wholly at variance; in a perfect state they would be wholly one; in ordinary states they are one more or less imperfectly. We need not be afraid to say, that in a perfect state the law of the government would be the law of the people, the law of their choice, the expression of their mind. In less perfect states the law of the government is more or less the law of the people, suiting them in the main if not entirely. If it be wholly or in great part unwelcome to them, something in that state is greatly wrong; and although I believe that there are cases where a dictatorship is a good, and where good laws may rightfully be imposed on a barbarian and unwilling people; yet, as the rule, there can be no doubt that such a state of things is tyranny. When I speak therefore of the government, I am speaking of it as expressing the mind and will of the nation; and though a government may not impose its own law, whether human or divine, upon an adverse people; yet a nation, acting through its government, may certainly choose for itself such a law as it deems most for its good.

And therefore when it has been said that "these islands do not belong to the king and parliament in the same manner as the house or land of any individual belongs to the owner," and that therefore a government may not settle the religious law of a

country as the master of a family may settle the religious practices of his household; this is true only if we consider the king and parliament as not speaking the voice of the nation, but their own opposed to that of the nation. For the right of a nation over its own territory must be at least as absolute as that of any individual over his own house and land; and it surely is not an absurdity to suppose that the voice of government can ever be the voice of the nation: although they unhappily too often differ, yet surely they may conceivably, and very often do in practice, completely agree.

The only question then is, how far the nation or society may impose its law upon a number of dissentient individuals; what we have to do with, are the rights of the body in relation to those of the several members; a grave question certainly,—I know of none more difficult; but which exists in all its force, even if we abandon the moral theory of the state altogether. For if we acknowledge the idea of a church, the difficulty meets us no less; the names of state and church make no difference in the matter; we have still a body imposing its laws upon individuals; if the state may not interfere with an individual's religion, how can the church do it? for the difficulty is that the individual cannot and must not be wholly merged in the society; he cannot yield all his convictions of truth and right to the convictions of other men: he may sometimes be called upon to dissent from, and to disobey, chief priests and doctors, bishops and presbyters, no less

than the secular authorities, as they are called, of emperors and kings, proconsuls and parliaments. Long before Constantine interfered with his imperial power in the concerns of the church, the question existed : conscience might be lorded over, tastes and feelings rudely shocked, belief claimed for that which to the mind of the individual appeared certain error ; the majority might tyrannize over the minority ; the society might interfere with the most sacred rights of the individual.

Nor is it the state alone which, by imposing articles of faith, is guilty of tempting men to hypocrisy ; a charge which has been very strongly urged against the system of making full citizenship depend on the profession of Christianity : nor is it the state alone which does more than merely instruct and persuade, and which employs “ secular coercion ” in the cause of the Gospel ; all which things have been said to be “ at variance with the true spirit of the Gospel,” and to “ imply a sinful distrust, want of faith in Christ’s wisdom and goodness and power.” The church has required obedience and punished disobedience ; I will not appeal to St. Paul’s expression of “ delivering a man to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that his spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord,” because what is there meant is uncertain, and the power claimed may be extraordinary ; but I maintain that the sentence of excommunication, which has been held always to belong to the church, is to all intents and purposes a secular coercion ; it goes much beyond instruction and persuasion, it is a

punishment as completely as ever was the ancient *ἀτιμία*, or deprivation of political rights: it inflicts and is meant to inflict great inconvenience and great suffering, acting most keenly upon the noblest minds, but yet touching the meanest as effectually, to say the least, as the ancient civil penalty of banishment.

Now accidentally excommunication may be a small penalty, but in its own nature it is most grievous. It cuts a man off from the kindness and society of his nearest and dearest friends; it divides him from those with whom alone he can in the nature of things feel strong sympathy; for where can a Christian find such but among Christ's people, and from these excommunication cuts him off. And conceive the case of a country, geographically remote from other countries, and inhabited only by Christians; what resource would, under such circumstances, be left to an excommunicated person? and would not the temptation be extreme to him to profess his belief in whatever the church taught, to yield obedience to whatever it required, in order to be saved from a life of loneliness and of infamy? Yet the power of excommunicating for heretical opinions is one which the church is supposed to hold lawfully, whilst the power of disfranchising for such opinions is called persecution, and a making Christ's kingdom a kingdom of the world.

It is of some consequence to disentangle this confusion, because what I have called the moral theory of a state, is really open to no objections but such as apply with equal force to the theory of a church, and

especially to the theory of a national, and still more of an universal church. Wherever there is centralization, there is danger of the parts of the body being too much crippled in their individual action; and yet centralization is essential to their healthy activity no less than to the perfection of the body. But if men run away with the mistaken notion that liberty of conscience is threatened only by a state religion, and not at all by a church religion, the danger is that they will abandon religion altogether to what they call the church, that is, to the power of a society far worse governed than most states, and likely to lay far heavier burdens on individual conscience, because the spirit dominant in it is narrower and more intolerant.

No doubt all societies, whether they are called states or churches, are bound to avoid tempting the consciences of individuals by overstraining the terms of citizenship or communion. And it is desirable, as I said before, to require a profession of obedience rather than of belief, because obedience can and will often be readily rendered where belief would be withheld. But as states require declarations of allegiance to the sovereign, so they may require declarations of submission to the authority of a particular law. If a man believes himself bound to refuse obedience to the law of Christianity, or will not pledge himself to regard it as paramount in authority to any human legislation, he cannot properly be a member of a society which conceives itself bound to regulate all its proceedings by this law, and cannot

allow any of its provisions to be regarded as revocable or alterable. But no human power can presume to enquire into the degree of a man's positive belief: the heretic was not properly he who did not believe what the church taught, but he who wilfully withdrew himself from its society, refusing to conform to its system, and setting up another system of his own.

I know that it will be objected to this, that it is no other than the system of the old philosophers, who upheld paganism as expedient, while they laughed at it in their hearts as false. But he who makes such an objection must surely forget the essential difference between paganism and Christianity. Paganism, in the days of the philosophers, scarcely pretended to rest on a foundation of historical truth; no thinking man believed in it, except as allegorically true. But Christianity commends itself to the minds of a vast majority of thinking men, as being true in fact no less than in doctrine; they believe in it as literally true no less than spiritually. When I speak then of a state requiring obedience to the Christian law, it means that the state, being the perfect church, should do the church's work; that is, that it should provide for the Christian education of the young, and the Christian instruction of the old; that it should, by public worship and by a Christian discipline, endeavour, as much as may be, to realize Christianity to all its people. Under such a system, the teachers would speak because they believed, for Christian teachers as a general rule do so, and their

hearers would, in like manner, learn to believe also. Farther, the evidence of the Christian religion, in itself so unanswerable, would be confirmed by the manifest witness of the Christian church, when possessing a real living constitution, and purified by an efficient discipline; so that the temptations to unbelief would be continually lessened, and unbelief, in all human probability, would become continually of more rare occurrence. And possibly the time might come when a rejection of Christianity would be so clearly a moral offence, that profane writings would be as great a shock to all men's notions of right and wrong as obscene writings are now, and the one might be punished with no greater injury to liberty of conscience than the other.

But this general hearty belief in Christianity is to be regarded by the Christian society, whether it be called church or state, not as its starting point, but as its highest perfection. To begin with a strict creed and no efficient Christian institutions, is the sure way to hypocrisy and unbelief; to begin with the most general confession of faith, imposed, that is, as a test of membership, but with vigorous Christian institutions, is the way most likely to lead, not only to a real and general belief, but also to a lively perception of the highest points of Christian faith. In other words, intellectual objections to Christianity should be tolerated, where they are combined with moral obedience; tolerated, because in this way they are most surely removed; whereas a corrupt or disorganized church with a minute creed, encourages

intellectual objections; and if it proceeds to put them down by force, it does often violate the right of conscience, punishing an unbelief which its own evil has provoked, and, so far as human judgment can see, has in great measure justified.

I have endeavoured to shew that the favourite objections against the state's concerning itself with religion, apply no less to the theory of a church, the difficulty being to prevent the society from controlling the individual mind too completely, and from encouraging unbelief and hypocrisy by requiring prematurely a declaration of belief from its members, rather than a promise of obedience. It is hardly necessary to observe, that the moral theory of a state is not open to the objection commonly brought against our actual constitution, namely, that parliament is not a fit body to legislate on matters of religion; for the council of a really Christian state would consist of Christians at once good and sensible, quite as much as the council of a really Christian church; and if we take a nominally Christian state or a nominally Christian church, their councils will be equally unfit to legislate; to say nothing of the obvious answer, that the details of all great legislative measures, whether ecclesiastical or legal or military, may be safely left to professional knowledge and experience, so long as there remains a higher power, not professional, to give to them the sanction of law.

Finally, the moral theory of a state, which I believe to be the foundation of political truth,

agrees and matches, so to speak, with the only true theory of a church. If the state under any form, and in its highest state of perfection, can only primarily take cognizance of physical ends; then its rulers can certainly never be the rulers of the church, and the church must be governed by rulers of its own. Now the notion of a priesthood, or of a divinely appointed succession of church governors, does not indeed necessarily follow from this; but at any rate it agrees marvellously with it: while, on the other hand, if there be in the church no priesthood, and no divinely ordered succession of governors, then it is ready to become identified with the Christian state, and to adopt its forms of government; and if the Christian state be a contradiction in terms, because the state must always prefer physical objects to moral, then the church has no resource but to imitate its forms as well as it can, although in a subordinate society they must lose their own proper efficacy.

Now believing with the Archbishop of Dublin, that there is in the Christian church neither priesthood nor divine succession of governors, and believing with Mr. Gladstone that the state's highest objects are moral and not physical, I cannot but wonder that these two truths are in each of their systems divorced from their proper mates. The church freed from the notions of priesthood and apostolical succession, is divested of all unchristian and tyrannical power; but craves by reason of its subordinate condition the power of sovereign govern-

ment, that power which the forms of a free state can alone supply healthfully. And the state having sovereign power, and also, as Mr. Gladstone allows, having a moral end paramount to all others, is at once fit to do the work of the church perfectly, so soon as it becomes Christian; nor can it abandon its responsibility, and surrender its conscience up into the hands of a priesthood, who have no knowledge superior to its own, and who cannot exercise its sovereignty. The Christian king, or council, or assembly, excludes the interference of the priesthood; the church without a priesthood, craves its Christian assembly, or council, or king.

Believing that the church has no divinely-appointed succession of governors or form of government, and that its actual governments, considering it as distinct from the state, have been greatly inferior to the governments of well-ordered kingdoms and commonwealths; believing that the end and object of a Christian kingdom or commonwealth is precisely the same with that of a Christian church, and that the separation of the two has led to the grievous corruption of both, making the state worldly and profane, and the church formal, superstitious, and idolatrous; believing farther, that the state cannot be perfect till it possess the wisdom of the church, nor the church be perfect till it possess the power of the state; that the one has as it were the soul, and the other the organized body, each of which requires to be united with the other; I would unite one half of the Archbishop of Dublin's theory with one half

of Mr. Gladstone's; agreeing cordially with Mr. Gladstone in the moral theory of the state, and agreeing as cordially with the Archbishop in what I will venture to call the Christian theory of the church, and deducing from the two the conclusion that the perfect state and the perfect church are identical.

In what has been said above, I have rather attempted to answer objections and to remove misconceptions with regard to the moral theory of a state, than to offer any positive proof of that theory. It seems to me to be one of those truths which in itself command general assent, and that the opposition to it is mostly an after-thought, originating solely in a sense of the difficulties which it is supposed practically to involve. And therefore to remove those difficulties, leaves the theory with its own internal persuasiveness unimpaired, and likely as such to be generally received. Something, however, in support of the theory itself has been offered in the Inaugural Lecture; and it may farther be proper to notice here a little more in detail two elaborate attacks upon it, which have been made in the Archbishop of Dublin's "Additional Remarks on the Jews' Relief Bill," published in the volume entitled, "Charges and other Tracts," printed in 1836: and in his work on the "Kingdom of Christ," printed in 1841.

In these works it is asserted and implied continually, that religion is not within the province of the civil magistrate; and that secular or legal

coercion may not be employed in the cause of the Gospel. Now the first of these statements is surely not a thing to be taken for granted ; and whether it be right or wrong, it is certain that such a doctrine is condemned by the almost unanimous consent of all writers on government, whether heathen or Christian, down to the eighteenth century ; and in later times, to name no others, by Burke^a and Coleridge. Grotius, no mean authority surely on points of law and government, has an express work, “ *De imperio summarum Potestatum circa sacra ;* ” in which he uses nearly the same argument that I have adopted in my Inaugural Lecture : namely, that the sovereignty of the state makes it necessarily embrace all points of human life and conduct. And he says, “ *Si quis dixerit actiones esse diversas, alias puta judiciales, alias militares, alias ecclesiasticas, ac proinde hujus diversitatis respectu posse ipsum summum imperium in plures dividi, sequitur*

^a “ An alliance between church and state in a Christian commonwealth, is, in my opinion, an idle and a fanciful speculation. An alliance is between two things that are in their nature distinct and independent, such as between two sovereign states. But in a Christian commonwealth, the church and the state are one and the same thing, being different integral parts of the same whole. * * * * Religion is so far, in my opinion, from being out of the province or duty of a Christian magistrate, that it is, and it ought to be, not only his care, but the principal thing in his care ; because it is one of the great bonds of human society, and its object the supreme good, the ultimate end and object of man himself.” Speech on the Unitarian Petition, 1792. Burke’s Works, Vol. X. p. 43. Ed. 1818.

ex ejus sententia, ut eodem tempore idem homo ab hoc ire jussus ad forum, ab illo ad castra, ab illo rursus in templum, his omnibus parere teneatur, quod est impossibile.” Grotius, *Opera Theol.* tom. iv. (iii.) p. 204. ed. Londin. 1679. Nay, it is allowed by those who object to the moral theory of a state, that Christian legislators did well in forcibly suppressing gladiatorial shows and impure rites, “as being immoral and pernicious actions;” but if the legislator has any thing to do with morality, the whole question is conceded; for morality is surely not another name for expediency, or what is advantageous for body and goods; yet if it be not, and a legislator may prohibit any practice because it is wicked, then he regards moral ends, and his care is directed towards man’s highest happiness, and to the putting down his greatest misery, moral evil. Nor in fact does it appear how, on other than purely moral considerations, a state is justified in making certain abominations penal; such acts involving in them no violence or fraud upon persons or property, which, according to Warburton, are the only objects of a state’s care.

The words “secular” and “temporal” appear to me to be used by the adversaries of the moral theory of a state with some confusion. Every thing done on earth is secular and temporal; and in this sense no society, whether it be called church or state, can have for its direct objects any other than such as are secular and temporal. The object of the church is not to raise men to heaven, but to make them fit

for heaven; but this is a work done in time and in the world, and completed there; nor does it differ from what it would be if there were no future life at all; our duties to God and man would be just the same whether we were to exist for seventy years or for ever, although our hope and encouragement would be infinitely different. The words “temporal” and “secular” have therefore no place in this question, unless we believe that the God of this world is really and truly not the God of the next; and that “temporal” things therefore are subject to a different government from things eternal. And so with the term “secular coercion:” it is manifest that no coercion can be applied to any man in this life without affecting his present well-being or enjoyment: excommunication is a “secular coercion” as much as imprisonment; it inflicts a present harm, it makes a man’s life less happy than it would be otherwise. It is, in fact, one of the severest of earthly punishments; for it is very well to talk of it as the natural act of a society against those who will not comply with its rules, and that it involves no injury, because a man has only to leave a society if he does not like it. But that society may be one to which it is the pride and pleasure of his life to belong; and if the majority form rules which he finds very irksome, and then expel him for not complying with them, he sustains, I will not say an injury, but a hurt and loss; he is put out of a society which he earnestly wished to belong to, and which comprehends, it may be, every respectable

person in his neighbourhood. He has a strong temptation to comply even against his conscience, rather than incur such a penalty; and when the society is the church of God, to live out of which would be to many minds intolerable, is it true that exclusion from that society is no temporal punishment or coercion?

But the argument against which I am contending relies mainly on our Lord's declaration to Pilate that "His kingdom was not of this world;" from which it is concluded that Christians can never be justified in making the profession of obedience to Christ a condition of citizenship, for that is to make Christ's kingdom a kingdom of the world. I have been in the habit of understanding our Lord to mean that His spiritual dominion did not of itself confer any earthly authority; that, therefore, His servants did not fight for him against the Roman soldiers, as the servants of an earthly king would be bound to defend their master against the servants of a foreign power. And so neither does the spiritual superiority of Christians either exempt them from obedience to the law of ordinary government, or authorize them to impose their own law on other men by virtue of that superiority. In other words, their religion gives them no political rights whatever which they would not have had without it.

But this meaning is not considered sufficient. Our Lord meant to disclaim political power for His people, not only in their actual circumstances, but in all other conceivable circumstances: not only as

claimed by virtue of their religious superiority, but as claimed according to the simplest and most acknowledged principles of political right. If in days to come, emperor, senate, and people, shall have become Christians by the mere force of the truth and holiness of Christianity, yet they must not think that they may exercise their executive and legislative powers to the hurt of any law or institution now existing in the Roman heathen world. Never may they dare to interfere with the Roman's peculiar pride, the absolute dominion of the father over his sons; nor with the state of slavery; nor with the solemn gladiatorial sacrifice, so grateful to the shades of the departed; nor with those festive rites of Flora, in which the people expressed their homage to the vivifying and prolific powers of nature. To stop one of these will be to make Christ's kingdom a kingdom of the world, which Christ has forbidden. True it is that to us these institutions appear immoral or unjust, because Christianity has taught us so to regard them; but to a Roman they were privileges, or powers, or pleasures, which he could ill bear to abandon. And most strange is the statement that "every tribe having been accustomed to establish, wherever they were able, a monopoly of political rights for themselves, keeping all other inhabitants of the same territory in a state of tributary subjection, this was probably the very thing apprehended by those who persecuted the early Christians as disaffected persons." In the first place, the notion of "one tribe establishing a monopoly of poli-

tical rights," belonged to a state of things which had long since perished, and was the last thing which any man would apprehend in the Roman world in the days of Tiberius, when all distinctions of condition between the various races subject to the empire had either been done away long since by Alexander's conquests, or were daily being destroyed by the gift of the Roman franchise more and more widely. What the Romans dreaded was simply a revolt of Judæa; they heard that there was a king of the Jews, and they naturally thought that he would attempt to recover the ancient kingdom of his nation; and to this it was a clear and satisfactory answer, that the kingdom spoken of was not an earthly kingdom, that no one claimed as David's heir to expel Cæsar as a foreign usurper. That the heathen Romans persecuted the Christians from a fear of losing their civil rights should Christians become the predominant party in the empire, is not only a statement without evidence, but against it. We know from the Christian apologists what were the grounds of the persecution; we know it farther from the well known letters of Pliny and Trajan. The Christians were punished for their resolute non-conformity to the laws and customs of Rome, and as men who, by their principles and lives, seemed to condemn the common principles and practice of mankind. They were punished not as men who might change the laws of Rome hereafter, but as men who disobeyed them now.

I am content with that interpretation of our Lord's

words which I believe has been generally given to them ; that He did not mean to call Himself king of the Jews in the common sense of the term, so as to imply any opposition to the government of the Romans. And as a general deduction from His words, I accept a very important truth which fanaticism has often neglected—that moral and spiritual superiority does not interfere with the ordinary laws, of political right ; that the children of God are not by virtue of that relation to claim any dominion upon earth. Being perfectly convinced that our Lord has not forbidden His people to establish His kingdom, when they can do so without the breach of any rule of common justice, I should hail as the perfect consummation of earthly things, the fulfilment of the word, that the kingdoms of the world should become the kingdoms of God and of Christ. And that kingdoms of the world not only may, but are bound to provide for the highest welfare of their people according to their knowledge, is a truth in which philosophers and statesmen, all theory and all practice, have agreed with wonderful unanimity down to the time of the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century, however, and since, the old truth has not wanted illustrious advocates. I have already named Burke and Coleridge in our own country, nor am I aware that the opposite notion has ever received any countenance from any one of the great men of Germany. Up to this moment the weight of authority is beyond all comparison against it ; and it is for its advocates to establish it, if they can, by some clear

proofs. At present there is no valid objection raised against the moral theory of a state's objects; difficulties only are suggested as to points of practical detail, some of them arising from the mixture of extraneous and indefensible doctrines with the simple theory itself, and others applicable indeed to that theory, but no less applicable to any theory which can be given of a Christian church, and to be avoided only by a system of complete individual independence, in matters relating to morals and to religion.

LECTURE I.

It will not, I trust, be deemed impertinent or affected, if at the very outset of these Lectures I venture again to request the indulgence of my hearers for the many deficiencies which will undoubtedly be found in them. I could not enter on the duties of my office with tolerable cheerfulness, if I might not confess how imperfectly I can hope to fulfil them. And this is the more necessary, because I hope that our standard of excellence in history will be continually rising; we shall be convinced, I trust, more and more, of the vast amount of knowledge which the historical student should aim at, and of the rare union of high qualifications required in a perfect historian. Now just in proportion to your sense of this, must be unavoidably your sense of the defects of these Lectures; because I must often dwell on the value of a knowledge which I do not possess; and must thus lay open my own ignorance by the very course which I believe to be most beneficial to my hearers.

I would gladly consent, however, even to call your attention to my want of knowledge, because it is, I think, of such great importance to all of us to have a lively consciousness of the exact limits of our knowledge and our ignorance. A keen sense of either implies, indeed, an equally keen sense of the other. A bad geographer looks upon the map of a known and of an unknown country with pretty nearly the same eyes. The random line which expresses the form of a coast not yet explored; the streams suddenly stopping in their course, or as suddenly beginning to be delineated, because their outlet or their sources are unknown; these convey to the eye of an untaught person no sense of deficiency, because the most complete survey of the most thoroughly explored country gives him no sense of full information. But he who knows how to value a good map, is painfully aware of the defects of a bad one; and he who feels these defects, would also value the opposite excellencies. And thus in all things, as our knowledge and ignorance are curiously intermixed with one another, so it is most important to keep the limits of each distinctly traced, that we may be able confidently to make use of the one, while we endeavour to remove or lessen the other.

One other remark of a different nature I would wish to make also, before I enter upon my lectures. Considering that the great questions on which men most widely differ from each other, belong almost all to modern history, it seems scarcely possible to avoid expressing opinions which some of my hearers will

think erroneous. Even if not expressed they would probably be indicated, and I do not know how this is to be avoided. Yet I shall be greatly disappointed if at the close of these lectures, our feeling of agreement with one another is not much stronger than our feeling of difference. You will not judge me so hardly as to suppose that I am expressing a hope of proselytizing any one: my meaning is very different. But I suppose that all calm enquiry conducted amongst those who have their main principles of judgment in common, leads, if not to an approximation of views, yet at least to an increase of sympathy. And the truths of historical science, which I certainly believe to be very real and very important, are not exactly the same thing with the opinions of any actual party.

I will now detain you no longer with any prefatory observations, but will proceed directly to our subject. I will suppose then, if you please, the case of a member of this university who has just taken his degree, and finding himself at leisure to enter now more fully into other than classical or mathematical studies, proposes to apply himself to modern history. We will suppose, moreover, that his actual knowledge of the subject goes no farther than what he has collected from any of the common popular compendiums. And now our question is, in what manner he should be recommended to proceed.

We must allow that the case is one of considerable perplexity. Hitherto in ancient profane history, his attention has been confined almost ex-

clusively to two countries: and to a few great writers whose superior claims to attention are indisputable. Nay, if he goes farther, and endeavours to illustrate the regular historians from the other and miscellaneous literature of the period, yet his work in most cases is to be accomplished without any impossible exertion; for many periods indeed of ancient history, and these not the least interesting, all our existing materials are so scanty that it takes but little time to acquaint ourselves with them all, and their information is not of a bulk to oppress any but the very feeblest memory.

How overwhelming is the contrast when the student turns to modern history! Instead of two countries claiming his attention, he finds several systems of countries, if I may so speak, any one of which offers a wide field of enquiry. First of all, there is the history of Europe; then quite distinct from this there is oriental history; and thirdly, there is the history of European colonies. But when we turn from the subjects of enquiry to the sources of information, the difference is greater still. Consider the long rows of folio volumes which present themselves to our notice in the Bodleian, or in our college libraries; and think how many of these relate to modern history. There is the Benedictine collection of the early French historians, and Muratori's great collection of the Italian historians of the middle ages: and these, vast as they are, relate only to two countries, and to particular periods. What shall we say of the great collections of works directly subsidiary

to history, such as Rymer's *Fœdera*, and the various collections of treaties; of bodies of laws, the statutes at large for example for England only: of such works as the publications of the Record Commission, or as the Journals of the Houses of Parliament. Turning then to lighter works, which contain some of the most precious materials for history, we find the countless volumes of the French memoirs, magazines, newspapers, (it is enough to remind you of the set of the *Moniteurs* in the Bodleian;) correspondence of eminent men printed or in MS., (the library at Besançon contains sixty volumes of the Letters of Granvella, Charles the Fifth's great minister,) and lastly, the swarm of miscellaneous pamphlets, which in these later days as we know are in numbers numberless, but which in the seventeenth and even in the sixteenth centuries were more numerous than we sometimes are aware of. There is a collection of these in Corpus library for example, of which I retain a very grateful recollection for many hours of amusement which they used to afford me. I might go on and extend my catalogue till it far exceeded the length of the Homeric catalogue of the ships: but I have mentioned quite enough for my purpose. We may well conceive that amid this boundless wilderness of historical materials, the student may be oppressed with a sense of the hopelessness of all his efforts; which way shall he choose among so many? what progress can he hope to make in a space so boundless?

It is quite manifest that a choice must be made

immediately. The English student, unless determined by particular circumstances, will have no difficulty in seeing that European history should be preferred to oriental or to colonial; and again in European history itself, that that of our own country, or of France, or of Germany, or of Italy, has a peculiar claim on his notice. Next, when he has fixed upon the country, he has to determine the period which he will study, whether he will apply himself to any one of the three last centuries, or to the middle ages; and if to these last, whether to their earlier period or to their close. And here again, particular circumstances or the taste of the student will of course influence his decision. It matters very little, I think, on which his choice may happen to fall.

We will suppose then the choice to be made of some one period, it should not be a very long one, whether bounded by merely arbitrary limits, as any one particular century, or by such as constitute a natural beginning and end, as for example the period in German history between the Reformation and the peace of Westphalia. If the period fixed on be very short, it may be made to include the history of two or three countries; but it would be best perhaps to select for our principal subject one country only. And now with our work limited sufficiently both as to time and as to space, it will assume a more compassable shape: and we shall be inclined to set about it vigorously.

In the first place then we should take, I think, some one history as nearly contemporary as may be,

and written, to speak generally, by a native historian. For instance, suppose that our subject be France in the middle of the fifteenth century, we should begin by reading the memoirs of Philip de Comines. The reason of this rule is evident; that it is important to look at an age or country in its own point of view; which of course is best to be obtained from a native and contemporary writer. Such a history is in fact a double lesson: it gives us the actions and the mind of the actors at the same time, telling us not only what was done, but with what motives and in what spirit it was done. Again the language of a native contemporary historian is the language of those of whom he is writing; in reading him we are in some sort hearing them, and an impression of the style and peculiarities of any man's language is an important help towards realizing our notion of him altogether. I know not whether others have been struck with this equally; but for myself I have seemed to gain a far more lively impression of what James the First was, ever since I read those humorous scenes in the *Fortunes of Nigel* which remind one so forcibly that he spoke a broad Scotch dialect.

If the period which we have chosen be one marked by important foreign wars, it will be desirable also to read another contemporary history, written by a native of the other belligerent power. The same war is regarded so differently by the two parties engaged in it, that it is of importance to see it in more than one point of view, not merely for

the correction of military details, but to make our general impressions and our sympathies with either side more impartial. And in contemporary histories of wars we have the passions and prejudices of both parties generally expressed with all their freshness, even in cases where both nations, when passion has gone to sleep, agree in passing the same judgment. Joan of Arc is now a heroine to Englishmen no less than to Frenchmen : but in the fifteenth century she was looked upon by Englishmen as a witch, while the French regarded her as a messenger sent from heaven.

And now the one or two general contemporary histories of our period having put us in possession not only of the outline and of some of the details of events, but also of the prevailing tone of opinion and feeling, we next proceed to a process which is indeed not a little laborious, and in many places would be impracticable, from the difficulty of obtaining the books required. But I am convinced that it is essential to be gone through once, if we wish to learn the true method of historical investigation : and if done once, for one period, the benefit of it will be felt in all our future reading, because we shall always know how to explore below the surface, whenever we wish to do so, and we shall be able to estimate rightly those popular histories which after all must be our ordinary sources of information, except where we find it needful to carry on our researches more deeply. And I am addressing those who having the benefit of the libraries of

this place, can really carry into effect, if they will, such a course of study as I am going to recommend. I cannot indeed too earnestly advise every one who is resident in the university to seize this golden time for his own reading, whilst he has on the one hand the riches of our libraries at his command, and before the pressure of actual life has come upon him, when the acquisition of knowledge is mostly out of the question, and we must be content to live upon what we have already gained. Many and many a time since I ceased to be resident in Oxford, has the sense of your advantages been forced upon my mind; for with the keenest love of historical researches, want of books and want of time have continually thrown obstacles in my way; and to this hour I look back with the greatest gratitude to the libraries and the comparative leisure of this place, as having enabled me to do far more than I should ever have been able to effect elsewhere, and amidst the engagements of a profession.

I think therefore that here I may venture to recommend what I believe to be the best method of historical reading; for although even here there will be more or less impediments in the way of our carrying it out completely, still the probability is that some may have both the will and the power to do it; and even an approximation to it, and a regarding it as the standard which we should always be trying to reach, will, I think, be found to be valuable.

To proceed therefore with our supposed student's

course of reading. Keeping the general history which he has been reading as his text, and getting from it the skeleton, in a manner, of the future figure, he must now break forth excursively to the right and left, collecting richness and fulness of knowledge from the most various sources. For example, we will suppose that where his popular historian has mentioned that an alliance was concluded between two powers, or a treaty of peace agreed upon, he first of all resolves to consult the actual documents themselves, as they are to be found in some one of the great collections of European treaties, or if they are connected with English history, in Rymer's *Fœdera*. By comparing the actual treaty with his historian's report of its provisions, we get in the first place a critical process of some value, inasmuch as the historian's accuracy is at once tested: but there are other purposes answered besides. An historian's report of a treaty is almost always an abridgment of it; minor articles will probably be omitted, and the rest condensed, and stripped of all their formal language. But our object now being to reproduce to ourselves, so far as is possible, the very life of the period which we are studying, minute particulars help us to do this; nay the very formal enumeration of titles, and the specification of towns and districts in their legal style, help to realize the time to us, if it be only from their very particularity. Every common history records the substance of the treaty of Troyes, May, 1420, by which the succession to the crown of

France was given to Henry the Fifth. But the treaty in itself, or the English version of it which Henry sent over to England to be proclaimed there, gives a far more lively impression of the triumphant state of the great conqueror, and the utter weakness of the poor French king, Charles the Sixth, in the ostentatious care taken to provide for the recognition of his formal title during his life-time, while all real power is ceded to Henry, and provision is made for the perpetual union hereafter of the two kingdoms under his sole government.

I have named treaties as the first class of official instruments to be consulted, because the mention of them occurs unavoidably in every history. Another class of documents, certainly of no less importance, yet much less frequently referred to by popular historians, consists of statutes, ordinances, proclamations, acts, or by whatever various names the laws of each particular period happen to be designated. That the Statute Book has not been more habitually referred to by writers on English history, has always seemed to me matter of surprise. Legislation has not perhaps been so busy in every country as it has been with us, yet everywhere and in every period it has done something: evils real or supposed have always existed, which the supreme power in the nation has endeavoured to remove by the provisions of law. And under the name of laws I would include the acts of councils, which form an important part of the history of European nations during many centuries; provincial councils, as you

are aware, having been held very frequently, and their enactments relating to local and particular evils, so that they illustrate history in a very lively manner. Now in these and all the other laws of any given period, we find in the first place from their particularity a great additional help towards becoming familiar with the times in which they were passed; we learn the names of various officers, courts, and processes; and these when understood, (and I suppose always the habit of reading nothing without taking pains to understand it,) help us from their very number to realize the state of things then existing; a lively notion of any object depending on our clearly seeing some of its parts, and the more we people it, so to speak, with distinct images, the more it comes to resemble the crowded world around us. But in addition to this benefit, which I am disposed to rate in itself very highly, every thing of the nature of law has a peculiar interest and value, because it is the expression of the deliberate mind of the supreme government of society; and as history, as commonly written, records so much of the passionate and unreflecting part of human nature, we are bound in fairness to acquaint ourselves with its calmer and better part also. And then if we find, as unhappily we often shall find, that this calmer and better part was in itself neither good nor wise: that law, which should be the very voice of justice, was on the other hand unequal, oppressive, insolent; that the deliberate mind of the ruling spirits of any age was sunk in ignorance or per-

verted by wickedness, then we may feel sure that with whatever bright spots to be found here and there, the general state of that age was evil.

I am imprudent perhaps in leading you at the outset of our historical studies into a region so forbidding; the large volumes of treaties and laws with which I have recommended the student to become familiar, may seem enough to crush the boldest spirit of enterprise. There is an alchemy, however, which can change these apparently dull materials into bright gold; but I must not now anticipate the mention of it. I will rather proceed to offer some relief to the student by inviting him next to turn to volumes of a very different character. Some of the great men of an age have in all probability left some memorials of their minds behind them, speeches, it may be, or letters, or a journal; or possibly works of a deeper character, in which they have handled, expressly and deliberately, some of the questions which most interested their generation. Now if our former researches have enabled us to people our view of the past with many images of events, institutions, usages, titles, &c., to make up with some completeness what may be called the still life of the picture, we shall next be anxious to people it also with the images of its great individual men, to change it as it were from a landscape or a view of buildings, to what may truly be called an historical picture. Whoever has made himself famous by his actions, or even by his rank or position in society, so that his name is at once familiar to our ears,

such a man's writings have an interest for us even before we begin to read them; the instant that he gets up as it were to address us, we are hushed into the deepest attention. These works give us an insight not only into the spirit of an age, as exemplified in the minds of its greatest men, but they multiply in some sort the number of those with whom we are personally and individually in sympathy; they enable us to recognise amidst the dimness of remote and uncongenial ages, the features of friends and of brethren.

But the greatest, or at least the most active men of an age, may have left but little behind them in writing; memorials of this kind, however precious, will often be but few. We next then consider who those were who were eminent by their writings only, who before they began to speak had no peculiar claim to be heard, but who won and fixed attention by the wisdom or eloquence of what they uttered. Or again, to take a still lower step, there may have been men who spoke only to a limited audience, men of eminence merely in their own profession or study, but who within their own precinct were listened to, and exercised considerable influence. Yet once again, there is a still lower division of literature, there are works neither of men great by their actions, nor of men proved to be great by these very works themselves; nor of men, who though not great properly in any sense, were yet within a certain circle respected and influential; but works written by common persons for common persons, works written because the pro-

fession or circumstances or necessities of their authors led them to write, second and third rate works of theology, second and third rate political, or legal, or philosophical, or literary disquisitions, ordinary histories, poetry of that class which is to a proverb worthless, novels and tales which no man reads twice, and only an indiscriminate literary voracity would read once. Time gives even to this mass of rubbish an accidental value; what was in its life-time mere moss, becomes in the lapse of ages, after being buried in its peat bed, of some value as fuel; it is capable of yielding both light and heat. And so even the most worthless pieces of the literature of a remote period, contain in them both instruction and amusement. The historical student should consult such of these as time has spared; all the four divisions of the literature of a period which I have mentioned should engage his attention, not all certainly in an equal degree, but all are of importance towards that object which at this part of his course he is especially pursuing; the realizing to himself, I mean, as vividly and as perfectly as possible, all the varied aspects of the period which he is investigating.

I feel sure that whilst I have been reading the three or four last pages, I have been drawing rather largely on your kind readiness to put the best construction on my words which they will possibly bear. But after all, you must I fear be unable to acquit me of great extravagance, in recommending the student to make himself acquainted with the whole litera-

ture of the period of which he wishes to learn the history. I trust, however, to clear myself of this imputation, by explaining in what manner so wide a range of reading is really practicable. There is no greater confusion than exists in many men's notions of deep and superficial reading. It is often supposed, I believe, that deep reading consists in going through many books from beginning to end, superficial reading in looking only at parts of them. But depth and shallowness have reference properly to our particular object: so that the very same amount of reading may be superficial in one sense, and deep in another. For example, I want to know whether a peculiar mode of expression occurs in a given writer; an expression, we will say, supposed to have come into existence only at a later period. Now with a view to this object, any thing short of an almost complete perusal of the writer's works from beginning to end is superficial: because I cannot be in a condition to decide the question on a partial hearing of the evidence; and the evidence in this case is not any given portion of the author's writings, but the whole of them. Again, if I wish to know what a writer has said on some one particular subject, and he has written an express work on this subject, my reading is not superficial if I go through that one work, although I may leave a hundred of his works on other subjects unread altogether. Now for what purpose is it that we wish to consult the general second-rate literature of a period, as an illustration of its history? Is it not in order to discover what was

the prevailing tone and taste of men's minds ; how they reasoned ; what ideas had most possession of them ; what they knew, and what use they made of their knowledge ? For this object, a judicious selection following a general survey of the contents of an author's works is really quite sufficient. We take the volume or volumes of them into our hands ; we look at the contents, and so learn the subjects and nature of his several writings. It may be and often is the case, that amongst them we find some letters ; on these we should fasten immediately, and read through several of them, taking some from different periods of his life, if his correspondence run through several years. Again, his works may contain treatises, we will say, on various subjects ; if he be a theologian, they may contain commentaries also on the whole or parts of the Scripture ; or controversial tracts, or meditations and prayers. Amongst his treatises we should select such as must from their subject call forth the character of his mind most fully ; and one or two of these we should read through. So again, we can test his character as a commentator by consulting him on such parts of Scripture as necessarily lead to the fullest development of his opinions and knowledge ; and we can deal in a similar way with his other writings. If he be an historian, a portion of his work will certainly display his historical powers sufficiently ; if he be a poet, the strength and character of his genius will appear, without our reading every line which he has written. It is possible certainly that an estimate so formed

may not be altogether correct ; we should not value Shakespeare sufficiently without being acquainted with all his great plays ; yet even in the case of Shakespeare, a knowledge of any one of his best tragedies, and any one of his best comedies, would give us a notion faithful in kind, although requiring to be augmented in degree. But what I am saying does not apply to the works of the very highest class of minds, but to the mass of ordinary literature ; and surely any one canto of Glover's *Leonidas* would enable us to judge very fairly of the merits and style of the poem ; and half a dozen of the letters of Junius would express faithfully the excellencies and faults of the author as a political writer, without our being obliged to read through the whole volume.

That, however, is really superficial reading, which dips merely into a great many places of a volume at random, and studies no considerable portion of it consecutively. One whole treatise upon a striking subject may, and will, give us an accurate estimate of a writer's powers ; it will exhibit his way of handling a question, his fairness or unfairness, his judgment, his clearness, his eloquence, or his powers of reasoning. One single treatise out of a great many will shew us this, but not mere extracts even from many treatises. Particular passages selected, whether for good or for bad, are really apt to remind one of the brick which the old pedant carried about as a specimen of his house. It is vain to judge of any writer from isolated quotations, least of all, when we want to judge of him as illustrating the views and habits of his time. No-

thing can be more unsafe than to venture to criticise the literature of a period from turning over the pages even of the fullest literary history: Tiraboschi is invaluable as a book of reference, furnishing us with the number of Italian writers who flourished at any one time, and with a catalogue raisonnée of their writings; but a catalogue is to guide research, not to supersede it. Besides, quotations made from writers to shew the character of their opinions, are not always to be trusted even for their honesty. One instance of this is so remarkable, and affords so memorable a warning, that I cannot refrain from noticing it, as it may possibly be new to some of my hearers. Mosheim, in his Ecclesiastical History, gave in one of his notes the following passage from the works of Eligius or Eloy, bishop of Noyon in the middle of the seventh century, as a specimen of the false notions of Christian duty entertained generally at that period, even by men of the highest reputed holiness^a. Robertson in his notes to his

* Text of Mosheim. “The Christians of this century (the seventh) seemed by their superstitious doctrine to exclude from the kingdom of heaven such as had not contributed by their offerings to augment the riches of the clergy or the church.” Century VII. Part ii. Ch. 3. Edit. 8vo. 1806.

His note is as follows:—“S. Eligius or Eloi expresses himself upon this matter in the following manner: Bonus Christianus est qui ad ecclesiam frequenter venit, et oblationem, quæ in altari Deo offeratur, exhibet: qui de fructibus suis non gustat nisi prius Deo aliquid offerat: qui quoties sanctæ solennitates adveniunt, ante dies plures castitatem etiam cum propriâ uxore custodit, ut securâ conscientîâ Domini altare accedere possit; qui postremo symbolum

Charles V. borrowed the quotation, to prove, that at that period “men instead of aspiring to sanctity and

vel orationem Dominicam memoriter tenet . . . Redimite animas vestras de poenâ, dum habetis in potestate remedia . . . oblationes et decimas ecclesiis offerite, luminaria sanctis locis, juxta quod habetis, exhibete . . . ad ecclesiam quoque frequentius convenite, sanctorum patrocinia humiliter expetite . . . quod si observaveritis, securi in die judicii ante tribunal æterni judicis venientes dicetis : Da, Domine, quia dedimus.” Maclaine, the English translator, then adds this farther note of his own : “We see here a large and ample description of the character of a *good Christian*, in which there is not the least mention of the *love of God*, *resignation* to his will, *obedience* to his laws, or of *justice*, *benevolence*, and *charity*, towards men, and in which the whole of religion is made to consist in *coming often to the church*, *bringing offerings to the altar*, *lighting candles* in consecrated places, and such like vain services.”

I am glad to say that Schröckh, although he quotes the passage as shewing how much stress was laid on gifts to the church, yet quotes it quite fairly, without garbling, and expressly says before he begins to quote it, “Man muss gestehen, dass darunter viel wahres und schriftmässiges vorkommt.” Christl. Kirch. Geschichte. xix. Theil. p. 438. Ed. 1794. Leipzig. The whole passage is as follows :—

“Qui verus Christianus vult esse, hæc ei necesse est præcepta custodire ; si enim non custodit, ipse se circumvenit. Ille itaque bonus Christianus est, qui nulla phylacteria vel adinventiones diaboli credit, sed omnem spem suam in solo Christo ponit : qui peregrinos tanquam ipsum Christum cum gaudio suscipit, quia ipse dicit, Hospes fui et suscepistis me ; Et, quando fecistis uni ex minimis meis mihi fecistis. Ille inquam bonus Christianus est qui hospitibus pedes lavat, et tanquam parentes carissimos diligit, qui juxta quod habet pauperibus eleemosynam tribuit, qui ad ecclesiam frequenter venit, et oblationem quæ in altari Deo offeratur exhibet, qui de fructibus suis non gustat, nisi prius Deo aliquid offerat : qui stateras dolosas et mensuras duplices non habet ; qui pecuniam suam non dedit ad usuram ; qui ipse caste

virtue, imagined that they satisfied every obligation of duty by a scrupulous observance of external cere-

vivit et filios vel vicinos docet, ut caste et cum timore Dei vivant; et quoties sanctæ solennitates adveniunt ante dies plures castitatem etiam cum propriâ uxore custodit, ut securâ conscientiâ Domini altare accedere possit: qui postremo symbolum vel orationem dominicam memoriter tenet, et filios ac familiam eandem docet. Qui talis est, sine dubio verus Christianus est, sed et Christus in ipso habitat, qui dixit, Ego et pater veniemus et mansionem apud eum faciemus. Similiter et per prophetam dixit, Ego inhabitabo in eis et inter illos ambulabo, et ero illorum Deus.

“ Ecce audistis fratres quales sint Christiani boni, ideo quantum potestis cum Dei adjutorio laborate, ut nomen Christianum non sit falsum in vobis, sed ut veri Christiani esse possitis: semper præcepta Christi et cogitate in mente, et implete in operatione. Redimite animas vestras de pœnâ, dum habetis in potestate remedia: eleemosynam juxta vires facite, pacem et charitatem habete, discordes ad concordiam revocate, mendacium fugite, perjurium expavescite, falsum testimonium non dicite, furtum non facite: oblationes et decimas ecclesiis offerte, luminaria sanctis locis juxta quod habetis, exhibete, symbolum et orationem Dominicam memoriâ retinete et filiis vestris insinuate, filios etiam quos ex baptismo suscepistis docete et castigate ut semper cum timore Dei vivant: scitote vos fidejussores pro ipsis apud Deum esse. Ad ecclesiam quoque frequenter convenite, sanctorum patrocinia humiliter expetite; diem Dominicum pro reverentiâ resurrectionis Christi absque ullo servili opere colite, sanctorum solennitates pio affectu celebrate, proximos vestros sicut vos ipsos diligite: quod vobis vultis ab aliis fieri hoc et vos aliis facite: quod vobis non vultis fieri nulli facite: charitatem ante omnia habete, quia charitas operit multitudinem peccatorum: estote hospitales, humiles, omnem sollicitudinem vestram ponentes in Deum, quoniam ipsi cura est de vobis. Infirmos visitate, carceratos requirite, peregrinos suscipite, esurientes pascite, nudos vestite. Ariolos et magos spernite: sit vobis æqualitas in pondere et mensurâ: sit statera justa, justus modius, æquusque sextarius, nec plusquam dedistis repetatis,

monies." Mr. Hallam, in the first editions of his work on the Middle Ages, (in the later editions the error has been corrected,) transcribed it into his account of the state of society, to shew that "priests made submission to the church not only the condition but the measure of all praise." Dr. Waddington in the text of his *History of the Church*, had referred to the self-same passage, which he gave accordingly, still copied from Mosheim, in a note at the foot of his page. But being led to enquire a little more fully into the matter, he found the whole passage in D'Acheri's *Spicilegium Veterum Scriptorum*, (D'Acheri was one of the learned French Benedictines of the seventeenth century,) and there he discovered that the quotation in Mosheim, which Robertson and Mr. Hallam and himself had all

neque usuras pro fenerata pecuniâ a quoquam exigatis. Quod si observaveritis, securi in die judicii ante tribunal æterni judicis venientes dicetis, Da Domine, quia dedimus; miserere, quia misericordiam fecimus; nos implevimus quod jussisti, tu redde quod promisisti."

I am only concerned with this passage as an instance of great misrepresentation: there is enough really bad in Eligius's theology to make it unnecessary to make it worse; and after all, how far it is Eligius's doctrine or not is very questionable; for the author of his *Life* merely professes to give the substance of his general teaching, to which he devotes eleven folio pages of double columns. It does not appear that it is more than a vague traditional impression of what he used to say; and the *Life* in which it appears, though professing to be written by S. Ouen, has been greatly interpolated, according to Baluze, by a later hand. The above extract has been made from Baluze's edition of D'Achery, 3 vols. Folio. Paris, 1723. Vol. II. pp. 96, 97.

copied from him in reliance on its fidelity, was utterly garbled, as you will see for yourselves when I read it to you at length. Here then is Eligius quoted by successive historians as proving what his real words do in fact effectually disprove. Well might Niebuhr protest against the practice of making quotations at second hand, instead of going ourselves to the original source. To do this is indeed a sort of superficial reading which we cannot be too careful to avoid.

You will therefore, I trust, acquit me of recommending any thing which really deserves the name of superficial reading; and yet I think that by following the method which I have suggested, we may arrive at a very just and full knowledge of the character of the literature of a period, and thereby of the period itself, without undergoing any extravagant burden of labour, or sacrificing an undue portion of time. And by such means, followed up still farther by those who have a taste for such studies, by enquiring into the state of art, whether in painting, sculpture, or architecture, or as exemplified in matters of common life, we may I think imbue ourselves effectually with the spirit of a period, no less than with the actual events which it witnessed; we may be able to image it to our minds in detail, and conceive of it as of an object with which we are really familiar.

But is our work now done? Is this full and distinct impression of the events, characters, institutions, manners, and ways of thinking of any period,

that true historical knowledge which we require? The answer at once is "No." What we have attained to is no more than antiquarianism, an indispensable element in history, but not history itself. Antiquarianism is no teacher of wisdom; on the contrary, few things seem more to contract and enfeeble the mind, few things differ more widely from that comprehensive view which becomes the true historian. And this is a point so important that I must venture to dwell upon it a little more particularly.

What is it that the mere antiquarian wants, and which the mere scholar wants also; so that satire, sagacious enough in detecting the weak points of every character, has often held them both up to ridicule? They have wanted what is the essential accompaniment to all our knowledge of the past, a lively and extensive knowledge of the present; they wanted the habit of continually viewing the two in combination with each other; they wanted that master power, which enables us to take a point from which to contemplate both at a distance, and so to judge of each and of both as if we belonged to neither. For it is from the views so obtained, from the conclusions so acquired, that the wisdom is formed which may really assist in shaping and preparing the course of the future.

Antiquarianism, then, is the knowledge of the past enjoyed by one who has no lively knowledge of the present. Thence it is, when concerned with great matters, a dull knowledge. It may be lively in little things, it may conceive vividly the shape and

colour of a dress, or the style of a building, because no man can be so ignorant as not to have a distinct notion of these in his own times; he must have a full conception of the coat he wears and the house he lives in. But the past is reflected to us by the present; so far as we see and understand the present, so far we can see and understand the past: so far but no farther. And this is the reason why scholars and antiquarians, nay, and men calling themselves historians also, have written so uninstructionally of the ancient world: they could do no otherwise, for they did not understand the world around them. How can he comprehend the parties of other days, who has no clear notion of those of his own? What sense can he have of the progress of the great contest of human affairs in its earlier stages, when it rages around him at this actual moment unnoticed, or felt to be no more than a mere indistinct hubbub of sounds and confusion of weapons?—what cause is at issue in the combat he knows not. Whereas on the other hand, he who feels his own times keenly, to whom they are a positive reality, with a good and evil distinctly perceived in them, such a man will write a lively and impressive account of past times, even though his knowledge be insufficient, and his prejudices strong. This I think is the merit of Mitford, and it is a great one. His very antijacobin partialities, much as they have interfered with the fairness of his history, have yet completely saved it from being dull. He took an interest in the parties of Greece because he was alive to the parties of his

own time : he described the popular party in Athens just as he would have described the whigs of England ; he was unjust to Demosthenes because he would have been unjust to Mr. Fox. His knowledge of the Greek language was limited, and so was his learning altogether ; but because he was an English gentleman who felt and understood the state of things around him, and entered warmly into its parties, therefore he was able to write a history of Greece, which has the great charm of reality ; and which, if I may judge by my own experience, is read at first with interest and retains its hold firmly on the memory.

This is an example of what I mean ; and it were easy to add others. Raleigh had perhaps less learning than Mitford ; he had at no time of his life the leisure or the opportunity to collect a great store of antiquarian knowledge. But he had seen life in his own times extensively, and entered keenly into its various pursuits. Soldier, seaman, court favourite, I am afraid we must add, intriguer, war and policy were perfectly familiar to him. His accounts therefore of ancient affairs have also a peculiar charm ; they too are a reality ; he entered into the difficulties of ancient generals from remembering what he had himself experienced ; he related their gallant actions with all his heart, recollecting what he had himself seen and done. Now I am well aware that this lively notion of our own times is extraneous to any course of historical study, and depends on other causes than those with which we are concerned now.

And farther, even under favourable circumstances, it can scarcely be attained in perfection by a young man, whose experience of life and its business is necessarily scanty. But where it does not exist, it is of importance that we should be aware of the greatness of the defect, and to take care lest while it destroys the benefit of our historical studies, they in their turn should aggravate it, and thus each should go on with an effect reciprocally injurious. And we should try, if not by the most effectual means then by some of inferior virtue, to prevent our historical studies from becoming mere antiquarianism. Accordingly, after having made ourselves familiar with the spirit of any given period from a study of the different writers of the period itself, we should turn to a history of it written by a modern writer, and observe how its peculiarities accord with those of a different age, and what judgment is passed by posterity upon its favourite views and practices. It does not follow that this judgment is to be an infallible guide to ours, but it is useful to listen to it, for in some points it will certainly be true, and its very difference from the judgment of our earlier period, even where it runs into an opposite extreme, is of itself worth attending to. And thus by seeing what was underrated once receiving its due and perhaps more than its due honour at a subsequent period, and by observing that what is now unjustly slighted was in times past excessively overvalued, we shall escape that Quixotism of zeal, whether for or against any particular institution, which is apt to be the re-

sult of a limited knowledge ; as if what we now find over honoured or too much despised, had never undergone the opposite fate ; as if it were for us now to redress for the first time the injustice of fortune, and to make up by the vehemence of our admiration for centuries of contempt, or by our scorn for centuries of blind veneration.

We may hope that such a comparison of the views of different periods will save us from one of the besetting faults of minds raised a little above the mass, but not arrived at any high pitch of wisdom ; I mean the habit either of sneering at or extravagantly exalting the age in which we ourselves live. At the same time I am inclined to think that although both are faulty, yet the temptation is far greater to undervalue our own age than to overvalue it. I am not speaking, be it observed, of the mass of mere ordinary minds, but of those which possess some portion of intelligence and cultivation. Our personal superiority seems much more advanced by decrying our contemporaries than by decrying our fathers. The dead are not our real rivals, nor is pride very much gratified by asserting a superiority over those who cannot deny it. But if we run down the living, that is, those with whom our whole competition exists, what do we but exalt ourselves, as having at any rate that great mark of superior wisdom, that we discern deficiency where others find nothing but matter of admiration. It is far more tempting to personal vanity to think ourselves the only wise amongst a generation of fools, than to glory in belonging to a

wise generation, where our personal wisdom, be it what it may, cannot at least have the distinction of singularity.

Thus far then we seem to have proceeded in our outline of the course of reading to be pursued by the historical student. It has combined at present two points, a full knowledge of the particular period which we choose to study, as derived from a general acquaintance with its contemporary literature, and then what I may call a knowledge of its bearings with respect to other and later periods, and not least with respect to our own times; that is to say, how succeeding ages have judged of it, how far their sympathies have gone along with its own in admiring what it admired; and as collected from this judgment, how far it coloured the times which followed it; in other words, what part it has played for good or for evil in the great drama of the world's history; what of its influence has survived and what has perished. And he who has so studied and so understood one period, deserves the praise generally of understanding history. For to know all history actually is impossible; our object should be to possess the power of knowing any portion of history which we wish to learn, at a less cost of labour and with far greater certainty of success than belong to other men. For by our careful study of some one period, we have learnt a method of proceeding with all; so that if we open any history, its facts at once fall into their proper places, indicating their causes, implying their consequences; we have gained also a

measure of their value, teaching us what are productive, and what are barren, what will combine with other facts, and establish and illustrate a truth, and what in our present state of knowledge are isolated, of no worth in themselves, and leading to nothing. This will be still more apparent, when we come to examine more carefully our student's process in mastering the history of any one period; for hitherto, you will observe, I have said nothing of the difficulties or questions which will occur to him in his reading; I have only said generally what he should read.

I purpose then in the following lectures to notice some of the principal difficulties or questions which the historical student will encounter, whether the period which he has chosen belong to the times of imperfect or of advanced civilization: for the questions in each of these are not altogether the same. And I will begin with the difficulties presented by the history of a period of imperfect civilization.

LECTURE II.

THE first step which I ventured to recommend in the study of the history of any period, was, that we should take some one contemporary historian, and if we were studying the history of any one country in particular, then it should be also an historian of that country, and that we should so gain our first introduction both to the events and to the general character of the times. I am now to consider what difficulties and what questions will be likely to present themselves in reading such an historian, interfering, if not answered, with our deriving from him all the instruction which he is capable of rendering. Now you will observe that I am purposely looking out for the difficulties in history, but I am very far from professing to be able to solve them. Still I think that what I am doing may be very useful: because to direct attention to what is to be done is the best means of procuring that it shall be done. And farther, an enterprising student will be rather encouraged by hearing that the work is not all done to

his hands ; he will be glad to find that the motto upon history, in spite of all that has been lately accomplished, is still "Plus ultra : " the actual boundary reached is not the final one ; every bold and able adventurer in this wide ocean may hope to obtain the honours of a discoverer of countries hitherto unknown.

In the first place I said that the difficulties and questions which occurred in reading an historian of a period of imperfect civilization, were not in all respects the same which we should meet with in an historian of a more advanced age. This leads me naturally to consider what constitutes the difference between these two classes of historians, before I proceed to the proper subject of this lecture, the questions namely suggested by the former class, or those of a period imperfectly civilized.

There are some persons whose prejudices are so violent against their own age, and that immediately preceding it, that they take offence at their claim to a higher civilization, and will by no means allow the earlier centuries of modern history to have been their inferiors in this respect. For my own part, I should find it very difficult, even if I thought it desirable, to relinquish the habitual language of our age ; which calls itself civilized, and the middle ages as in comparison half civilized, not in the spirit of controversy or of boasting, but as a simple matter of fact. However, I do not wish to assume any conclusion at the outset which may be supposed to be disputable ; and therefore, I will not if I can help it

use the terms more or less civilized as applied to the earlier or later periods of modern history, but will state the difference between them in more neutral language. For that there is a difference will scarcely I think be disputed: or that this difference coincides chronologically, or nearly so, with the sixteenth century; so that the historians prior to this period up to the very beginning of modern history, have, speaking generally, one character; and those who flourished subsequently to it have another. And farther, I cannot think it disputable, that the great historians of Greece and Rome resemble for the most part the historians of the last two or three centuries, and differ from those of the early or middle ages.

Now without using the invidious words, "civilized" or "half civilized," the difference may be stated thus; that the writers of the early and middle ages belonged to a period in which the active elements were fewer, and the views generally prevalent were therefore fewer also. Fewer in two ways, first inasmuch as the classes or orders of society which expressed themselves actively in word or deed were fewer; and then, as there were very much fewer individual varieties amongst members of the same class. Hence therefore the history of the early ages is simple; that of later times is complicated. In the former the active elements were kings, popes, bishops, lords, and knights, with exceptions here and there of remarkable individuals; but generally speaking the other elements of society were passive. In later times, on

the other hand, other orders of men have been taking their part actively; and the number of these appears to be continually increasing. So that the number of views of human life, and the number of agencies at work upon it, are multiplied; the difficulty of judging between them all theoretically is very great: that of adjusting their respective claims practically is almost insuperable. Again, in later times, the individual differences between members of the same class or order have been far greater; for while the common class or professional influence has still been powerful, yet the restraint from without having been removed, which forced the individual to abstain from disputing that influence, the tendencies of men's individual minds have worked freely, and where these were strong, they have modified the class or professional influence variously, and have thus produced a great variety of theories on the same subject. The introduction of new classes or bodies of men into the active elements of society may be exemplified by the increased importance in later times of the science of political economy, while the individual variety amongst those of the same order is shewn by the various theories which have been advanced at different times by different economical writers. This will explain what I mean, when I divide the historians of modern history into two classes, and when I call the one class, that belonging to a simpler state of things; and the other that belonging to a state more complicated.

We are now, you will remember, concerned with

the writers of the first class; and as a specimen of these in their simplest form, we will take the Church History of the Venerable Bede. This work has been lately published, 1838, in a convenient form, 1 vol. 8vo, by the English Historical Society; and it is their edition to which my references have been made. I need scarcely remind you of the date and circumstances of Bede's life. Born in 674, only fifty years after the flight of Mahomet from Mecca, he died at the age of sixty-one, in 735, two or three years after that great victory of Charles Martel over the Saracens, which delivered France and Europe from Mahometan conquest. At seven years old he was placed under the care of the abbot of Wearmouth, and from that monastery he removed to the neighbouring one of Jarrow, and there passed the remainder of his life. He was ordained deacon in his nineteenth year, and priest in his thirtieth, and beyond these two events we know nothing of his external life except his writings. These are various, and he himself, at the conclusion of his Ecclesiastical History, has left us a list of them:—they consist of commentaries on almost all the books of Scripture, of treatises on some scriptural subjects, of religious biographies, of a book of hymns; and of some of a different character, on general history and chronology, a book *de orthographiâ*, and another *de metricâ arte*. His Ecclesiastical History, in five books, embraces the period from Augustine's arrival in 597, down to the year 731, only four years before his own death; so that for a considerable portion of

the time to which it relates his work is a contemporary history.

In Bede we shall find no political questions of any kind to create any difficulty, nor are there those varied details of war and peace which, before they can be vividly comprehended, require a certain degree of miscellaneous knowledge. I may notice then in him one or two things which belong more or less to all history. First, his language. We derive, or ought to derive from our philological studies, a great advantage in this respect; we ought to have acquired in some degree the habit of regarding language critically, and of interpreting it correctly. This is not a trifling matter; for as an immense majority of histories must be written in a foreign language, it is very possible for a careless reader, who has never been trained as we have been from our earliest years in grammatical analysis, to make important mistakes as to the meaning of his author; for translation, to be thoroughly good, must be a matter of habit, and must be grounded on such a minutely accurate process as we are early trained to in our study of Greek and Latin writers. It must be grounded on such a process, the great value of which is, that it hinders us from neglecting little words, conjunctions especially, on which so large a portion of the meaning of continuous writing depends, and which a careless reader not so trained is apt to pass over. But there is a higher step in translation which is by no means a mere matter of ornament, and which I believe is not always attended to

as it deserves even amongst ourselves. I mean translation as distinguished from construing; a process which retains all the accuracy of the earlier habit; its searching view into every corner, so to speak, of the passage to be translated; its appreciation of every little word, of every shade of distinction in mood or tense; but from this accuracy makes its way to another still more perfect: the exact expression of the mind of the original, so that the feelings excited by the translation, the images conveyed by the words, the force of their arrangement, their tone, whether serious or half playful, should be the exact representation of the original. And in this greater accuracy construing must always be deficient, because the grammatical order of one language is not the same as that of another, and to keep the real order, which is of great importance to the fidelity of the translation, the grammatical order must often be sacrificed. I have ventured to say thus much, because I have continually had occasion to feel the difficulty of good translation, and because in this respect our admirable classical system is apt, I think, to forego one of its great advantages, that in the habit of *vivâ voce* translation, as opposed to construing, we have an exercise at once in the two great subjects of grammar and rhetoric,—an exercise in extemporaneous composition in our own language to which none other is comparable, no less than an exercise in the language from which we are translating.

To return, however, to the language of Bede.

We in one way may have a source of error peculiarly our own; that is, our almost exclusive familiarity with classical Latin is sometimes apt to mislead us, when we transfer its rules, and its senses of words, without hesitation, to the Latin of what are called the low or middle ages. As a single and very familiar instance of the difference between classical Latin and low Latin I may notice the perpetual usage of the conjunction "*quia*" in the latter in the sense of the Greek *ὅτι*. "Nosti *quia* ad tui oris imperium semper vivere studui," "Thou knowest that I have ever been careful to live in obedience to thy words;" iv. 29. This occurs in the Latin of unclassical writers continually; I do not know what is the earliest instance of it, but it is frequent in the Latin version of the Scriptures which was used by the western churches before Jerome's time, and in the old Latin translation of Irenæus. Facciolati gives no instance of it in any classical writer, except we choose to bestow that title on Palladius, one of the agricultural writers, whose date is not known, but who certainly did not flourish earlier than the third century, or the very end of the second, inasmuch as he quotes Apuleius, who lived under M. Aurelius Antoninus. Besides this, it is always worth while in reading the Latin of the lower ages to observe the gradual introduction of words of Barbarian origin, such as *scabini*, *scaccarium*, *marchio*, *batallum*, and innumerable others of which the pages of Ducange are full. But of these, very few, perhaps no certain instance, is to be found in Bede.

Another question comes before us in the history of Bede, which also is common to all history, although in him and in the other writers of the middle ages it often takes a peculiar form. I mean the great question of the trustworthiness of historians; on what grounds and to what degree we may venture to yield our belief to what we read in them. In Bede and in many others the question takes this form, What credit is to be attached to the frequent stories of miracles or of wonders which occur in their narratives? And it is this peculiar form of it which I would wish to notice now. The question is not an easy one, and I must here remind you of what I said at the beginning of this lecture, that while pointing out the difficulties of history, I was very far from professing to be able always to solve them.

You will, I think, allow that the difficulty here relates much more to miracles than to mere wonders. By the term miracle we imply I think two things which do not exist in mere wonders; two things or perhaps more properly one, that God is not only the author of the wonderful work, but that it is wrought for us to observe and be influenced by it; whereas a wonder is no doubt God's work also, but it is not wrought so far as we can discern for our sakes, so far as we are concerned it is a work without an object. Being therefore wholly ignorant of the nature and object of wonders, and being ignorant of a great many natural laws, by which they may be produced, the question of their credibility resolves itself into

little more than a mere question as to the credibility of the witnesses ; there is little room for considerations of internal evidence as to the time and circumstances when the wonder is said to have happened. The internal evidence only comes in with respect to our knowledge of the law, which the wonder is supposed to violate : in proportion to our observations of its comprehensiveness and its unbroken observance, would be our unwillingness to believe that it had been ever departed from. And thus I suppose that any deviation from the observed laws with respect to the heavenly bodies, as, for instance, to the time of the sun's rising or setting, if we looked upon it as a mere wonder and not as a miracle, we should scarcely be persuaded by any weight of evidence to believe : or to speak more correctly, if the weight of evidence were overwhelmingly great, we should be obliged to regard the phenomenon as a miracle, and not as a wonder ; as a sign given by God for our instruction. But in a great number of cases, we may admit the existence of a wonder without seeing any reason to conclude that it is a miracle. A man may appear ridiculous if he expresses his belief in any particular story of this sort to those who know nothing of it but its strangeness. And there is no doubt that human folly and human fraud are mixed up largely with most accounts of wonders, and render it our duty to receive them not with caution merely, but with unwillingness and suspicion. Yet to say that all recorded wonders are false, from those recorded by Herodotus down to the latest reports of

animal magnetism, would be a boldness of assertion wholly unjustifiable and extravagant. The accounts of wonders then, from Livy's prodigies downwards, I should receive according to Herodotus's expression when speaking of one of them, οὐτε ἀπιστέων, οὐτε πιστεύων τι λίην: sometimes considering of what fact they were an exaggerated or corrupted representation, at other times trying to remember whether any and how many other notices occur of the same thing, and whether they are of force enough to lead us to search for some law hitherto undiscovered, to which they may all be referred, and become hereafter the foundation of a new science.

But when a wonderful thing is represented as a miracle, the question becomes far graver and far more complicated. Moral and religious considerations then come in unavoidably, and involve some of the deepest questions of theology. What is reported as a miracle may be either the answer to the believing prayer of a Christian, or it may be the working of one of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, or it may be a special sign sent from God for a special mercy or judgment in the particular case, and for the instruction and warning of others. And whichever of these kinds it may be, the question follows, why then are miracles not performed in every age and in every Christian country? And if they are not, are the ages and countries thus excepted, to be considered as having fallen away from the faith, and to have forfeited what is properly a perpetual privilege of Christianity, to have God

visibly and sensibly near to us? Say that we acquiesce in this conclusion, yet proceeding to regard the question in this point of view, is it embarrassed with no difficulties? Is it possible to deny that the individuals, the churches, and the times, which appear to have been left without miracles, have displayed other and even more unquestionable signs of God's presence amongst them; signs which have not always existed with peculiar brightness where miracles are alleged to have most abounded? Or again, Can it be denied that the times and the writers where these miraculous accounts are to be found, were generally, as compared with those where they are wanting, apt to take little pains in their examination of truth, of such truth, I mean, as their previous state of mind did not dispose them to question? We see this from their accounts of points of natural history; how few of these can be depended upon, and what extravagant and palpable fables were transmitted from generation to generation. It is enough to notice the famous story of the barnacle tree, which dropped its fruit into the water, and the fruit cracked, and out swam a gosling. Bede's accounts of natural objects are few, but it so happens that one of these relates to a place with which I have been acquainted all my life, and its incorrectness is remarkable. He says that in the Solent sea, which separates the Isle of Wight from Hampshire, "two tides of the ocean, breaking forth round Britain from the boundless Northern ocean, meet every day in mutual conflict with each other

beyond the mouth of the river of Homelea, (Hamble,) and after their conflict is over they sweep back to the ocean, and return to the place from whence they came.”^a Who could recognise in this description the sort of race which runs at certain times of the tide and in rough weather over the shoal called the Brambles, or the slight agitation sometimes produced, not by the conflicting tides of the Solent sea itself, but by the ebb of the Southampton or Hamble river meeting at an angle with the tide of the Solent. We have to weigh then this fact in the character of Bede and other such historians, and this added to the religious difficulty noticed above, may incline us rather to take the opposite conclusion, and limiting miracles to the earliest times of Christianity, refuse our belief to all those which are reported by the historians of subsequent centuries.

Yet, again, this conclusion has its difficulties. We may not like to refuse assent to so many statements of so many writers, of men, so far as we know, who believe that they were speaking the truth. And we may be taxed with inconsistency in stopping our scepticism arbitrarily as it may seem when we arrive at the first century, and according to the miracles of the Gospels that belief which we refuse to those of ecclesiastical history. This last charge, however, we may satisfactorily repel. The miracles of the Gospel and those of later history do not stand on the same ground. I do not think that they stand on the same ground of external evidence ;

^a Histor. Ecclesiast. iv. 16.

I cannot think that the unbelieving spirit of the Roman world in the first century was equally favourable to the origination and admission of stories of miracles, with the credulous tendencies of the middle ages. But the difference goes far deeper than this to all those who can appreciate the other evidences of Christianity, and who therefore feel that in the one case what we call miracles were but the natural accompaniments, if I may so speak, of the Christian revelation ; accompaniments, the absence of which would have been far more wonderful than their presence. This, as I may almost call it, this *a priori* probability in favour of the miracles of the Gospel cannot be said to exist in favour of those of later history.

Disembarrassed then of this painful parallel, and able to judge freely of the miraculous stories of Bede and other historians, without feeling our whole Christian faith to rest on the decision, it will not however follow, as some appear to think, that we shall riot as it were in a full license of unbelief, or that a reasonable mind will exercise no belief in religious matters except such as it dares not withhold. Some appear to be unable to conceive of belief or unbelief except as having some ulterior object ; “ we believe this, because we love it ; we disbelieve it, because we wish it to be disproved.” There is, however, in minds more healthfully constituted, a belief and a disbelief grounded solely upon the evidence of the case, arising neither out of partiality nor out of prejudice against the supposed conclusions which

may result from its truth or falsehood. And in such a spirit the historical student will consider the cases of Bede's and other historians' miracles. He will, I think, as a general rule disbelieve them; for the immense multitude which he finds recorded, and which I suppose no credulity could believe in, shews sufficiently that on this point there was a total want of judgment and a blindness of belief generally existing which makes the testimony wholly insufficient; and while the external evidence in favour of these alleged miracles is so unsatisfactory, there are, for the most part, strong internal improbabilities against them. But with regard to some miracles, he will see that there is no strong *a priori* improbability in their occurrence, but rather the contrary; as, for instance, where the first missionaries of the Gospel in a barbarous country are said to have been assisted by a manifestation of the spirit of power, and if the evidence appears to warrant his belief, he will readily and gladly yield it. And in doing so he will have the countenance of a great man^a, who in his fragment of English history has not hesitated to express the same sentiments. Nor will he be unwilling, but most thankful, to find sufficient grounds for believing that not only at the beginning of the Gospel but in ages long afterwards, believing prayer has received extraordinary answers, that it has been heard even in more than it might have dared to ask for. Yet again, if the gift of faith—the gift as distinguished from the grace—of the faith which removes moun-

^a Burke.

tains, has been given to any in later times in remarkable measure, the mighty works which such faith may have wrought cannot be incredible in themselves to those who remember our Lord's promise; and if it appears from satisfactory evidence that they were wrought actually, we shall believe them, and believe with joy. Only as it is in most cases impossible to admit the trustworthiness of the evidence, our minds must remain at the most in a state of suspense, and I do not know why it is necessary to come to any positive decision. For if we think that supposing the miracle to be true, it gives the seal of God's approbation to all the belief of him who performed it, this is manifestly a most hasty and untenable inference. The gift of faith does not imply the gift of wisdom, nor is every believing Christian, whose prayer God may hear in an extraordinary manner, endued also with an exemption from error. Men's gifts are infinitely different, distinct from each other, as from God's gifts of inward grace; unequal in value outwardly, the highest, it may be, of less value spiritually to its possessor than the humblest grace of him who has no remarkable gift at all. Yet the grace cannot do the work of the gift, nor the higher gift the work of the meaner; nor may he who can work miracles claim therefore the gift of understanding the Scripture, and interpreting it with infallible truth. Cyprian said of the martyrs, when he thought that they were impairing the discipline of the church by granting tickets of communion over hastily to the Lapsi, or those who

had fallen away in the persecutions, "The martyrs do not make the Gospel, for it is through the Gospel that they acquire the glory of martyrdom."^a And so we might say of certain miracles, if there were any such, wrought by persons who had in many points grievously corrupted the Christian faith, "Miracles must not be allowed to overrule the Gospel; for it is only through our belief in the Gospel that we accord our belief to them."

I do not make any apology for the length of this discussion, because the subject was one which lay directly in our way, and could not be passed over hastily; and I am never averse to shewing how closely connected are those studies which we will attempt to divide by the names religious and secular, injuring both by trying to separate them. Let us now proceed with our review of the difficulties of history, and still confining ourselves to what I have called the simpler period, we will pass on however from the eighth to the thirteenth century, and briefly notice some of the questions which suggest themselves when we read Matthew Paris, or, still more, any of the French, German, or Italian historians of the same period.

The thirteenth century contains in it at its beginning the most splendid period of the papacy, the time of Innocent the Third; its end coincides with that great struggle between Boniface the Eighth and Philip the Fair, which marks the first stage of its

^a Cyprian Epist. xxvii. "Minime consideravit quod non martyres Evangelium faciant, sed per Evangelium martyres fiant."

decline. It contains the reign of Frederick the Second, and his long contests with the popes in Italy; the foundation of the orders of friars, Dominican and Franciscan; the last period of the crusades, and the age of the greatest glory of the schoolmen. Thus full of matters of interest as it is, it will yet be found that all its interest is more or less connected with two great questions concerning the church; namely, the power of the priesthood in matters of government and in matters of faith; the merits of the contest between the papacy and the kings of Europe; the nature and character of that influence over men's minds which affected the whole philosophy of the period, the whole intellectual condition of the Christian world.

It would be out of place here altogether to enter at large into either of these questions. But it is closely connected with my subject, to notice one or two points as to the method of studying them. I observed in my first lecture, that after studying the history of any period in its own contemporary writers, it was desirable also to study the view of it entertained by a later period, as whether more or less true, it was sure to be different, and would probably afford some truth in which the contemporary view was deficient. This holds good with the thirteenth century as with other periods; it is quite important that we should see it as it appears in the eyes of later times, no less than as it appears in its own. But the questions of the thirteenth century, if I am right in saying that they are connected with the church,

require especially that our view should be cast backwards as well as forwards; we should regard them not only as they appear to later times, but to a time far earlier; the merits or demerits of the papacy must be tried with reference to the original system of Christianity, not as exhibited only in what is called the early church, but much more as exhibited in Scripture. Is the church system of Innocent the Third, either in faith or in government, the system of the New Testament? That the two differ widely is certain; but is one the developement of the other? Is the spirit of both the same, with no other alteration than one merely external, such as must be found in passing from the infancy of the church to its maturity? Or is the spirit altogether different, so that the later system is not the developement of the earlier, but its perversion? And then follows the enquiry, intensely interesting to those who are able to pursue it, what is the history of this perversion, and how far is it unlike merely, without being corrupted from, the Gospel; for the perversion may not extend through every part of it; there may be in it differences from the original system which are merely external; there may be in it, even where superficially considered it is at variance with the scriptural system, there may be in it developement merely in some instances while there is perversion in others. Only it is essential that we do not look at the first century through the medium of the thirteenth, nor through the medium of any earlier century: the judge's words must not be taken according to the advocate's sense

of them: the first century is to determine our judgment of the second, and of all subsequent centuries; it will not do to assume that the judgment must be interpreted by the very practices and opinions the merits of which it has to try.

We may, however, choose rather to look at the outside of the middle ages than penetrate to the deeper principles which are involved in their contests and their condition. We may study the chroniclers rather, who paint the visible face of things with exceeding liveliness, however little they may be able or may choose to descend to what lies within. And as a specimen of these we may take one of the latest of their number, the celebrated Philip de Comines.

Philip de Comines came from the small town of that name near Lisle in Flanders, and was thus born a subject of the dukes of Burgundy, in the reign of Duke Philip the Good, in the year 1445. He served Duke Philip, and his son Duke Charles the Bold, but left the latter and went over to the service of Louis the Eleventh in 1472, by whom he was employed in his most important and confidential affairs. He was present with Louis during the last scenes of his life at Plessis les Tours; he lived through the reign of Charles the Eighth with great varieties of fortune, being at one time shut up in prison, and at another employed in honourable and important duties, and he died in the reign of Louis the Twelfth. His *Memoirs* embrace a period of thirty-four years, from 1464, when he first entered into the service of Duke Charles of Burgundy, then count of Charolois, to

the death of King Charles the Eighth in 1498. Thus they are not only a contemporary history, but relate mostly to transactions which the writer actually witnessed, or in which he was more or less concerned.

Philip de Comines has been called the father of modern history, a title which would class him with the writers of the second, or what I have called the more complicated period. But it seems to me that he belongs entirely to the simpler period; and this is most apparent when we compare him with Machiavelli, who, although almost his contemporary, yet does in his whole style, and in the tone of his mind, really belong to the later period. Thus in Philip de Comines we meet with scarcely any thing of the great political questions which arose in the next century; his *Memoirs* paint the wars and intrigues carried on by one prince against another for the mere purpose of enlarging his dominions; and, except in the revolts of Liege against the Duke of Burgundy, we see no symptoms of any thing like a war of opinion. We get then only a view of the external appearance of things; and meet with no other difficulties than such as arise from a want of sufficient circumstantial knowledge to enable us to realize his pictures fully.

And here I cannot but congratulate ourselves in this place on those habits of careful sifting and analysis which we either have, or ought to have gained, from our classical studies. Take any large work of a classical historian, and with what niceness

of attention have we been accustomed to read it. How many books have we consulted in illustration of its grammatical difficulties, how have we studied our maps to become familiar with its geography; what various aids have we employed to throw light on its historical allusions, on every office or institution casually named; on all points of military detail, the divisions of the army, the form of the camp, the nature of the weapons and engines used in battles or in sieges; or on all matters of private life, points of law, of domestic economy, of general usages and manners. In this way we penetrate an ancient history by a thousand passages, we explore every thing contained in it; if some points remain obscure, they stand apart from the rest for that very reason distinctly remembered, the very page in which they occur is familiar to us. We are already trained, therefore, in the process of studying history thoroughly; and we have only to repeat for Philip de Comines, or any other writer on whom we may have fixed our choice, the very same method which we have been accustomed to employ with Herodotus and Thucydides.

At the same time it is fair to add, that this process with a modern historian is accidentally much more difficult. For the ancient writers we have our helps ready at hand, well-known, cheap and accessible. The school-boy has his Ainsworth or his Donnegan; he has his small atlas of ancient maps, his compendium of Greek or Roman antiquities, his abridgments of Greek and Roman history. The more

advanced student has his Facciolati, his Schneider, or his Passow; his more elaborate atlas, his fuller histories, his vast collections of Greek and Roman antiquities, to which all the learning of Europe has contributed its aid. How different is the case with the history of the middle ages! If there are any cheap or compendious helps for the study of them, I must profess my ignorance of them. There may be many, known on the Continent if not in England, but I am unable to mention them. For the Latin of the middle ages, I know of nothing in a smaller form than Adelung's abridged edition of Ducange; yet this abridgment consists of six thick octavos. Maps accommodated to the geography of the middle ages, and generally accessible, there are I think, at least in England, none^a. We have nothing I think for the history of the middle ages answering in fulness and convenience to that book so well known to us all, Lempriere's Classical Dictionary. For antiquities, laws, manners, customs, &c., many large and valuable works might be named,—many sources of information scattered about in different places; let me name several excellent papers by Lancelot, St. Palaye, and others, occurring in the volumes of the Memoirs of the French Academy,—but a cheap popular compendium like our old acquaintances Adam and Potter, or the more improved works which are now superseding them, does not, I believe,

^a An atlas of this kind, however, exhibiting the several countries of Europe at successive periods, is now in the course of publication in Germany.

exist. My object in stating this is twofold; first, because to state publicly the want is likely perhaps to excite some one or other to make it good; and secondly, to point out again to you how invaluable is the time which you are passing in this place, inasmuch as the libraries here furnish you with that information in abundance which to any one settled in the country is in ordinary cases inaccessible.

But to return to Philip de Comines. We find well exemplified in him one of the peculiarities of modern history, as distinguished from that of Greece and Rome, the importance namely of attending to genealogies. Many of the wars of modern Europe have been succession wars; questions of disputed inheritance, where either competitor claimed to be the legal heir of the last undoubted possessor of the crown. Of such a nature were the great French wars in Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of which Comines witnessed and has recorded the beginning. And this same thing shews us also how impossible it is to study any age by itself, how necessarily our enquiries run back into previous centuries, how instinctively we look forward to the results in a succeeding period of what we are now studying in its origin. For instance, Comines records the marriage of Mary duchess of Burgundy, daughter and sole heiress of Charles the Bold, with Maximilian archduke of Austria. This marriage, conveying all the dominions of Burgundy to Maximilian and his heirs, established a great independent sovereign on the frontiers of France,

giving to him on the north, not only the present kingdoms of Holland and Belgium, but large portions of what is now French territory, the old provinces of Artoise and French Flanders, French Hainault and French Luxembourg: while on the east it gave him Franche Comté, thus yielding him a footing within the Jura, on the very banks of the Saône. Thence ensued, in after ages, when the Spanish branch of the house of Austria had inherited this part of its dominions, the long contests which deluged the Netherlands with blood, the campaigns of King William and Luxembourg, the nine years of efforts no less skilful than valiant, in which Marlborough broke his way through the fortresses of the iron frontier. Again, when Spain became in a manner French by the accession of the house of Bourbon, the Netherlands reverted once more to Austria itself; and from thence the powers of Europe advanced almost in our own days to assail France as a republic; and on this ground, on the plains of Fleurus, was won the first of those great victories which for nearly twenty years carried the French standards triumphantly over Europe. Thus the marriage recorded by Comines has been working busily down to our very own times: it is only since the settlement of 1814, and that more recent one of 1830, that the Netherlands have ceased to be affected by the union of Charles the Bold's daughter with Maximilian of Austria.

Again, Comines records the expedition of Charles the Eighth of France into Italy to claim the crown

of Naples. He found the throne filled by a prince of the house of Arragon. A Frenchman and a Spaniard contend for the inheritance of the most southern kingdom of Italy. We are obliged to unroll somewhat more of the scroll of time than the part which was at first lying open before us, in order to make this part intelligible. The French king represented the house of Anjou, the elder branch of which, more than two centuries earlier, had been invited by the pope into Italy to uphold the Guelf or papal cause against the Ghibelines or party of the emperors; headed as it was by Manfred king of Naples, son of the Swabian emperor of the house of Hohenstaufen, Frederick the Second. And thus we open upon the rich story of the contests in Italy in the thirteenth century, the conquering march of Charles of Anjou, the unworthy brother of the noblest and holiest of monarchs Louis the Ninth; the battle of Benevento; the sad history of the young Conradin, Manfred's nephew,—his defeat at Scurgola under the old walls of the Marsian and Pelasgian Alba, his cruel execution, the transferring of his claims to Peter of Arragon who had married his cousin Constance, Manfred's daughter, the tragedy of the Sicilian vespers, and the enthroning of the Arragoneze monarch in Sicily. All these earlier events, and the extinction subsequently of the elder branch of the house of Anjou; the crimes and misfortunes of queen Joanna, her adoption of the younger branch of the house of Anjou, and the counter adoption of a prince of the house of Arragon by queen Joanna the

Second, the new contest between the French and Spanish princes, and the triumph of the latter in 1442, fall naturally under our view, in order to explain the expedition of Charles the Eighth. I say nothing of enquiries less closely connected with our main subject, enquiries suggested by the events of the Italian expedition; the state of Florence after the unsubstantial lustre of Lorenzo di Medici's government had passed away; the state of the papacy when Alexander the Sixth could be elected to fill the papal chair. But in the more direct enquiries needed to illustrate the contest in Naples itself, we see how wide a field must be explored of earlier times, in order to understand the passing events of modern history.

The Memoirs of Philip de Comines terminate about twenty years before the reformation, six years after the first voyage of Columbus. They relate then to a tranquil period immediately preceding a period of extraordinary movement; to the last stage of an old state of things, now on the point of passing away. Such periods, the lull before the burst of the hurricane, the almost oppressive stillness which announces the eruption, or to use Campbell's beautiful image,—

“The torrent's smoothness ere it dash below,”

are always, I think, full of a very deep interest. But it is not from the mere force of contrast with the times that follow, nor yet from the solemnity which all things wear when their dissolution is fast ap-

proaching,—the interest has yet another source ; our knowledge namely, that in that tranquil period lay the germs of the great changes following, taking their shape for good or for evil, and sometimes irreversibly, while all wore an outside of unconsciousness. We, enlightened by experience, are impatient of this deadly slumber, we wish in vain that the age could have been awakened to a sense of its condition, and taught the infinite preciousness of the passing hour. And as when a man has been cut off by sudden death, we are curious to know whether his previous words or behaviour indicated any sense of his coming fate, so we examine the records of a state of things just expiring, anxious to observe whether in any point there may be discerned an anticipation of the great future, or whether all was blindness and insensibility. In this respect Comines' Memoirs are striking from their perfect unconsciousness : the knell of the middle ages had been already sounded, yet Comines has no other notions than such as they had tended to foster ; he describes their events, their characters, their relations, as if they were to continue for centuries. His remarks are such as the simplest form of human affairs gives birth to ; he laments the instability of earthly fortune, as Homer notes our common mortality, or in the tone of that beautiful dialogue between Solon and Cræsus, when the philosopher assured the king that to be rich was not necessarily to be happy. But resembling Herodotus in his simple morality, he is utterly unlike him in another point ; for whilst Herodotus speaks freely

and honestly of all men without respect of persons, Philip de Comines praises his master Louis the Eleventh as one of the best of princes, although he witnessed not only the crimes of his life, but the miserable fears and suspicions of his latter end, and has even faithfully recorded them. In this respect Philip de Comines is in no respect superior to Froissart, with whom the crimes committed by his knights and great lords never interfere with his general eulogies of them : the habit of deference and respect was too strong to be broken, and the facts which he himself relates to their discredit, appear to have produced on his mind no impression.

It is not then in Philip de Comines, nor in the other historians of the earlier period of modern history, that we find the greatest historical questions presenting themselves. If we attempt to ascend to these, we must seek them by ourselves ; the historians themselves do not naturally lead us to them. But we must now proceed to the second or more complicated period, and we must see to what kind of enquiries the histories of this period immediately introduce us, and what is necessary to enable us fully to understand the scenes which they present to us. And on this subject I hope to enter in my next lecture.

LECTURE III.

It is my hope, if I am allowed to resume these lectures next year, to enter fully into the history of some one characteristic period of the middle ages, to point out as well as I can the sources of information respecting it, and to paint it, and enable you to judge of its nature both absolutely and relatively to us. But for the present, I must turn to that period which is properly to be called modern history, the modern of the modern, the complicated period as I have called it, in contradistinction to the simpler period which preceded it. And here too, if life and health be spared me, I hope hereafter to enter into minute details; selecting some one country as the principal subject of our enquiries, and illustrating the lessons of history for the most part from its particular experience. Now, however, I must content myself with more general notices: I must remember that I am endeavouring to assist the student of modern history, by suggesting to him the best method of

studying it, and pointing out the principal difficulties which will impede his progress. I must not suppose the student to be working only at the history of one country, or one age: the points of interest in the three last centuries are so numerous that our researches may be carried on far apart from each other, and I must endeavour, so far as my knowledge will permit, to render these lectures serviceable generally.

Now in the first place, when we enter upon modern history, our work, limit it as we will, unavoidably grows in magnitude. Allowing that we are not so extravagant as to aim at mastering the details of the history of the whole world, that we set aside oriental history and colonial history; that farther, having now restricted ourselves to Europe, we separate the western kingdoms from the northern and eastern, and confine our attention principally to our own country and to those which have been most closely connected with it; yet still the limit which we strive to draw round our enquiries will be continually broken through, they will and must extend themselves beyond it. Northern, eastern, and south-eastern Europe, the vast world of European colonies, nay sometimes the distinct oriental world itself, will demand our attention: there is scarcely a portion of the globe of which we can be suffered to remain in complete ignorance. Amidst this wide field, widening as it were before us at every step, it becomes doubly important to gain certain principles of enquiry,

lest we should be wandering about vaguely like an ignorant man in an ill-arranged museum, seeing and wondering at much, but learning nothing.

The immense variety of history makes it very possible for different persons to study it with different objects; and here we have an obvious and convenient division. But the great object, as I cannot but think, is that which most nearly touches the inner life of civilized man, namely, the vicissitudes of institutions, social, political, and religious. This, in my judgment, is the *τελειότατον τέλος* of historical enquiry; but because of its great and crowning magnitude we will assign to it its due place of honour, we will survey the exterior and the outer courts of the temple, before we approach the sanctuary.

In history, as in other things, a knowledge of the external is needed before we arrive at that which is within. We want to get a sort of frame for our picture; a set of local habitations, *τόποι*, where our ideas may be arranged, a scene in which the struggle of principles is to be fought, and men who are to fight it. And thus we want to know clearly the geographical bounds of different countries, and their external revolutions. This leads us in the first instance to geography and military history, even if our ultimate object lies beyond. But being led to them by necessity we linger in them afterwards from choice; so much is there in both of the most picturesque and poetical character, so much of

beauty, of magnificence, and of interest, physical and moral.

The student of modern history especially needs a knowledge of geography, because, as I have said, his enquiries will lead him first or last to every quarter of the globe. But let us consider a little what a knowledge of geography is. First, I grant, it is a knowledge of the relative position and distance of places from one another: and by places I mean either towns, or the habitations of particular tribes or nations; for I think our first notion of a map is that of a plan of the dwellings of the human race; we connect it strictly with man, and with man's history. And here I believe many persons' geography stops: they have an idea of the shape, relative position and distance of different countries; and of the position, that is as respects the points of the compass, and mutual distance, of the principal towns. Every one for example has a notion of the shapes of France and of Italy, that one is situated north-west of the other, and that their frontiers join: and again, every one knows that Paris is situated in the north of France, Bordeaux in the south-west; that Venice lies at the north-east corner of Italy, and Rome nearly in the middle as regards north and south, and near to the western sea. Thus much of knowledge is indeed indispensable to the simplest understanding of history; and this kind of knowledge, extending over more or less countries as it may be, and embracing with more or less minuteness the divisions of

provinces, and the position of the smaller towns, is that which passes, I believe, with many for a knowledge of geography.

Yet you will observe, that this knowledge does not touch the earth itself, but only the dwellings of men upon the earth. It regards the shapes of a certain number of great national estates, if I may so call them; the limits of which, like those of individuals' property, have often respect to no natural boundaries but are purely arbitrary. A real knowledge of geography embraces at once a knowledge of the earth, and of the dwellings of man upon it; it stretches out one hand to history, and the other to geology and physiology; it is just that part in the dominion of knowledge where the students of physical and of moral science meet together.

And without denying the usefulness of that plan-like knowledge of geography of which I was just now speaking, it cannot be doubted that a far deeper knowledge of it is required by him who would study history effectively. And the deeper knowledge becomes far the easier to remember. For my own part I find it extremely difficult to remember the position of towns, when I have no other association with them than their situation relatively to each other. But let me once understand the real geography of a country, its organic structure if I may so call it: the form of its skeleton, that is, of its hills: the magnitude and course of its veins and arteries, that is, of its streams and rivers: let me conceive of it as of a whole made up of connected

parts; and then the position of man's dwellings, viewed in reference to these parts, becomes at once easily remembered, and lively and intelligible besides.

I said that geography held out one hand to geology and physiology, while she held out the other to history. In fact geology and physiology themselves are closely connected with history. For instance, what lies at the bottom of that question which is now being discussed everywhere, the question of the corn laws, but the geological fact that England is more richly supplied with coal mines^a than any other

^a The importance of our coal mines is so great, that I think it a duty to reprint here a note of Dr. Buckland's, which is to be found in p. 41 of his "Address delivered at the Anniversary Meeting of the Geological Society of London, 19th February, 1841." What Dr. Buckland says on such a subject is of the very highest authority; and should be circulated as widely as possible.

"As no more coal is in process of formation, and our national prosperity must inevitably terminate with the exhaustion of those precious stores of mineral fuel, which form the foundation of our greatest manufacturing and commercial establishments, I feel it my duty to entreat the attention of the legislature to two evil practices which are tending to accelerate the period when the contents of our coal mines will have been consumed. The first of these is the wanton waste which for more than fifty years has been committed by the coal-owners near Newcastle, by screening and burning annually in never-extinguished *fiery heaps* at the pits' mouth, more than one million of chaldrons of excellent small coal, being nearly one third of the entire produce of the best coal-mines in England. This criminal destruction of the elements of our national industry, which is accelerating by one third the not very distant period when these mines will be exhausted, is perpetrated

country in the world? What has given a peculiar interest to our relations with China, but the physiological fact, that the tea plant, which is become so necessary to our daily life, has been cultivated with equal success in no other climate or country? What is it which threatens the permanence of the union between the northern and southern states of the American confederacy, but the physiological fact that the soil and climate of the southern states render them essentially agricultural; while those of the northern states, combined with their geographical advantages as to sea-ports, dispose them no less naturally to be manufacturing and commercial? The whole character of a nation may be influenced by its geology and physical geography.

But for the sake of its mere beauty and liveliness, if there were no other consideration, it would be worth our while to acquire this richer view of geography. Conceive only the difference between a ground plan and a picture. The mere plan-geography of Italy

by the colliers, for the purpose of selling the remaining two thirds at a greater profit than they would derive from the sale of the entire bulk unscreened to the coal-merchant.

“The second evil is the exportation of coal to foreign countries, in some of which it is employed to work the machinery of rival manufactories, that in certain cases could scarcely be maintained without a supply of British coals. In 1839, 1,431,861 tons were exported, and in 1840, 1,592,283 tons, of which nearly one fourth were sent to France. An *increased duty* on coals exported to any country, excepting our own colonies, might afford a remedy. See note on this subject in my Bridgewater Treatise, vol. i. p. 535.”

gives us its shape, as I have observed, and the position of its towns; to these it may add a semi-circle of mountains round the northern boundary, to represent the Alps; and another long line stretching down the middle of the country to represent the Apennines. But let us carry on this a little farther, and give life and meaning and harmony to what is at present at once lifeless and confused. Observe in the first place, how the Apennine line, beginning from the southern extremity of the Alps, runs across Italy to the very edge of the Adriatic, and thus separates naturally the Italy proper of the Romans from Cisalpine Gaul. Observe again, how the Alps, after running north and south where they divide Italy from France, turn then away to the eastward, running almost parallel to the Apennines, till they too touch the head of the Adriatic, on the confines of Istria. Thus between these two lines of mountains there is enclosed one great basin or plain; enclosed on three sides by mountains, open only on the east to the sea. Observe how widely it spreads itself out, and then see how well it is watered. One great river flows through it in its whole extent; and this is fed by streams almost unnumbered, descending towards it on either side, from the Alps on one side, and from the Apennines on the other. Who can wonder that this large and rich and well-watered plain should be filled with flourishing cities, or that it should have been contended for so often by successive invaders? Then descending into Italy proper, we find the complexity of its geography quite in accordance with its

manifold political divisions. It is not one simple central ridge of mountains, leaving a broad belt of level country on either side between it and the sea; nor yet is it a chain rising immediately from the sea on one side, like the Andes in South America, and leaving room therefore on the other side for wide plains of table land, and for rivers with a sufficient length of course to become at last great and navigable. It is a back-bone thickly set with spines of unequal length, some of them running out at regular distances parallel to each other, but others twisted so strangely that they often run for a long way parallel to the back-bone, or main ridge, and interlace with one another in a maze almost inextricable. And as if to complete the disorder, in those spots where the spines of the Apennines, being twisted round, run parallel to the sea and to their own central chain, and thus leave an interval of plain between their bases and the Mediterranean, volcanic agency has broken up the space thus left with other and distinct groups of hills of its own creation, as in the case of Vesuvius and of the Alban hills near Rome. Speaking generally then, Italy is made up of an infinite multitude of valleys pent in between high and steep hills, each forming a country to itself, and cut off by natural barriers from the others. Its several parts are isolated by nature, and no art of man can thoroughly unite them. Even the various provinces of the same kingdom are strangers to each other; the Abruzzi are like an unknown world to the inhabitants of Naples, insomuch that when two Nea-

politan naturalists not ten years since made an excursion to visit the Majella, one of the highest of the central Apennines, they found there many medicinal plants growing in the greatest profusion, which the Neapolitans were regularly in the habit of importing from other countries, as no one suspected their existence within their own kingdom. Hence arises the romantic character of Italian scenery: the constant combination of a mountain outline, and all the wild features of a mountain country, with the rich vegetation of a southern climate in the valleys: hence too the rudeness, the pastoral simplicity, and the occasional robber habits, to be found in the population; so that to this day you may travel in many places for miles together in the plains and valleys without passing through a single town or village: for the towns still cluster on the mountain sides, the houses nestling together on some scanty ledge, with cliffs rising above them and sinking down abruptly below them, the very "*congesta manu præruptis oppida saxis*" of Virgil's description, which he even then called "antique walls," because they had been the strongholds of the primeval inhabitants of the country, and which are still inhabited after a lapse of so many centuries, nothing of the stir and movement of other parts of Europe having penetrated into these lonely valleys, and tempted the people to quit their mountain fastnesses for a more accessible dwelling in the plain.

I have been led on farther than I intended; but I wished to give an example of what I meant by a real

and lively knowledge of geography, which brings the whole character of a country before our eyes, and enables us to understand its influence upon the social and political condition of its inhabitants. And this knowledge, as I said before, is very important to enable us to follow clearly the external revolutions of different nations, which we want to comprehend before we penetrate to what has been passing within.

The undoubted tendency of the last three centuries has been to consolidate what were once separate states or kingdoms into one great nation. The Spanish peninsula, which in earlier times had contained many distinct states, came to consist as at present of two kingdoms only, Spain and Portugal, in the last ten years of the fifteenth century. France about the same period acquired Bretagne and Provence, but its acquisitions of Artois, of Franche Comté, of French Flanders, of Lorraine and of Alsace, have been much later; and Avignon and its territory were not acquired till the revolution. For a century after the beginning of our period, Scotland and England were governed by different sovereigns; for two centuries they remained distinct kingdoms; and the legislative union with Ireland is no older than the present century. Looking eastward, how many kingdoms and states have been swallowed up in the empire of Austria: Bohemia, and Hungary: the duchies of Milan and Mantua, and the republic of Venice. The growth of Prussia into a mighty kingdom, and Russia into the most colossal of empires, is

the work of the last century or of the present. Even in Germany and Italy, where smaller states still subsist, the same law has been in operation ; of all the free imperial cities of Germany four only are left, Frankfort, Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubec ; and not Prussia only but Bavaria has grown into a great kingdom. So it has been in Italy ; Venice and Genoa have both been absorbed in our own days into the monarchies of Austria and Sardinia ; but the sixteenth century, and even the fifteenth had begun this work : Venice had extinguished the independence of Padua and Verona ; Florence had conquered its rival Pisa : and at a later period the duchies of Ferrara and Urbino fell under the dominion of the popes. This then has been the tendency of things generally ; but it has been a tendency by no means working unchecked ; on the contrary, wherever it has threatened to lead to the universal or overbearing dominion of a single state, it has been strenuously resisted, and resisted with success ; as in the case of Austria and Spain in the sixteenth and early part of the seventeenth centuries, of France at the end of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth ; of England in some degree after the peace of Paris in 1763, and again of France in our own times. These successive excesses of the tendency towards consolidation, and the resistance offered to them, afford some of the most convenient divisions for the external history of modern Europe, and as such I will briefly notice them.

We have seen that at the end of the fifteenth cen-

tury, France and Spain had already become greatly consolidated within themselves; the former by the acquisition of the duchy of Burgundy, of Provence, and above all of Bretagne; the latter by the union of the kingdoms of Castile and Leon, and the destruction of the Moorish kingdom of Granada. But after the marriage of the heiress of Burgundy to Maximilian archduke of Austria had united the Netherlands and Franche Comté to the Austrian dominions, the subsequent marriage of the archduke Philip, Maximilian's son, with Joanna daughter and heiress of Ferdinand and Isabella, added to them besides in the beginning of the sixteenth century the whole inheritance of the crown of Spain. And as the kingdom of Naples had finally fallen into the hands of Ferdinand of Arragon, at the termination of the long struggle between the Arragoneze line and that of Anjou, Naples also was included in this inheritance. So that when Charles the Fifth, the archduke Philip's son, succeeded his grandfather Maximilian as emperor, in 1519, the mass of his dominions seemed to put him in the way of acquiring an universal empire. And this Austro-Spanish power is the first of those which going beyond the just limits of the law of consolidation of states, threatened to alter altogether the condition of Europe.

It was opposed principally by France, kept at bay by Francis the First throughout his reign, notwithstanding the defeats which he suffered; humbled by the successful alliance of his successor Henry the Second with the German Protestants in 1551, and

finally dissolved by the abdication of Charles the Fifth, and the consequent division of his empire, his brother Ferdinand succeeding to his German dominions, whilst his son Philip inherited Spain, Naples, and the Netherlands. This took place in 1555, the second year of the reign of our queen Mary.

But though deprived of his father's German dominions, yet the inheritance of Philip the Second was still so ample that the Spanish power itself overstepped its just bounds, and became a new object of alarm to Europe. The conquest of Portugal after the death of king Sebastian in Africa had given to Philip the whole Spanish peninsula; to this were added the Spanish discoveries and conquests in America, with the wealth derived from them; besides the kingdom of Naples, including the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, and the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands. There was this important circumstance in addition, that France, which had successfully resisted Charles the Fifth, was now distracted by its own religious wars, and in no condition to uphold the balance of power abroad. The dominion of Philip the Second was therefore a very reasonable cause of alarm.

But this too was resisted and dissolved; principally owing to the revolt of the Netherlands, the opposition of England, and the return of France to her proper place amongst European powers, when her religious wars were ended by Henry the Fourth. Philip lived to see the decline of his power, and the dismemberment of his empire was sanctioned by his

successor Philip the Third, who virtually resigned his claim to the sovereignty of the seven united provinces of the Netherlands, the newly formed republic of Holland. This great concession, expressed under the form of a truce for twelve years, was made in the year 1609, the sixth year of the reign of our James the First.

During the reign of Philip the Second, Austria had stood aloof from Spain; but in the reigns of his successors the two branches of the Austrian line were drawn more closely together, and their power was exerted for the same object. The conquest of the Palatinate by the emperor Ferdinand the Second, in 1622, again excited general alarm, and resistance was organized once more against the dangerous power of the house of Austria. France, under Richelieu, was once more the principal bond of the union, but the power which acted the most prominent part was one which had not hitherto interfered in the general affairs of Europe, the northern kingdom of Sweden. Sweden, Holland, and the protestant states of Germany, were leagued against the house of Austria under its two heads, the emperor and the king of Spain. Again the resisting power triumphed; the Austrian power in Germany was effectually restrained by the peace of Westphalia, in 1648; Spain saw Portugal again become an independent kingdom, and when she ended her quarrel with France by the peace of the Pyrenees in 1659, she retired for ever from the foremost place amongst the powers of Europe.

Austria thus curbed, and Spain falling into decline,

room was left for others to succeed to the highest place in Europe, now left vacant, and that place was immediately occupied by France. Louis the Fourteenth, Henry the Fourth's grandson, began to reign without governors in the year 1661, the year after our restoration, and for the next twenty or thirty years the French power became more and more formidable. Its conquests indeed were not considerable, when compared with those of a later period, yet were they in themselves of great and enduring importance. French Flanders gave to France the fortress of Lisle and the port of Dunkirk. Franche Comté extended its frontier to the eastern slope of the Jura, and the borders of Switzerland; Alsace carried it over the crest of the Vosges, and established it on the Rhine. But the power of France was not to be judged of merely by its territorial conquests. Its navy had arisen from nothing to the sovereignty of the seas; its internal resources were developed, the ascendancy of its arts, its fashions, and its literature, was universal. Yet this fourth alarm of universal dominion passed away like those which had preceded it. And here the resisting power was England, which now for the first time since the reign of Elizabeth, took an active part in the affairs of Europe. This change was effected by the accession of William the Third, the stadtholder of Holland and the great antagonist of Louis the Fourteenth, to the throne of England; and by the strong national, and religious, and political feeling against France which possessed the English people.

William checked the power of Louis the Fourteenth, Marlborough and Eugene overthrew it. Oppressed by defeats abroad, and by famine and misery at home, Louis was laid at the mercy of his enemies, and was only saved by a party revolution in the English ministry. But the peace of Utrecht in 1713, although it sanctioned the succession of the French prince Philip, grandson of king Louis, to the throne of Spain, yet by its other stipulations, and still more by the weakness which made France accept it, shewed sufficiently that all danger of French dominion was effectually overpast.

Then followed a period of nearly ninety years, during which the external order of Europe was not materially threatened. Had Frederic the Second of Prussia possessed greater physical resources, his personal qualities and dispositions might have made him the most formidable of conquerors; but as it was, his extraordinary efforts were essentially defensive; it was his glory at the end of the Seven Years' War that Prussia was not overwhelmed, that it had shattered the mighty confederacy which had assailed it, and that having ridden out the storm, the fiery trial left it with confirmed and proved strength, and protected besides by the shield of its glory. England alone, by her great colonial and naval successes in the war of 1755, and by the high pretensions of her naval code, excited during this period the jealousy of Europe; and thus not only France and Spain, but her old ally Holland, took part against her in the American war, and the northern powers shewed that

their disposition was equally unfriendly, by agreeing together in their armed neutrality. But in the loss of America, England seemed to have paid a sufficient penalty, and the spirit of jealousy and hostility against her did not appear to survive the conclusion of the peace of Paris in 1783.

Ten years afterwards there broke out by far the most alarming danger of universal dominion, which had ever threatened Europe. The most military people in Europe became engaged in a war for their very existence. Invasion on the frontiers, civil war and all imaginable horrors raging within, the ordinary relations of life went to wrack, and every Frenchman became a soldier. It was a multitude numerous as the hosts of Persia, but animated by the courage and skill and energy of the old Romans. One thing alone was wanting, that which Pyrrhus said the Romans wanted, to enable them to conquer the world, a general and a ruler like himself. There was wanted a master hand to restore and maintain peace at home, and to concentrate and direct the immense military resources of France against her foreign enemies. And such an one appeared in Napoleon. Pacifying La Vendee, receiving back the emigrants, restoring the church, remodelling the law, personally absolute, yet carefully preserving and maintaining all the great points which the nation had won at the revolution, Napoleon united in himself not only the power but the whole will of France, and that power and will were guided by a genius for war such as Europe had never seen since Cæsar.

The effect was absolutely magical. In November 1799 he was made First Consul; he found France humbled by defeats, his Italian conquests lost, his allies invaded, his own frontier threatened. He took the field in May 1800, and in June the whole fortune of the war was changed, and Austria driven out of Lombardy by the victory of Marengo. Still the flood of the tide rose higher and higher, and every successive wave of its advance swept away a kingdom. Earthly state has never reached a prouder pinnacle, than when Napoleon in June 1812 gathered his army at Dresden, that mighty host, unequalled in all time, of 450,000, not men merely but effective soldiers, and there received the homage of subject kings. And now what was the principal adversary of this tremendous power? by whom was it checked, and resisted, and put down? By none, and by nothing, but the direct and manifest interposition of God. I know of no language so well fitted to describe that victorious advance to Moscow, and the utter humiliation of the retreat, as the language of the prophet with respect to the advance and subsequent destruction of the host of Sennacherib. "When they arose early in the morning, behold they were all dead corpses," applies almost literally to that memorable night of frost in which twenty thousand horses perished, and the strength of the French army was utterly broken. Human instruments no doubt were employed in the remainder of the work, nor would I deny to Germany and to Prussia the glories of that great year 1813,

nor to England the honour of her victories in Spain, or of the crowning victory of Waterloo. But at the distance of thirty years, those who lived in the time of danger, and remember its magnitude, and now calmly review what there was in human strength to avert it, must acknowledge, I think, beyond all controversy, that the deliverance of Europe from the dominion of Napoleon was effected neither by Russia, nor by Germany, nor by England, but by the hand of God alone.

What I have now been noticing will afford one division which may be convenient for the student of modern history; one division, out of many which might be made, and purely an external one. But for this purpose it may be useful, just as we sometimes divide Grecian History into the periods of the Lacedæmonian, the Athenian, the Theban, and the Macedonian ascendancy. It shews us how the centre of external movement has varied, round what point the hopes and fears of Europe have been successively busy, so far as concerns external dominion. You will observe, however, how strictly I have confined myself to the outward and merely territorial struggle; how entirely I have omitted all those other and deeper points which are in connexion with the principles of internal life. I have regarded Austria, Spain, and France purely in one and the same light; that is, as national bodies occupying a certain space on the map of Europe, and endeavouring to spread themselves beyond this space, and so deranging

the position of those other national bodies which existed in their neighbourhood. You know that this is a very imperfect representation of the great contests of Europe. You know that Austria and Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were not merely two nations governed by the same sovereign or by sovereigns closely allied together, and which sought their own aggrandizement at the expense of their neighbours. They were a great deal more than this; they were the representatives, not purely but in a great measure, of certain political and religious principles; and the triumph of these principles was involved in their territorial conquests. So again, the resistance to them was in part also the resistance of the opposite principles; in part, but by no means purely. It is worth our while to observe this, as one instance out of thousands, how little any real history is an exact exemplification of abstract principles; how our generalizations,—which must indeed be made, for so alone can history furnish us with any truths,—must yet be kept within certain limits, or they become full of error. Thus, for instance, it is quite true to say that the struggle against Austria and Spain in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not a mere resistance against territorial aggression: there were principles involved in the contest. Yet all concerned in this resistance did not feel it to be a contest of principle: France under Francis the First and Henry the Second, and again under Henry the Fourth, and lastly under Louis the Thirteenth, or rather under Richelieu, was most deeply engaged in

the resistance to Austria and Spain; yet certainly the French government at no one time was contending either for Christian truth or for civil freedom. With France it was a purely territorial and external contest; and this was well shewn by the conduct of Francis the First, who burnt French protestants at Paris, while he was allying himself with the protestants of Germany; who opposed, accidentally indeed, the papal power and cause, but who did not scruple to form a league with the Turks. So again, in the Thirty Years' War, that very Richelieu who mainly contributed to the establishment of protestantism in Germany on a perfectly equal footing by the treaty of Westphalia, was the very man who threw his mole across the harbour of Rochelle, and conquered the great stronghold of protestantism in France.

These external movements, then, as we have now been contemplating them, involve no questions of political or religious principle. We may conceive of them as of a mere game of chess, where the pieces and pawns on both sides differ from each other only in being played from a different part of the board. What we have to consider in these contests are mostly economical questions and military: the purse and the sword were the powers which decided them. But is the study of such questions indifferent to us? That surely it were most unwise to imagine. For in the first place, these very contests which we are now regarding as purely external, were really as we have seen contests of principle also; and thus the economical and military skill which determined their

issue, were in fact the means by which certain principles were attacked or defended. Besides, economy and military virtues are the great supports of national existence, as food and exercise support our individual bodies. I grant that the existence so supported may be worthless, may be sinful: yet self-preservation is an essential condition of all virtue; in order to do their duty both states and individuals must first live and be kept alive. But more than all this, economical and military questions are not purely external; they are connected closely with moral good and evil; a faulty political economy is the fruitful parent of crime; a sound military system is no mean school of virtue; and war, as I have said before, has in its vicissitudes, and much more in the moral qualities which it calls into action, a deep and abiding interest for every one worthy of the name of man.

Economical questions arise obviously out of the history of all wars, although careless readers are very apt to neglect them. They arise out of that simple law of our nature which makes it necessary for every man to eat and drink and be clothed. Common readers, and I am afraid I may add, many historians also, appear to write and read about military operations without recollecting this. We hear of armies marching, advancing and retreating, besieging towns, fighting battles, being engaged actively for some weeks or months, and are apt to think of them solely as moving or fighting machines, whose success depends on the skill with which their general plays them, as if they were really so many chess-men. Yet

one would think it was sufficiently obvious that these armies are made up of men who must eat and drink every day, and who wear clothing. Of the expense and difficulty of maintaining them it is not easy, I grant, for private persons in peace to form any adequate idea. Yet here we may gain something more of a notion of it than can be obtained readily in a private family. A college will contain perhaps seventy or eighty members; let any man but look round the hall at dinner; or let him go into the kitchen and see the number of joints at the fire, or let him ask the number of pounds of meat required for the daily consumption of the college, and see what the cost will amount to. Then he may think what it is to provide for the food not of eighty or of ninety persons, but of twenty, or of forty, or of sixty, or even of a hundred thousand. All this multitude doing nothing to raise food or make clothing for themselves, must be fed and clothed out of the wealth of the community. Again this community may have to maintain not one of these armies but several, and large fleets besides, and this for many years together; while it may often happen that its means of doing so are at the same time crippled: its foreign trade may be cut off, or large portions of its territory may be laid waste; while the event of the contest being uncertain, and defeat and ruin being a possible consequence of it, hope and confidence are checked, and with them credit perishes also. Is it then a light matter first to provide the necessary resources for such a contest, and next to see that they are not spent wastefully?

With regard to providing them, there is first the great question between direct taxation and loans. Shall we lay the whole burden of the contest upon the present generation, or divide it between ourselves and posterity? Conceive now the difficulties, the exceeding temptations, which beset the decision of this question. In a free government it may be doubtful whether the people will consent to raise the money or no. But suppose that legally they have no voice in the matter, that the government may lay on what taxes it will; still extreme discontent at home is not likely to be risked in the midst of foreign war; or if the people are willing to bear the burden still the power may be wanting. A tax may easily destroy itself: that is, suppose that a man's trade just yields him a profit which he can live upon, and a tax is laid upon him to the amount of a fourth part of his profit. If he raises the price of his commodity to the consumer, the consumer will either purchase so much the less of it, or will endeavour to procure it from other countries where the dealer being less heavily taxed can afford to sell on cheaper terms. Then the government interposes to protect the taxed native dealer by prohibiting the importation of the commodity of the untaxed foreigner. But such a prohibition running counter to a plain rule of common sense, which makes every man desire to buy a cheaper article rather than a dearer, when both are of equal goodness, it can only be maintained by force. Thence arises the necessity of a large constabulary or preventive force to put down smuggling, and, to say

nothing of the moral evils produced by such a state of things, it is clear that the expense of the additional preventive force which the new tax rendered necessary, is all to be deducted from the profits of that tax ; and this deduction, added to the falling off in its productiveness occasioned by the greater poverty of the tax payer, may reduce its return almost to nothing. Suppose then that a statesman, appalled by all these difficulties, resolves to share the burden with posterity, and begins to raise money by loans. No doubt for the present his work is greatly facilitated ; instead of providing for the principal of the money which he wants, he has only to provide for the interest of it. But observe what follows. In the first place, by an almost universal law of our nature, money lightly gained is lightly spent : a revenue raised at the expense of posterity is sure to be squandered wastefully. Waste as usual begetting want, the sums raised by loans will commonly be large. Now these large sums are a mortgage on all the property, on all the industry, on all the skill and ability of a country for ever. Every acre of land from henceforth has not only to maintain its owner and his family, and to answer the just demands of the actual public service, but it has also to feed one or more extraneous persons besides, the state's creditors or their heirs, who in times past lent it their money. Every man who would have laboured twelve hours for the support of his family and the public service of his own generation, must labour one or two hours in addition, for the support of a stranger, the state's creditor. So

with all its property, with all its industry, with all its powers thus burdened, thus strained to the very extremity of endurance, the nation is committed to the vicissitudes of all coming time, to run in the race with other nations who are in the full freshness of their unstrained strength ; to battle with occasional storms which would try the lightest and stoutest vessel, but in which one already overloaded till the timbers are well nigh starting, must necessarily expect to founder.

Such then being the financial or economical difficulties besetting every great contest, it is no mean wisdom to avoid them as far as is possible ; to make the people so keenly enter into the necessity of the contest that they will make real sacrifices to maintain it ; so to choose the subjects of taxation, and so to distribute its burden, as to make it press with the least possible severity, neither seriously impairing a people's resources, nor irritating their feelings by a sense of its inequality. If a statesman after all finds that he must borrow,—and I am far from denying that such a necessity has sometimes existed,—it is no mean administrative wisdom to enforce the strictest economy in his expenditure ; rigorously to put down and punish all jobbing, whether in high quarters or in low, but more especially in the former ; to resist the fatal temptation of having frequent recourse to an expedient promising present ease and only threatening future ruin ; and to keep his eye steadily upon the payment within a definite time of the sums which he is obliged to borrow. That

this is a most rare and high wisdom we shall learn from history, by seeing the fatal consequences of the opposite follies: consequences wide and deep and lasting; and affecting not only a nation's physical welfare, but through it surely and fatally corrupting its higher welfare also.

One example of this sad truth may be taken from a foreign history; the other which I shall give affects us yet more closely. We know in how many wars France was engaged throughout the eighteenth century. We know that in the Seven Years' War her efforts were great and her defeats overwhelming, while her government was in the highest degree wasteful and unequal in its dealings towards the different classes of society. We know that about fifteen years afterwards France again engaged in our American war, and supported a very expensive contest, still aggravated as before by wastefulness, corruption, and injustice at home, for the space of five years. A general embarrassment in the finances was the consequence, and this brought the old and inveterate evils of the political and social state of France to a head. Both together led, not to the revolution, but to those tremendous disorders which accompanied and followed the revolution; disorders quite distinct from it, and which were owing mainly to the extremely unhealthy state of the social relations in France, to which unhealthy state wide-spreading distress, brought on by a most unequal and corrupt system of taxation, had largely contributed.

The other, and unhappily the nearer instance, is

yet even more significant. Whatever distress or difficulty at this moment surrounds us, has its source in a very great degree in financial or economical causes. Of course I am not going to offer any opinion as to the present or future; I am merely referring to what is an historical fact belonging to the past. It is a fact beyond all controversy that the wars of the last century, and particularly that great war which raged during the first fifteen years of the present century, were supported largely by loans; it is no less certain a fact that of the debt thus contracted a sum amounting to above £700,000,000 is still unpaid, and that more than half of our yearly revenue, to say the least, is appropriated to paying the interest of it. That such a burden must be too much for the resources or industry of any country to bear without injury, would seem to be a proposition absolutely self-evident. Every interest in the country is subject to unfair disadvantages in the competition with foreigners; every interest being heavily taxed is either unable, or able only by the most extraordinary exertions, to sustain itself in the market of the world against untaxed or lightly taxed rivals. Now the evils being enormous, and so far as we can see perpetual, it does become an important question to ask, whether they were also inevitable? that is to say, whether, if the same circumstances were to occur again, which is a matter not within our control, we should have no choice but to adopt the very same financial expedients. It may be that the sums raised, and nothing less, were required by the urgency of

the crisis; it may be that no larger portion of them could have been raised by present taxation than was so raised actually; it may be that nothing more could have been done to liquidate the debt when contracted than has been done actually. But where the measures adopted have been so ruinous, we must at least be disposed to hope that they might have been avoided; that here, as in so many other instances, the fault rests not with fortune or with outward circumstances, but with human passion and human error.

Such is the importance and such the interest of the economical questions which arise out of the history of the great external contests of modern Europe. The military questions connected with the same history, will form our next subject of enquiry; and on this I propose to enter in my next lecture.

LECTURE IV.

AT the very beginning of this lecture I must myself remind you, lest it should occur to your own minds if I were to omit it, of that well-known story of the Greek sophist who discoursed at length upon the art of war, when Hannibal happened to be amongst his audience. Some of his hearers, full of admiration of his eloquence and knowledge, for such it seemed to them, eagerly applied to the great general for his judgment, not doubting that it would confirm their own. But Hannibal's answer was, that he had met with many absurd old men in his life, but never with one so absurd as this lecturer. The recollection of this story should ever be present to unmilitary men, when they attempt to speak about war; and though there may be no Hannibal actually present amongst us, yet I would wish to speak as cautiously as if my words were to be heard by one as competent to judge them as he was.

But although the story relates to the art of war only, yet it is in fact universally applicable. The

unprofessional man, *ιδιώτης*, must speak with hesitation in presence of a master of his craft. And not only in his presence, but generally, he who is a stranger to any profession must be aware of his own disadvantages when speaking of the subject of that profession. Yet consider, on the other hand, that no one man in the common course of things has more than one profession; is he then to be silent, or to feel himself incapable of passing a judgment upon the subjects of all professions except that one? And consider farther, that professional men may labour under some disadvantages of their own, looking at their calling from within always, and never from without; and from their very devotion to it, not being apt to see it in its relations with other matters. Farther still, the writer of history seems under the necessity of overstepping this professional barrier; he must speak of wars, he must speak of legislation, he must often speak of religious disputes, and of questions of political economy. Yet he cannot be at once soldier, seaman, statesman, lawyer, clergyman, and merchant. Clearly then there is a distinction to be drawn somewhere, there must be a point up to which an unprofessional judgment of a professional subject may be not only competent but of high authority; although beyond that point it cannot venture without presumption and folly.

The distinction seems to lie originally in the difference between the power of doing a thing, and that of perceiving whether it be well done or not. He who lives in the house, says Aristotle, is a better

judge of its being a good or a bad one, than the builder of it. He can tell not only whether the house is good or bad, but wherein its defects consist ; he can say to the builder, This chimney smokes, or has a bad draught : or this arrangement of the rooms is inconvenient ; and yet he may be quite unable to cure the chimney, or to draw out a plan for his rooms which would on the whole suit him better. Nay, sometimes he can even see where the fault is which has caused the mischief, and yet he may not know practically how to remedy it. Following up this principle, it would appear that what we understand least in the profession of another is the detail of his practice ; we may appreciate his object, may see where he has missed it, or where he is pursuing it ill ; nay, may understand generally the method of setting about it ; but we fail in the minute details. Applying this to the art of war, and we shall see, I think, that the part which unprofessional men can least understand is what is technically called tactic, the practical management of the men in action or even upon parade ; the handling, so to speak, of themselves, no less than the actual handling of their weapons. Let a man be as versed as he will in military history, he must well know that in these essential points of the last resort he is helpless, and the commonest serjeant, or the commonest soldier, knows infinitely more of the matter than he does. But in proportion as we recede from these details to more general points, first to what is technically called strategy, that is to say, the directing the movements

of an army with a view to the accomplishment of the object of the campaign; and next to the whole conduct of the war, as political or moral questions may affect it, in that proportion general knowledge and powers of mind come into play, and an unprofessional person may without blame speak or write on military subjects, and may judge of them sufficiently.

Thus much premised, we may venture to look a little at the history of the great external contests of Europe, and as all our historians are full of descriptions of wars and battles, we will see what lessons are to be gained from them, and what questions arise out of them.

The highest authority in such matters, the Emperor Napoleon, has told us expressly that as a study for a soldier there were only four generals in modern history whose campaigns were worth following in detail; namely Turenne, Montecuculi, Eugene of Savoy, and Frederick of Prussia. It was only an unworthy feeling which made him omit the name of Marlborough; and no one could hesitate to add to the list his own. But he spoke of generals who were dead, and of course in adding no other name to this catalogue, 'I am following the same rule. Marlborough and Eugene, Frederick and Napoleon, are generals whose greatness the commonest reader can feel, because he sees the magnitude of their exploits. But the campaigns of Turenne and Montecuculi on the Rhine, where they were opposed to each other, although Napoleon's testimony is quite sufficient to

establish their value as a professional study for a soldier, are yet too much confined to movements of detail to be readily appreciated by others. Turenne's military reputation we must for the most part take upon trust, not disputing it, but being unable to appreciate it. On the other hand, the general reader will turn with interest to many points of military history which Napoleon disregarded: the greatness of the stake at issue, the magnitude of the events, the moral or intellectual qualities displayed by the contending parties, are to us exceedingly interesting; although I confess that I think the interest heightened when there is added to all these elements that of consummate military ability besides.

One of the most certain of all lessons of military history, although some writers have neglected it, and some have even disputed it, is the superiority of discipline to enthusiasm. Much serious mischief has been done by an ignorance or disbelief of this truth; and if ever the French had landed in this country in the early part of the late war, we might have been taught it by a bitter experience. The defeat of Cope's army by the Highlanders at Preston Pans is no exception to this rule, for it was not the enthusiasm of the Highlanders which won the day, but their novel manner of fighting which perplexed their enemies; and the Highlanders had besides a discipline of their own which made them to a certain degree efficient soldiers. But as soon as the surprise was over, and an officer of even moderate ability was placed at the head of the royal army, the effect of the higher

discipline and superior tactic of one of the regular armies of Europe became instantly visible, and the victory at Culloden was won with no difficulty. Even in France, where the natural genius of the people for war is greater than in any other country, and although the enthusiasm of the Vendéans was directed by officers of great ability, yet the arrival of the old soldiers of the garrison of Mentz immediately decided the contest, and gave them a defeat from which they could never recover. On the other hand, while not even the most military nations can become good soldiers without discipline, yet with discipline even the most unmilitary can be made efficient ; of which no more striking instance can be given than the high military character of our Sepoy army in India. The first thing then to be done in all warfare, whether foreign or domestic, is to discipline our men, and till they are thoroughly disciplined to avoid above all things the exposing them to any general actions with the enemy. History is full indeed of instances of great victories gained by a very small force over a very large one ; but not by undisciplined men, however brave and enthusiastic, over those who were well disciplined, except under peculiar circumstances of surprise or local advantages, such as cannot affect the truth of the general rule.

It is a question of some interest, whether history justifies the belief of an inherent superiority in some races of men over others, or whether all such differences are only accidental and temporary ; and we are to acquiesce in the judgment of king Archidamus,

that one man naturally differs little from another, but that culture and training makes the distinction. There are some very satisfactory examples to shew that a nation must not at any rate assume lightly that it is superior to another, because it may have gained great victories over it. Judging by the experience of the period from 1796 to 1809, we might say that the French were decidedly superior to the Austrians; and so the campaign of 1806 might seem to shew an equal superiority over the Prussians. Yet in the long struggle between the Austrian and French monarchies, the military success of each are wonderfully balanced; in 1796, whilst Napoleon was defeating army after army in Italy, the archduke Charles was driving Jourdan and Moreau before him out of Germany; and Frederick the Great defeated the French at Rosbach as completely and easily as Napoleon defeated the Prussians at Jena. The military character of the Italians is now low: yet without going back to the Roman times, we find that in the sixteenth century the inhabitants of the Roman states were reputed to possess in an eminent degree the qualities of soldiers, and some of the ablest generals of Europe, Alexander Farnese prince of Parma, Spinola, and Montecuculi, were natives of Italy. In our own contests with France, our superiority has not always been what our national vanity would imagine it; Philip Augustus and Louis the Ninth were uniformly successful against John and Henry the Third; the conquests of Edward the Third and Henry the Fifth were followed by periods

of equally unvaried disasters; and descending to later times, if Marlborough was uniformly victorious, yet king William when opposed to Luxembourg, and the duke of Cumberland when opposed to Marshal Saxe, were no less uniformly beaten: Such examples are, I think, satisfactory; for judging calmly, we would not surely wish that one nation should be uniformly and inevitably superior to another; I do not know what national virtue could safely be subjected to so severe a temptation. If there be, as perhaps there are, some physical and moral qualities enjoyed by some nations in a higher degree than by others, and this, so far as we see, constitutionally; yet the superiority is not so great but that a little over presumption and carelessness on one side, or a little increased activity and more careful discipline on the other, and still more any remarkable individual genius in the generals or in the government, may easily restore the balance, or even turn it the other way. It is quite a different thing and very legitimate to feel that we have such qualities as will save us from ever being despicable enemies, or from being easily defeated by others; but it is much better that we should not feel so confident, as to think that others must always be defeated by us.

But the thoughtful student of military history will find other questions suggesting themselves of a deeper interest; he will consider whether the laws of war, as at present acknowledged, are not susceptible of further improvement; he will wish to make out the real merits of certain cases, which historians

seem always to decide from mere partial feelings, according to the parties concerned, rather than by any fixed principle. For what is sometimes and by one party called an heroic national resistance, is by others called insurrection and brigandage; and what, according to one version, are but strong and just severities for the maintenance of peace, are, according to another, wholesale murders and military massacres. Now certainly, if there be no other rule in this matter than the justice of either party's cause, the case is evidently incapable of decision till the end of time; for in every war, whether civil or foreign, both sides always maintain that they are in the right. But this being a point always assumed by one party and denied by the other, it is much better that it should be put aside altogether, and that the merits or demerits of what is called a national war should be tried on some more tangible and acknowledged ground. Now it seems one of the greatest improvements of the modern laws of war, that regular armies are considered to be the only belligerents, and that the inhabitants of a country which shall happen to be the seat of war, shall be regarded as neutrals, and protected both in their persons and property. It is held that such a system does but prevent gratuitous horrors; a treacherous and assassinating kind of warfare on one side, and on the other cruelties and outrages of the worst description, in which the most helpless part of the population, the sick and the aged, women and children, are the greatest sufferers. But it is quite

essential that this system of forbearance should be equally observed by both parties ; if soldiers plunder or set fire to a village they cannot complain if the inhabitants cut off their stragglers, or shoot at them from behind walls and hedges ; and, on the other hand, if the inhabitants of a village will go out on their own account to annoy an enemy's march, to interrupt his communications, and to fire upon his men wherever they can find them, they too must be patient if the enemy in return burn their village, and hang them up as brigands. For it is idle to say that the mere circumstance that an army is invading its enemy's country, puts it out of the pale of civilized hostility ; or, at any rate, if this be maintained, it is worse than idle to say that it may not retaliate this system, and put out of the pale of civilized hostility those who have begun so to deal with them. The truth is, that if war, carried on by regular armies under the strictest discipline, is yet a great evil, an irregular partisan warfare is an evil ten times more intolerable ; it is in fact no other than to give a license to a whole population to commit all sorts of treachery, rapine, and cruelty, without any restraint ; letting loose a multitude of armed men, with none of the obedience and none of the honourable feelings of a soldier ; cowardly because they are undisciplined, and cruel because they are cowardly. It seems then the bounden duty of every government, not only not to encourage such irregular warfare on the part of its population, but carefully to repress it, and to oppose its enemy only

with its regular troops, or with men regularly organized, and acting under authorized officers, who shall observe the ordinary humanities of civilized war. And what are called patriotic insurrections, or irregular risings of the whole population to annoy an invading army by all means, ought impartially to be condemned, by whomsoever and against whomsoever practised, as a resource of small and doubtful efficacy, but full of certain atrocity, and a most terrible aggravation of the evils of war. Of course, if an invading army sets the example of such irregular warfare, if they proceed after the manner of the ancients to lay waste the country in mere wantonness, to burn houses, and to be guilty of personal outrages on the inhabitants, then they themselves invite retaliation, and a guerilla warfare against such an invader becomes justifiable. But our censure in all cases should have reference not to the justice of the original war, which is a point infinitely disputable, but to the simple fact, which side first set the example of departing from the laws of civilized warfare, and of beginning a system of treachery and atrocity.

As this is a matter of some importance, I may be allowed to dwell a little longer upon a vague notion not uncommonly, as I believe, entertained, that a people whose country is attacked, by which is meant, whose territory is the seat of war, are sustaining some intolerable wrong which they are justified in repelling by any and every means. But in the natural course of things, war must be carried on in the territory of one belligerent or of the other; it is

an accident merely if their fighting ground happen to be the country of some third party. Now it cannot be said that the party which acts on the offensive, war having been once declared, becomes in the wrong by doing so, or that the object of all invasion is conquest. You invade your enemy in order to compel him to do you justice; that is, to force him to make peace on reasonable terms. This is your theory of the case, and it is one which must be allowed to be maintainable just as much as your enemy's, for all laws of war waive and must waive the question as to the original justice of the quarrel; they assume that both parties are equally in the right. But suppose invasion for the sake of conquest, I do not say of the whole of your enemy's country, but of that portion of it which you are invading; as we have many times invaded French colonies with a view to their incorporation permanently with the British dominions. Conquests of such a sort are no violations necessarily of the legitimate object of war, they may be considered as a security taken for the time to come. Yet undoubtedly the shock to the inhabitants of the particular countries so invaded is very great; it was not a light thing for the Canadian, or the inhabitant of Trinidad, or of the Cape of Good Hope, to be severed from the people of his own blood and language, from his own mother state, and to be subjected to the dominion of foreigners, men with a strange language, strange manners, a different church, and a different law. That the inhabitants of such countries should enlist very zea-

lously in the militia, and should place the resources of defence very readily in the hands of the government, is quite just and quite their duty; I am only deprecating the notion that they should rise in irregular warfare, each man or each village for itself, and assail the invaders as their personal enemies, killing them whenever and wherever they can find them. Or again, suppose that the invasion is undertaken for the purpose of overthrowing the existing government of a country, as the attempted French descents to co-operate with the Jacobites, or the invasion of France by the coalesced powers in 1792 and 1793, and again in 1814 and 1815. When the English army advanced into France in 1814, respecting persons and property, and paying for every article of food which they took from the country, would it have been for the inhabitants to barricade every village, to have lurked in every thicket and behind every wall to shoot stragglers and sentinels, and keep up night and day a war of extermination? If indeed the avowed object of the invader be the destruction not of any particular government, but of the national existence altogether; if he thus disclaims the usual object of legitimate war, a fair and lasting peace, and declares that he makes it a war of extermination, he doubtless cannot complain if the usual laws of war are departed from against him when he himself sets the example. But even then, when we consider what unspeakable atrocities a partisan warfare gives birth to, and that no nation attacked by an overwhelming force of disciplined

armies was ever saved by such means, it may be doubted even then whether it be justifiable, unless the invader drives the inhabitants to it, by treating them from the beginning as enemies, and outraging their persons and property. If this judgment seem extreme to any one, I would only ask him to consider well first the cowardly, treacherous, and atrocious character of all guerilla warfare, and in the next place the certain misery which it entails on the country which practises it, and its inefficacy, as a general rule, to conquer or expel an enemy, however much it may annoy him.

Other questions will also occur to us, questions I grant of some theoretical and much practical difficulty, yet which surely require to be seriously considered. I allude particularly to the supposed right of sacking a town taken by assault, and of blockading a town defended not by the inhabitants but by a garrison wholly independent of their control; the known consequences of such a blockade being the starvation of the inhabitants before the garrison can be made to suffer. The extreme hardness in such cases is that the penalty falls chiefly on the innocent. When a town is sacked we do not commonly hear of the garrison being put to the sword in cold blood, on the plea that they have no right to quarter. General Philippon and his garrison laid down their arms at Badajoz, and were treated as prisoners of war, whilst the houses of the Spanish inhabitants were plundered. And be it remembered, that when we speak of plundering a town after an assault, we

veil under that softer name all crimes which man in his worst excesses can commit, horrors so atrocious that their very atrocity preserves them from our full execration, because it makes it impossible to describe them. On this subject, on the abominable character of such scenes, and the possibility of preventing them, I will give you not my own crude opinion, who know nothing of the actual state of armies at such moments, but that of a veteran soldier, who knows well the horrors of war while he deeply feels its stirring power, and its opportunities of nobleness, the historian of the war in the Spanish peninsula. General Napier's language is as follows :

“It is a common but shallow and mischievous notion, that a villain makes never the worse soldier for an assault, because the appetite for plunder supplies the place of honour ; as if the compatibility of vice and bravery rendered the union of virtue and courage unnecessary in warlike matters. In all the host which stormed San Sebastian, there was not a man who being sane would for plunder only have encountered the danger of that assault, yet under the spell of discipline all rushed eagerly to meet it. Discipline however has its root in patriotism, or how could armed men be controlled at all, and it would be wise and far from difficult to graft moderation and humanity upon such a noble stock. The modern soldier is not necessarily the stern bloody-handed man the ancient soldier was ; there is as much difference between them as between the sportsman and the butcher ; the ancient warrior fighting with the

sword and reaping his harvest of death when the enemy was in flight, became habituated to the act of slaying. The modern soldier seldom uses his bayonet, sees not his peculiar victim fall, and exults not over mangled limbs as proofs of personal prowess. Hence preserving his original feelings, his natural abhorrence of murder and crimes of violence, he differs not from other men unless often engaged in the assault of towns, where rapacity, lust, and inebriety, unchecked by the restraints of discipline, are excited by temptation. It is said that no soldier can be restrained after storming a town, and a British soldier least of all, because he is brutish and insensible to honour! Shame on such calumnies! What makes the British soldier fight as no other soldier ever fights? His pay? Soldiers of all nations receive pay. At the period of this assault, a sergeant of the twenty-eighth regiment named Ball, had been sent with a party to the coast from Roncesvalles, to make purchases for his officers. He placed the money he was entrusted with, two thousand dollars, in the hands of a commissary, and having secured a receipt, persuaded his party to join in the storm. He survived, reclaimed the money, made his purchases, and returned to his regiment. And these are the men, these are the spirits, who are called too brutish to work upon except by fear. It is precisely fear to which they are most insensible.

“Undoubtedly if soldiers read and hear that it is impossible to restrain their violence they will not be restrained. But let the plunder of a town after an assault be expressly made criminal by the articles of

war, with a due punishment attached ; let it be constantly impressed upon the troops that such conduct is as much opposed to military honour and discipline as it is to morality ; let a select permanent body of men receiving higher pay form a part of the army, and be charged to follow storming columns to aid in preserving order, and with power to inflict instantaneous punishment, death if it be necessary. Finally, as reward for extraordinary Valour should keep pace with chastisement for crimes committed under such temptation, it would be fitting that money, apportioned to the danger and importance of the service, should be ensured to the successful troops, and always paid without delay. This money might be taken as ransom from enemies, but if the inhabitants are friends, or too poor, government should furnish the amount. With such regulations, the storming of towns would not produce more military disorders than the gaining of battles in the field.”^a

The other case on which it seems desirable that the law of nations should either be amended, or declared more clearly and enforced in practice, is that of the blockade of towns not defended by their inhabitants, in order to force their surrender by starvation. And here let us try to realize to ourselves what such a blockade is. We need not, unhappily, draw a fancied picture ; history, and no remote history either, will supply us with the facts. Some of you, I doubt not, remember Genoa ; you have seen that queenly city with its streets of palaces,

^a History of the War in the Peninsula. Vol. vi. p. 215.

rising tier above tier from the water, girdling with the long lines of its bright white houses the vast sweep of its harbour, the mouth of which is marked by a huge natural mole of rock, crowned by its magnificent light-house tower. You remember how its white houses rose out of a mass of fig and olive and orange trees, the glory of its old patrician luxury; you may have observed the mountains behind the town spotted at intervals by small circular low towers, one of which is distinctly conspicuous where the ridge of the hills rises to its summit, and hides from view all the country behind it. Those towers are the forts of the famous lines, which, curiously resembling in shape the later Syracusan walls enclosing Epipolæ, converge inland from the eastern and western extremities of the city, looking down, the western line on the valley of the Polcevera, the eastern on that of the Bisagno, till they meet as I have said on the summit of the mountains, where the hills cease to rise from the sea, and become more or less of a table land running off towards the interior, at the distance, as well as I remember, of between two and three miles from the outside of the city. Thus a very large open space is enclosed within the lines, and Genoa is capable therefore of becoming a vast entrenched camp, holding not so much a garrison as an army. In the autumn of 1799 the Austrians had driven the French out of Lombardy and Piedmont; their last victory of Fossano or Genola had won the fortress of Coni or Cuneo close under the Alps, and at the very extremity of the plain of

the Po ; the French clung to Italy only by their hold of the Riviera of Genoa, the narrow strip of coast between the Apennines and the sea, which extends from the frontiers of France almost to the mouth of the Arno. Hither the remains of the French force were collected, commanded by general Massena, and the point of chief importance to his defence was the city of Genoa. Napoleon had just returned from Egypt, and was become First Consul ; but he could not be expected to take the field till the following spring, and till then Massena was hopeless of relief from without, every thing was to depend on his own pertinacity. The strength of his army made it impossible to force it in such a position as Genoa ; but its very numbers, added to the population of a great city, held out to the enemy a hope of reducing it by famine ; and as Genoa derives most of its supplies by sea, Lord Keith, the British naval commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, lent the assistance of his naval force to the Austrians, and by the vigilance of his cruizers, the whole coasting trade right and left along the Riviera was effectually cut off. It is not at once that the inhabitants of a great city, accustomed to the daily sight of well-stored shops and an abundant market, begin to realize the idea of scarcity ; or that the wealthy classes of society, who have never known any other state than one of abundance and luxury, begin seriously to conceive of famine. But the shops were emptied, and the storehouses began to be drawn upon ; and no fresh supply or hope of supply appeared. Winter

passed away, and spring returned, so early and so beautiful on that garden-like coast, sheltered as it is from the north winds by its belt of mountains, and open to the full rays of the southern sun. Spring returned, and clothed the hill sides within the lines with its fresh verdure. But that verdure was no longer the mere delight of the careless eye of luxury, refreshing the citizens by its liveliness and softness when they rode or walked up thither from the city to enjoy the surpassing beauty of the prospect. The green hill sides were now visited for a very different object; ladies of the highest rank might be seen cutting up every plant which it was possible to turn to food, and bearing home the common weeds of our roadsides as a most precious treasure. The French general pitied the distress of the people, but the lives and strength of his garrison seemed to him more important than the lives of the Genoese, and such provisions as remained were reserved in the first place for the French army. Scarcity became utter want, and want became famine. In the most gorgeous palaces of that gorgeous city, no less than in the humblest tenements of its humblest poor, death was busy; not the momentary death of battle or massacre, nor the speedy death of pestilence, but the lingering and most miserable death of famine. Infants died before their parents' eyes, husbands and wives lay down to expire together. A man whom I saw at Genoa in 1825 told me that his father and two of his brothers had been starved to death in this fatal siege. So it went on, till in the month of June,

when Napoleon had already descended from the Alps into the plain of Lombardy, the misery became unendurable, and Massena surrendered. But before he did so, twenty thousand innocent persons, old and young, women and children, had died by the most horrible of deaths which humanity can endure. Other horrors which occurred besides during this blockade I pass over; the agonizing death of twenty thousand innocent and helpless persons requires nothing to be added to it.

Now is it right that such a tragedy as this should take place, and that the laws of war should be supposed to justify the authors of it? Conceive having been a naval officer in Lord Keith's squadron at that time, and being employed in stopping the food which was being brought for the relief of such misery. For the thing was done deliberately; the helplessness of the Genoese was known, their distress was known; it was known that they could not force Massena to surrender; it was known that they were dying daily by hundreds; yet week after week, and month after month, did the British ships of war keep their iron watch along all the coast: no vessel nor boat laden with any article of provision could escape their vigilance. One cannot but be thankful that Nelson was spared from commanding at this horrible blockade of Genoa.

Now on which side the law of nations should throw the guilt of most atrocious murder, is of little comparative consequence, or whether it should attach it to both sides equally: but that the deliberate

starving to death of twenty thousand helpless persons should be regarded as a crime in one or both of the parties concerned in it, seems to me self-evident. The simplest course would seem to be that all non-combatants should be allowed to go out of a blockaded town, and that the general who should refuse to let them pass, should be regarded in the same light as one who were to murder his prisoners, or who were to be in the habit of butchering women and children. For it is not true that war only looks to the speediest and most effectual way of attaining its object, so that as the letting the inhabitants go out would enable the garrison to maintain the town longer, the laws of war authorize the keeping them in and starving them. Poisoning wells might be a still quicker method of reducing a place, but do the laws of war therefore sanction it? I shall not be supposed for a moment to be placing the guilt of the individuals concerned in the two cases which I am going to compare, on an equal footing; it would be most unjust to do so, for in the one case they acted, as they supposed, according to a law which made what they did their duty. But take the cases themselves, and examine them in all their circumstances; the degree of suffering inflicted, the innocence and helplessness of the sufferers, the interests at stake, and the possibility of otherwise securing them; and if any man can defend the lawfulness in the abstract of the starvation of the inhabitants of Genoa, I will engage also to establish the lawfulness of the massacres of September.

Other points of the received law of nations might be noticed, and more especially of maritime law, which require, to say the least, a full reconsideration. They will suggest themselves to the attentive reader of history, if his thoughts have been once turned in that direction. And, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, any defect in national law is surely no less important than a defect in civil law; to lend a sanction to the passions and injustice of men where they operate most extensively, is a sad perversion of the nature of law; it is that corruption of the noblest thing which is itself the vilest. But in these enquiries, amidst all our condemnation of a bad law, we must remember that its very evil consists mainly in this, that it throws its sanction over crime; that is, that men commit crime as a thing lawful. The magnitude of the evil of a bad law is, I was almost going to say, the measure of the allowance to be granted to the individuals whom it misleads; at any rate it greatly diminishes their guilt. And for this reason I chose in the instances which I gave of faulty national law, to take those in which our countrymen acted upon the bad law, rather than those in which it was acted upon by foreigners or enemies. In our own case we are willing enough to make that allowance which in the case of others we might be inclined to refuse. Generally, however, I confess, that amongst ourselves, and when we are not concerned to establish our own just claims to the respect of others, I think that it is more useful to contemplate our own national faults

and the worthy deeds of other nations, than to take the opposite course; or even to dwell singly upon our own glories, or on the dishonour of others. For there can be, I imagine, no danger of our admiring our neighbours too much, or ourselves too little. It cannot be necessary to enlarge before an English audience upon the greatness of England, whether past or present: it cannot be necessary for an Englishman to express in so many words his love and admiration for his country. It is because England is so great, and our love for our country is so deep and so just, that we can not only afford to dwell upon the darker spots in our history, but we absolutely require them, lest our love and admiration should become idolatrous; it is because we are only too apt to compare foreign nations with ourselves unfavourably, that it is absolutely good for us to contemplate what they have suffered unjustly or done worthily.

Connected with the last point which I have been noticing, is another which appears to me of importance in studying military or external history, and that is, to apprehend correctly in every war what are the merits of the quarrel. I do not mean only so far as such an apprehension is essential to our sympathizing rightly with either of the parties concerned in it, but with a higher object; that we may see, namely, what have been ordinarily the causes of wars, and then consider whether they have been sufficient to justify recourse to such an extreme arbitrament. For as I speak freely of the intense interest of military history, and the great sympathy due to the many

heroic qualities which war calls into action, so we must never forget that war is after all a very great evil; and though I believe that theoretically the quakers are wrong in pronouncing all wars to be unjustifiable, yet I confess that historically the exceptions to their doctrine have been comparatively few; that is to say, as in every war one party I suppose must be to blame, so in most wars both parties have been blamable; and the wars ought never to have taken place at all. Two cases of wars where both parties appear to me more or less to blame, I will now give by way of example. It sometimes happens, especially in the intercourse of a civilized nation with barbarians, that the subjects of one nation persist in a course of conduct at variance with the laws of the other; and that the party thus aggrieved takes its redress into its own hands and punishes the offenders, summarily, with over severity perhaps, and sometimes mistakenly: that is, the individuals punished may in that particular case be innocent; as it has often happened that when soldiers fire upon a riotous crowd, some harmless passers by are the sufferers, although they had no concern whatever in the riot. It cannot be denied that the party originally aggrieved has now given some just cause of complaint against itself; yet it is monstrous in the original aggressor to prosecute his quarrel forthwith by arms, or to insist peremptorily on receiving satisfaction for the wrong done to him, without entering into the question of the previous and unprovoked wrong which had been done by him. For after all, the balance of wrong is

not, when all things are taken into the account, so much as brought to a level: the original debtor is the debtor still; some counter claims he has upon his creditor; but the balance of the account is against him. Yet he goes to war as if it were not only in his favour, but as if his adversary had suffered no wrong at all, and he had done none.

The other case is one of greater difficulty, and has been the fruitful parent of wars continued from generation to generation. This is where nations suspect each other, and the suspicion has in the case of either enough to justify it. Thus what one party claims as a security, the other regards as a fresh aggression; and so the quarrel goes on interminably. The Punic wars in ancient history are one instance of this: the long wars between France and the coalesced powers in our own times are another. At a given moment in the contest the government on one side may feel sure of its own honest intentions, and suspect with justice the hostile disposition of its rival. But in all fairness, the previous steps of the struggle must be reviewed; have our predecessors never acted in such a way as to inspire suspicion justly? We stand in their place, the inheritors of their cause, and the suspicions which their conduct occasioned still survive towards us. Our enemy is dealing insincerely with us, because he cannot be persuaded that we mean fairly by him. A great evil, and one almost endless, if each party refuses to put itself in the other's place, and presses merely the actual fact of the moment, that while it is dealing in all sincerity, its adversary

is meditating only deceit and hostility. In such cases I cannot but think that the guilt of the continued quarrel must be divided, not equally perhaps, but divided, between both the belligerents.

And now coming to the mere history of military operations themselves, in what manner may a common reader best enter into them, and read them with interest? It is notorious, I believe, that our ordinary notions of wars are very much those which we find in the accounts of the Samnite wars in Livy. We remember the great battles, sometimes with much particularity; but they stand in our memory as isolated events; we cannot connect them with each other, we know not what led to them, nor what was their bearing on the fate of the campaign. Sometimes, it is true, this is of no great consequence; for the previous movements were no more than the Homeric οἱ δ' ὅτε δὴ σχεδὸν ἦσαν ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισιν ἰόντες, the armies marched out to meet each other, and the battle decided every thing. But in complicated wars it is very different. Take for instance the wars of Frederick the Great; we may remember that he was defeated at Kolin, at Hochkirchen, and at Cunersdorf; that he was victorious at Rosbach, at Lissa, at Zorn-dorf, and at Torgau; but how far are we still from comprehending the action of the war, and appreciating his extraordinary ability. To do this, a good map is essential; a map which shall exhibit the hills of a country, its principal roads, and its most important fortresses. To understand the operations of the Seven Years' War, we must comprehend the situa-

tion of the Prussian dominions with respect to those of the allies, and must know also their geographical character, as well as that of the countries immediately adjoining them. We must observe the importance of Saxony, as covering Prussia on the side of Austria; the importance of Silesia, as running in deeply within what may be called the line of the Austrian frontier, and flanking a large part of Bohemia. For these reasons Frederick began the war by surprising Saxony, and amidst all his difficulties clung resolutely to the possession of Silesia. His vulnerable side was on the east towards Russia; and had the Russian power been in any degree such as it became afterwards, he would have lost Berlin not once only, but permanently. But the Russian armies being better fitted for defence than offence, even their great victory of Cunnernsdorf was followed by no important consequences, and Frederick was able generally to leave the defence of his eastern frontiers to his generals, and to devote his own attention to the great struggle with Austria on the side of Saxony and Silesia.

Connected with the details of military history, and in itself in many respects curious, is the history, so far as it can be traced, of great roads and fortresses; for these, like all other earthly things, change from age to age, and if we do not know or observe these changes, the military history of one period will be almost unintelligible, if judged of according to the roads and fortresses of another. For example, there are at present three great lines of communication between the north-west of Italy and the Rhone: one

is the coast road from Nice to Marseilles, and Tarascon or Avignon; another is the road over Mont Cenis upon Montmeillan, and so descending the valley of the Isere by Grenoble upon Valence; a third is the road so well known to all travellers, from Montmeillan upon Chamberri, and from thence by Les Echelles upon Lyons. But in the early part of the sixteenth century, I find in the work of an Italian, named Gratarolo, who wrote a sort of guide for travellers, that the principal line of communication between Italy and the Rhone was one which it now requires a good map even to trace; it crossed the Alps by the Mont Genève, descended for a certain distance along the valley of the Durance, and then struck off to the right, and went straight towards Avignon, by a little place called Sault, and by Carpentras. The abandonment in many instances of the line of the Roman roads in Italy is owing, as I have been informed, to the extreme insecurity of travelling during a long period; so that according to the description of a similar state of things in Scripture, "the high ways were unoccupied, and the travellers walked through by-ways." Merchants and those who were obliged to go from place to place followed by-roads, as nearly parallel as they could find them to the line of the great roads; and when a better state of things returned, the by-roads were become so much in use, that they remained the ordinary lines of communication, and the great roads of the Roman time went to ruin. So again with fortresses; when Charles the Fifth invaded Champagne in the six-

teenth century, his army was resisted by the little town of St. Dizier, which is now perfectly open, and incapable of stopping an enemy for half a hour; while the fortresses which resisted the Prussians in 1792, Longwy and Verdun, seem to have been in Charles the Fifth's days of no consequence whatever. The great Piedmontese fortress at this day is Alessandria, which I think hardly occurs in the military history of Piedmont previously to the wars of the French revolution. On the other hand, Turin itself, which was besieged so elaborately by Marshal Marsin in 1706, and so effectually relieved by Prince Eugene's victorious assault on the besiegers' lines, and the citadel of which was a fortress of some importance so late as 1799, is now wholly an open town, and its ramparts are become a promenade.

When speaking of the altered lines of roads, one is naturally led to think of the roads over great mountain chains, of which so many have been newly opened in our own days; and a few words on mountain warfare, which has been called the poetry of the military art, shall conclude this lecture. But by mountain warfare I do not mean the mere attack or defence of a mountain pass, such as we read of in the Tyrolese insurrection of 1809; but the attack and defence of a whole mountain country, comprehending a line perhaps of eighty or a hundred miles. You have here almost all the elements of interest in war met together; the highest exercise of skill in the general in the combination of his operations; the greatest skill and energy in the officers and soldiers

in overcoming or turning to account the natural difficulties of the ground; and the picturesque and poetical charm of the grouping together of art and nature, of the greatest works and efforts of man with the highest magnificence of natural scenery. One memorable instance of this grand mountain warfare was the contest in the Pyrenees in 1813; another may be found in Napoleon's operations in the Apennines, in the beginning of the campaign of 1796, and those in the valley of the Adige in January 1797; a third, and in some respects the most striking of all, was the struggle in Switzerland in 1799, when the eastern side of Switzerland was made as it were one vast fortress, which the French defended against the attacks of the allies. In such warfare, a general must bear constantly in mind the whole anatomy of the mountains which he is defending or attacking: the geographical distance of the several valleys and passes from each other, their facilities of lateral communication, their exact bearings and windings, as well as the details of their natural features, and resources. He must also conceive the disposition of his enemy's army, the force at each particular point, and the facilities of massing a large force at any one point in a given time. For a blow struck with effect at any one spot is felt along the whole line; and the strongest positions are sometimes necessarily abandoned without firing a shot, merely because a point has been carried at the distance of thirty or forty miles from them, by which the enemy may penetrate within their line and

threaten their rear. And surely the moving forty or fifty thousand men with such precision, that marching from many different quarters they may be all brought together at a given hour on a given spot, is a very magnificent combination, if we consider how many points must be embraced at once in the mind, in order to its conception, and how many more are essential to its successful execution. But lest I should seem here forgetting my own caution, and imitating the presumption of Hannibal's sophist, I will only refer you to general Matthieu Dumas' History of the Campaigns of 1799 and 1800, in which, illustrated as it is by its notes, you will find a very clear account of the particular contest in Switzerland, and some general remarks on mountain warfare, very clear and very interesting.

The subject is so vast that it would not be easy to exhaust it; but enough has been said perhaps to fulfil my immediate object, that of noticing some of the questions and difficulties which occur in military history; and I have lingered long enough upon ground on which my right as an unmilitary man to enter at all may possibly be questioned. Here then I shall end what I have to say with regard to external history: it follows that we should penetrate a little deeper, and endeavour to find some clue to guide us through the labyrinth of opinions and parties, political and religious, which constitute at once the difficulty and the interest of internal history.

LECTURE V.

I PROPOSED that in the present lecture we should approach to the consideration of the internal history of the last three hundred or three hundred and forty years which have elapsed since the close of the middle ages. It is not without some peculiar apprehensions that I enter upon this part of my subject. Its difficulties are so great that I cannot hope to do more than partially remove them ; and still more, when we come to an analysis of opinions and parties, it is scarcely possible to avoid expressing or at least implying some judgments of my own which may be at variance with the judgments of many of my hearers. Yet with a full sense of all these impediments in my way, I yet feel that I must proceed, and that to turn aside from the straightforward road would be an unworthy shrinking from one of the most important parts of my duty. For as I said at the beginning, any thing of the nature of a calm analysis of that on which we have been accustomed to feel much more than to think, cannot but be

useful to us. Nor will it be the least valuable part of it that it should teach us to disentangle principles first from parties, and again from one another; first of all as shewing how imperfectly all parties represent their own principles, and then, how the principles themselves are a mingled tissue, the good and evil being sometimes combined together; and practically, that which under some circumstances was good or evil, changing under different circumstances and becoming the opposite.

Now here at the outset of our enquiry, I must again dwell for a moment on our peculiar advantages in this place in being made so familiar with the histories of Greece and of Rome. For in those histories is involved a great part of our own: they contain a view of our own society, only somewhat simplified, as befits an earlier and introductory study. And our familiarity with their details will be convenient on the present occasion, because they will furnish us with many illustrations familiar already to all my hearers. Besides this, he who has studied Thucydides and Tacitus, and has added to them as so many of us have done, a familiar acquaintance with Aristotle, Plato, and Cicero, has already heard the masters of political wisdom, and will have derived from them some general rules to assist him in making his way through the thicket of modern history.

When we surveyed the external history of the last three centuries, we found that there were at different times different centres of action; that at one

time Austria was this centre, at another Spain, and at another France: so that if one were asked quite generally what was Europe doing externally at such or such a period, it might be answered that it was engaged in favouring or in resisting one or other of these great powers. Now if we ask at any given period, what Europe was doing internally, can we give an answer equally simple? Has there been any principle predominant with respect to internal history, as successive nations have been in external matters, and has the advancing or putting down this principle been the great business of the mind of Europe, as the supporting or opposing Austrian or French dominion has been the business of her external policy and action?

Now for the convenience of division, and as an aid to our examination, we may say perhaps that there was: and we may divide the three last centuries into two periods, the first extending from 1500 to the middle of the seventeenth century, and the second going on from 1650 or 1660 to nearly our own times. And quite generally, we might answer that in the first of these periods Europe was engaged in maintaining or opposing the protestant reformation; in the second in maintaining or opposing a reformation, or to use a more neutral word, an alteration in matters political. Such a division, and such a view of each of the two parts of the division, would be allowable and just, I think, if made for the mere purpose of assisting our studies, while we were fully aware of its incompleteness. But if we believed it to be

altogether correct, it would be sadly misleading ; for in reality more than one principle has been contended for at one time : and what we call the protestant reformation is itself a complex thing, embracing a great many points, theological, moral, and political : and these points may not have been all pressed by the same persons, nor at the same time ; and political reformation also is very variously understood ; some wishing for greater changes, others for less ; and the points most passionately desired by some being to others almost indifferent, or it may be, even objectionable. So that it becomes essential to carry our analysis a little farther, and to shew in this way what a complicated subject we have to deal with.

Let us suppose for an instant that the whole struggle which has occupied the internal history of modern Europe has been a political one : we will take nothing more into the account than those questions which are ordinarily called political. Now then what is the real political question which is at the bottom of all others, or in other words, what is the principle of all political divisions ? Shall we say that it is this, whether political power shall be vested in a greater or less number of hands, the old Greek question in short as to the ascendancy of the many or the few ? Accordingly they who take one side of this question, which we call the popular side, should advocate, we will say, the communication of political power as widely as possible ; those who take the anti-popular side, should wish it to be confined only to a

few? A complete democracy would appear to be the consummation of the wishes of the former, a simple monarchy would most answer the views of the latter. And thus if the contest be between a republic and an individual aiming at monarchy, men who espouse the popular party would wish well to the republic, their opponents would favour the attempt at monarchy. Accordingly in the greatest heat of the French revolution, this was the view taken of the civil wars of Rome; and the popular party in France revered the memory and on all occasions magnified the names of Cato and Brutus as true republicans, who were upholding the cause of liberty against a tyrant. Yet it is certain that this view was quite fallacious: that Cato and Brutus belonged not to the popular party at Rome but to the aristocratical; they belonged to that party which had steadily opposed the agrarian laws, and the communication of the Roman franchise to the allies; to the party which had destroyed the Gracchi, and had recovered its ascendancy through the proscriptions of Sylla. And it is no less certain that Cæsar was supported by the popular party; and that when he marched into Italy at the beginning of the civil war his pretext was that he was come to uphold the tribunician power, and in point of fact the mass of the inhabitants of Italy regarded him with favour.

Here then the opposition of a republic to an individual aiming at monarchy, is not the opposition of a popular party to an antipopular one, but exactly the reverse. Again, a similar mistake has been com-

mitted with regard to parties in Carthage. Dr. Priestley, a most strenuous advocate of popular principles, in his Lectures on History sympathizes entirely with Hanno's opposition to Hannibal; he is afraid that Hannibal's standing army might have overthrown the liberties of Carthage. Yet nothing is more certain than that Hanno belonged to the high aristocratical party, that same party which never forgave Hannibal for his attempt to lessen the powers of their exclusive courts of judicature. So that it is very possible that judging of political parties merely by their advocating the power of a greater or smaller number, we should estimate them quite erroneously.

Again, what is at the bottom of our preference of what is called the popular cause, or of the anti-popular? Do we rest in the simple fact of the supreme power being vested in more hands or in fewer? or do we value this fact only as a means to some farther end, such as the liberty and happiness of the several individuals of the commonwealth? Do we, in short, most value political equality, or the absence of restraint from us as individuals? It is manifest that as we value the one or the other, our estimate of a pure democracy may greatly differ. If our great object be equality, then the equal enjoyment of political rights and honours by all will seem to us the perfection of government: if the absence of restraint on individuals be what we most desire, then we may complain of the tyranny of a majority, of a severe system of sumptuary laws, of hindrances thrown in

the way of our unlimited accumulation of property, or of our absolute disposal of it whether by gift or by will.

Yet again, taking the mere ascendancy of the many or the few to be our object, without looking any farther, yet there arises a most important question, how many we comprehend in our division of many and few. Do we mean the many and the few of all the human beings within our territory, or of all the freemen, or of all the sovereign state as opposed to its provinces, or of all the full citizens as opposed to half citizens and sojourners? According as we mean either the one or the other, the same party may be popular or antipopular: Are the southern states of the North-American union then to be regarded as democratical or as oligarchical? In the old constitution of Switzerland what was the canton of Uri, as we regard it either with or without its Italian bailiwicks? In Spanish America what would have been a Creole democracy, as we either forgot or remembered the existence of the men of colour? So that our very principle of the mere ascendancy of the few or the many becomes complicated; and we very often regard a government as popular when it might with justice in another respect be called antipopular.

Thus regarding the contests of Europe simply in a political light and as they affect one single political question, that of the ascendancy of the many or the few, we do not find it easy to judge of them. Let us carry this on a little farther. Say that we do not

regard the mere machinery of governments but their results; we value that most which is best administered, and most promotes the good of the nation; our views are not so much popular, as liberal. Have we arrived therefore at a greater simplification of the question? Shall we as liberal men agree in regarding the same government as deserving of our support or our opposition? Scarcely, I think, unless we are first agreed as to what the good of the nation is. The ancient commonwealths, for the most part, discouraged trade and manufactures as compared with agriculture. Were these governments promoting the public good, or no? Other nations have followed a different course, have encouraged trade and rejoiced in the growing wealth and comforts of their people. These in their turn are denounced by the principles and practice of others, who dread above all things the introduction of luxury. Again, we attach great importance to the cultivation of art and science; to all humanizing amusements; music, the theatre, dancing, &c. But when Lavoisier pleaded for his life to the French government of 1793, he was told that the republic had no need of chemists; the Roman senate expelled the rhetoricians from Rome; the early government of the state of Connecticut, one of the freest of commonwealths, would tolerate no public amusements, least of all the theatre. I might instance other differences in matters of a still higher character: as, for example, with regard to the expediency of a severe penal code or a mild one; to the establishment of one religion, or the extending equal

favour to all. We see that the good government of one man is the bad government of another; the best results, according to one man's estimate, are in the eyes of his neighbour the most to be deprecated.

Now all these different views are found in connexion with different views on questions purely political; so that the very same party may in some respects advocate what we approve of, and in others follow what we most dislike; and farther it may often act inconsistently with itself, and pursue its principles, thus mingled as they are, imperfectly, or even may seem to act at variance with them. What then are we to judge of it, when we are studying past history; or how should we have to act, if a similar party were to exist in our own generation?

Such, we see, are the difficulties of our subject; and to illustrate them still farther, I will name one or two instances in which men may seem to have mistaken their own natural side, owing to the complicated character of actual parties; and from their keen perception of some one point, either as loving it or abhorring it, have for its sake renounced much that was congenial, or joined much that was unsuited to them. This was the case, I think, with the historian Hume. A man of his exceedingly enquiring and unrestrained mind, living in the midst of the eighteenth century, might have been expected to have espoused what is called the popular side in the great questions of English history, the side, in later language, of the movement. Yet we know that Hume's leaning is the other way. Accidental causes

may perhaps have contributed to this; the prejudice of an ingenious mind against the opinions which he found most prevalent around him; the resistance of a restless mind to the powers that be, as natural as implicit acquiescence in them is to an indolent mind. But the main cause apparently is to be sought in his abhorrence of puritanism, alike repugnant to him in its good and its evil. His subtle and active mind could not bear its narrowness and bigotry, his careless and epicurean temper had no sympathy with its earnestness and devotion. The popular cause in our great civil contests was in his eyes the cause of fanaticism; and where he saw fanaticism he saw that from which his whole nature recoiled, as the greatest of all conceivable evils.

I have spoken of the popular party in our great civil contest as being in modern language the party of the movement. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that a popular party and a movement party are always synonymous. A movement party is a very indefinite expression, applicable equally to very different things. It includes equally those who move with a clearly apprehended object, aware of the evil which they are leaving, and of the good towards which they are tending; and those who move from an impulse of intolerable suffering in their actual state, but are going they know not whither; and those who would move from mere restlessness; and those, lastly, who move as the instruments of a power which they serve unconsciously, altering the state of the world while they are thinking only of

some object of personal ambition. In this latter sense Philip of Macedon belonged to the party of the movement, while Demosthenes would have kept Greece in her old relations. We see in this last instance the popular party and the movement party directly opposed to one another, accidentally, however, as their coincidence also is accidental. We cannot but see that the change which Philip wrought, caring only for his personal objects, was in fact an onward step in the scheme of God's providence, involving as it did that great spread of the Greek race and language over Asia, which was to serve such high purposes hereafter. To this Demosthenes was opposed; his object being only to maintain the old independence of Greece, and the old liberty and glory of Athens. A hundred years earlier, Pericles, heading the same political party, if we look only to the political relations of Athens abroad and at home, had also headed the party of the movement; new dominion, new wealth, new glory, new arts, and a new philosophy, every thing in Pericles and his administration was a going onward from what had existed before. So again, to take our examples from modern times, the great religious movement in England at the Reformation was quite unconnected with popular principles in politics; and the same was the case in France in the wars of the League. The popular party in France, so far as either of the contending parties deserved that name, was opposed to Henry the Fourth, and in favour of the house of Guise. The burghers of Paris were as zealously at-

tached to the Holy Catholic League as those of London, sixty years later, were devoted to the Solemn League and Covenant. The great movement, therefore, of the world is often wholly unconnected with the relations of the popular and antipopular parties in any one particular state, it may be favoured or resisted by either of them.

Farther still, the mere change of time and circumstances may alter the character of the same party without any change on its own part: its triumph may be at one time an evil, and at another time a good. This is owing to a truth which should never be forgotten in all political enquiries, that government is wholly relative; and that there is and can be no such thing as the best government absolutely, suited to all periods and to all countries. It is a fatal error in all political questions to mistake the clock; to fancy that it is still forenoon, when the sun is westering; that it is early morning, when the sun has already mounted high in the heavens. No instance of this importance of reading the clock aright can be more instructive, than the great quarrel ordinarily known as that of the Guelfs and Ghibelins. I may remind you that these were respectively the parties which embraced the papal and the imperial cause in the struggle between these two powers in Italy and Germany from the eleventh century onwards to the fourteenth. Here, as in all other actual contests, a great variety of principles and passions and instincts, so to speak, were intermingled; we must not suppose that it was any thing like a pure

struggle on what may be called the distinguishing principle of the Guelf or Ghibelin cause. But the principle in itself was this; whether the papal or the imperial, in other words, the sacerdotal or the regal power, was to be accounted the greater. Now conceive the papal power to be the representative of what is moral and spiritual, and the imperial power to represent only what is external and physical; conceive the first to express the ideas of responsibility to God and paternal care and guidance, while the other was the mere embodying of selfish might, like the old Greek tyrannies; and who can do other than wish success to the papal cause? who can help being with all his heart a Guelf? But in the early part of the struggle this was to a great degree the state of it; the pope stood in the place of the church, the emperor was a merely worldly despot, corrupt and arbitrary. But conceive, on the other hand, the papacy to become the representative of superstition, and of spiritual tyranny, while the imperial power was the expression and voice of law; that the emperor stood in the place of the church, and the pope was the mere priest, the church's worst enemy; and this was actually the form which the contest between the sacerdotal and regal powers assumed at a later period; then our sympathies are changed, and we become no less zealously Ghibelin than we before were Guelf. Now so far at least as the papal power was concerned, the change was not in it, but in outward circumstances. In the beginning of the dispute the papal claims were no less excessive than they became

afterwards, all the notions of priestly power were to be found in them, if not fully developed yet virtually. But these claims are harmless when the church is asleep or inactive, except so far as they tend to prolong the sleep and inactivity. Setting aside this consideration, and supposing a state of ignorance and torpor not produced by the papacy, and likely to exist for a long time to come from other causes independent of the papacy's control, and then the papal dominion may be no more than the natural and lawful authority of mature age over childhood, of the teacher over him who needs to be taught, of those who understand what Christianity is, over those who, professing to be Christians, yet know not what their principles are. But so soon as the child grew up into the man, that the sleeper was awakened, the inactive roused, the Christian taught to know his privileges and his duties; then the church being competent to do its own work, the claim of the pope to stand in its place became impertinent; and when that claim was urged as one of divine right, for all times and circumstances, and men were required to acknowledge its validity, then having become as useless and mischievous practically, as it was and always had been false theoretically, it was rejected as it deserved to be, and was considered amongst the greatest obstacles to truth and to goodness.

This inattention to altered circumstances, which would make us be Guelfs in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries because the Guelf cause had been right in the eleventh or twelfth, is a fault of most

universal application in all political questions, and is often most seriously mischievous. It is deeply seated in human nature, being in fact no other than an exemplification of the force of habit. It is like the case of a settler landing in a country overrun with wood and undrained, and visited therefore by excessive falls of rain. The evil of wet and damp and closeness is besetting him on every side; he clears away the woods, and he drains his land, and he by doing so mends both his climate and his own condition. Encouraged by his success he perseveres in his system; clearing a country is with him synonymous with making it fertile and habitable; and he levels or rather sets fire to his forests without mercy. Meanwhile the tide is turned without his observing it; he has already cleared enough, and every additional clearance is a mischief; damp and wet are no longer the evils most to be dreaded, but excessive drought. The rains do not fall in sufficient quantity; the springs become low, the rivers become less and less fitted for navigation. Yet habit blinds him for a long while to the real state of the case; and he continues to encourage a coming mischief in his dread of one that is become obsolete. We have been long making progress on our present tack, yet if we do not go about now, we shall run ashore. Consider the popular feeling at this moment against capital punishments; what is it but continuing to burn the woods, when the country actually wants shade and moisture. Year after year men talked of the severity of the penal code, and

struggled against it in vain. The feeling became stronger and stronger, and at last effected all and more than all which it had at first vainly demanded ; yet still from mere habit it pursues its course, no longer to the restraining of legal cruelty but to the injury of innocence and the encouragement of crime ; and encouraging that worse evil, a sympathy with wickedness justly punished, rather than with the law, whether of God or man, unjustly violated. So men have continued to cry out against the power of the crown after the crown had been shackled hand and foot ; and to express the greatest dread of popular violence, long after that violence was exhausted, and the antipopular party was not only rallied, but had turned the tide of battle, and was victoriously pressing upon its enemy.

I am not afraid after having gone thus far, to mention one consideration more, which, however over nice it may seem to some, appears to me really deserving to be taken into account. I mean that although the danger from any party in our own particular contest may seem to be at an end, and our alarms are beginning to be transferred to the opposite party, yet it is an important modification of the case, if in other countries the party which with us has just ceased to be formidable is still entirely predominant, and no opposition to it seems to be in existence. This would seem to shew that the main current of our times is still setting in that direction, and that the danger is still where we at first apprehended it ; although in our own particular country, a local cross

current may seem to indicate the contrary. For example, any excesses of the popular party in England in 1642 and the subsequent years, were much less dangerous, because the same party in other parts of Europe was so completely powerless; whereas in later years the triumph, first of the Americans and afterwards of the French Revolution, would make an essential difference in the strength of popular principles in the world generally, and therefore would make their excess in any one particular country more really formidable.

If we take into consideration all that has been hitherto said, and remember besides how much national questions have been mixed up with those of a political or religious character, to say nothing of commercial or economical interests, or of the anomalies of individual caprice or passion, we shall have some notion of the difficulty of our task to analyse the internal history of the last three centuries. And I have said nothing of philosophy, and nothing of religion, both of which have been very influential causes of action, and thus tend to complicate the subject still farther. Let us now see how far it is possible to separate a little this perplexed mass, and to arrive at some distinct views of the course of events and of opinions.

In order to do this, the most effectual way perhaps will be to select some one particular country, and make its internal history the subject of an analysis. But I should wish it to be understood that I am offering rather a specimen of the method to be pur-

sued in analyzing history, than pretending to execute the analysis completely. In fact if there were no other obstacles in the way of such a complete work, the limits of these lectures would alone render it impracticable. And therefore if any of my hearers notice great omissions in the following sketch, he may suppose, at least in many instances, that they are made advisedly, that I am not attempting a complete historical view, but only exhibiting, in some very familiar instances, what I believe to be the method of studying internal history to the greatest advantage.

Availing myself then of the division which I have noticed above, and assuming for our present purposes that the three last centuries may be divided into two periods, the one of religious, the other of political movement, I will now endeavour to offer a specimen of the analysis of internal history, taking for my subject these two periods successively, as far as regards our own country; and beginning therefore with the sixteenth century.

It does not appear to me that there was at the beginning of this century any thing in England which deserves to be called either a political or a religious party. There were changes at work no doubt, social changes going on imperceptibly which prepared the way for the developement of parties hereafter; but the parties themselves were not yet in existence. There was no party to assert the right of any rival claimant to the throne, there was no question stirring between the king and the nobility, or between the

king and the commons, or between the nobility and commons. A more tranquil state of things politically could not well be found.

So it was also religiously. The great schism of the rival popes had been long settled, and Wickliffe's doctrines, although they could never have become extinct, did not gain strength visibly; and those who held them were in no condition to form a party against the prevailing church doctrines or government. We start therefore upon our enquiry, with the whole matter of it before us, nothing of it has been already begun.

Neither do I think that any thing properly to be called a party shewed itself till the reign of Elizabeth. I do not mean to deny that Cranmer and Gardiner, the Seymours and the Howards, may have had their adherents and their enemies, principally amongst those who were attached on the one hand to the Reformation, and on the other hand to the system which was being reformed. So again there were insurrections both in Henry the Eighth's reign and in Edward the Sixth's against the measures of the government, when it was assailing the ancient system. But none of these things seem to have had sufficient consistence or permanence to entitle them to the name of national parties. At any rate the reign of Elizabeth witnessed them in a much more formed state, and here therefore we will consider them.

Elizabeth ascended the throne in the year 1558; Charles the Fifth had died about two months before

her accession; Henry the Second was still reigning. Paul the Fourth, John Peter Caraffa, had been pope for the last three years: the Reformation, dating from Luther's first preaching, was now about forty years old: the council of Trent was suspended; its third and final period began under Pius the Fourth, four years later. The Reformation after having been established fully in England under Edward the Sixth, and again completely overthrown under Mary, was now once more triumphant. But its friends were divided amongst themselves, and we can now trace two active and visible parties in England, with a third no longer combating in its own name in the front of the battle, but still powerful, and transferring some of its principles to one of the other two parties, whose triumph might possibly lead the way hereafter to its own. These three parties were the favourers of the church system as actually established, those who wished to reform it still more, and those who wished to undo what had been done to it already. But the Roman Catholics, who formed this last party, could not, as I have said, fight their battle openly, as both the government and the mass of the nation were against them.

It does not appear that these parties had as yet assumed a directly political form. They as yet involved no struggle between the crown and the parliament, or between the government and the nation. Of course they contained in them certain political tendencies, which were afterwards developed sufficiently; but they were as yet, in their form, of a reli-

gious, or at least of an ecclesiastical character. And like all other parties they represented each no one single principle but several; and mixed with principles, a variety of interests and passions besides.

1st. The friends or supporters of the existing church system, however different in other respects, agreed in one great point; namely, in the exclusion of the papal power, and in asserting the national independence in things ecclesiastical and spiritual. Farther, they agreed in the main in regarding the national voice, whose independence they maintained, as expressed by the national sovereign, in recognising the king or queen as the head of the church. In other matters they differed greatly, as was unavoidable; for thus far the most worldly men and the most religious might go along with each other, although in other things most at variance. It may be safely said that this point of the national religious independence, expressed by the royal supremacy, was the main bond which held Elizabeth to the Reformation; not that she was averse to it religiously, at least in its principal points; but that this threw her at once into its arms: she preferred that system which made her a queen altogether, to that which subjected her, in the most important of all human concerns, to the authority of an Italian priest. Elizabeth's own views were shared by a large portion of her people; they utterly abhorred the papal supremacy, with an English feeling quite as much as a religious one; it is not clear that they would have abhorred it equally had the papal see been removed for

ever from Rome to Canterbury, and the pope been necessarily an Englishman. But in proportion as religious questions had come to engage men's minds more generally, so they became desirous to have the power of deciding them for themselves. And no doubt mere political feelings had a great deal to do with the matter; the papacy was a government constantly varying in its foreign policy; French influence was at one time predominant at Rome, Spanish influence at another; but English influence was never powerful; and Englishmen did not wish to be in any degree subject to an authority which might be acting in the interests of their rivals or their enemies.

Again, the existing church system as opposed to the old one was upheld by a great number of persons throughout the country, because it was the relaxation of an irksome control. The Roman Catholic system, when enforced, does undoubtedly interfere considerably with men's liberty of thought and action. Its ritual and ceremonial ordinances are very numerous, and may be compared to the minute details of military discipline in the bondage which they are felt to impose. Its requiring auricular confession, and its assumed right of exercising over men's minds and studies the same absolute authority which a parent claims over the mind and pursuits of a young child, were unendurable at a moment when the burst of mental vigour in England was so extraordinary as it was in the reign of Elizabeth. Let any man read Shakespeare and the other great dramatists of the period, and he will observe nothing more remarkable

in them than their extreme freedom, I may almost call it, their license of thought. These dramatists were entirely men of the people; and other writers of the day belonging to the same class, shew no less the same tendency. Men of various ranks and degrees, from the highest nobility to the humblest of that middle class which was now daily growing in numbers and importance, all loving their liberty of thought and action in their several ways, were averse to the return of a system, which, whenever it was enforced, as it now seemed likely to be, exercised a constant control over both.

To be classed in the same party, and yet very different in themselves from the division of it just noticed, were all those who out of sincere and conscientious feeling concurred heartily in the church system as it was established in the reign of Edward the Sixth, and from various motives were disposed to rest contented in it. Some thinking it a matter of wisdom and charity not to go farther from the old system than was necessary; some also, and this is a natural feeling in the leaders of a reforming party, esteeming very much what they had done already, and yielding to that desire of our nature which after work well done longs to rest. And these took it ill when they were told to think nothing accomplished, till they should have accomplished every thing; it seemed like an unthankful disparagement of their past efforts, to be requiring of them immediately to exert themselves farther. Nor was it possible for the bishops and others of the high clergy to escape the

influence of professional feelings ; which would plead in favour of a system which, however much it subjected them to the control of the crown, gave them much authority and dignity with respect to the inferior clergy and to the laity.

2ndly. Distinct from and soon to be strongly opposed to this first party, was the party which wished to carry the Reformation farther ; that party which is commonly known by the name of Puritan. This was composed of less different elements than the church party, from the nature of the case ; although in it too differences were in process of time observable. But at first it contained only those who in their main principle were agreed : they deemed the old church system to be utterly bad, so bad as to have defiled whatever it had touched, even things in their own nature indifferent ; they wished therefore to reform it utterly, and abandoning every thing of man's device, to adopt nothing either in church doctrine or discipline which was not authorized directly by God's word. Being men of exceeding zeal and of a most stirring nature, they were anxious to do the work effectually, and would listen to no considerations which pleaded for compromise or for delay.

Familiarity with and love of the foreign protestant churches on the one hand, especially that of Geneva ; an extreme veneration for what they found in the letter of the Scripture, and probably also certain notions of good and free government which the actual state of the English monarchy could not but shock ; disposed the puritans to regard with

dislike the principle of the royal supremacy. They saw that practically the arbitrary power which they abhorred in the pope had been transferred in the lump to the queen ; they saw no such thing in the Christian church, as exhibited in the Scriptures ; neither could they find there, as they thought, any like the English episcopacy and hierarchy ; but the government of the church vested in a body of elders, and these not all members of the order of the clergy. What they thought they found in the Scriptures they believed to be of divine authority, not only when it was first instituted, but for ever ; and they wished therefore to substitute for the royal supremacy and hierarchy of the existing English church, that church government which alone, as they were persuaded, was ordained by God himself.

Furthermore, as men to whom religious questions were a great reality, and a matter of the deepest personal interest, they were in the highest degree impatient of all which seemed to them formalism. They conceived that amidst the prevailing ignorance and indifference on religious matters, a liturgical service was of much less consequence than a stirring preaching of the gospel ; they complained, therefore, of the evil of an unpreaching ministry ; for the mass of the clergy were so ignorant that they were unable, or could not be trusted to preach, and the homilies had been set forth by authority to remedy, as far as might be, this defect. The puritans said that the liturgy might become a mere form both in the minister and in the congregation, if it were not ac-

accompanied by an effective preaching ; the minister in their view was not to be the mere instrument of the church services, but to be useful to the people by his own personal gifts ; an ignorant or utterly vicious man might read a form prescribed by others ; they wanted a man who should believe, and must therefore speak, not the words of others, but those of his own convictions and affections.

There was in the principles of the puritans nothing of philosophy, either in the good sense of the word or the bad. And it is also most unjust to charge them with irreverence or want of humility. They received the Scriptures as God's word, and they followed them implicitly. Neither do they seem chargeable with establishing nice distinctions in order to evade their obvious meaning ; their fault seems rather to have lien in the other extreme ; they acquiesced in the obvious and literal meaning too unhesitatingly. Nor yet were they wanting in respect for all human authority, as trusting in their own wisdom and piety only. On the contrary, the decisions of the earlier church with respect to the great Christian doctrines, they received without questioning : they by no means took the Scriptures into their hands, and sat down to make a new creed of their own out of them. They disregarded the church only where the church departed from the obvious sense of Scripture ; I do not say the true sense, but the obvious one. The difference as to their moral character is considerable : because he who maintains another than the obvious sense of

Scripture against other men, may indeed be perfectly right, but he is liable to the charge, whether grave or frivolous as it may be, of preferring his own interpretation to that of the church. But maintaining the obvious sense, even if it be the wrong one, he can hardly be charged himself with arrogance; he may with greater plausibility retort the charge on his opponents, that they are substituting the devices of their own ingenuity for the plain sense of the word of God.

To say that the puritans were wanting in humility because they did not acquiesce in the state of things which they found around them, is a mere extravagance arising out of a total misapprehension of the nature of humility, and of the merits of the feeling of veneration. All earnestness and depth of character is incompatible with such a notion of humility. A man deeply penetrated with some great truth, and compelled as it were to obey it, cannot listen to every one who may be indifferent to it or opposed to it. There is a voice to which he already owes obedience, which he serves with the humblest devotion, which he worships with the most intense veneration. It is not that such feelings are dead in him, but that he has bestowed them on one object and they are claimed for another. To which they are most due is a question of justice; he may be wrong in his decision, and his worship may be idolatrous; but so also may be the worship which his opponents call upon him to render. If indeed it can be shewn that a man admires and reverences nothing, he may

justly be taxed with want of humility; but this is at variance with the very notion of an earnest character; for its earnestness consists in its devotion to some one object, as opposed to a proud or contemptuous indifference. But if it be meant that reverence in itself is good, so that the more objects of veneration we have, the better is our character, this is to confound the essential difference between veneration and love. The excellence of love is its universality; we are told that even the highest object of all cannot be loved, if inferior objects are hated. And with some exaggeration in the expression, we may admit the truth of Coleridge's lines,

He prayeth well, who loveth well
Both man and bird and beast;

insomuch that if we were to hear of a man sacrificing even his life to save that of an animal, we could not help admiring him. But the excellence of veneration consists purely in its being fixed upon a worthy object; when felt indiscriminately it is idolatry or insanity. To tax any one therefore with want of reverence because he pays no respect to what we venerate, is either irrelevant or is a mere confusion. The fact, so far as it is true, is no reproach but an honour; because to reverence all persons and all things is absolutely wrong: reverence shewn to that which does not deserve it, is no virtue, no, nor even an amiable weakness, but a plain folly and sin. But if it be meant that he is wanting in proper reverence, not respecting what is really to be respected, that is assuming the whole question at issue, because what

we call divine he calls an idol; and as supposing that we are in the right, we are bound to fall down and worship, so, supposing him to be in the right, he is no less bound to pull it to the ground and destroy it.

I have said thus much not only to do justice to the puritans, but because this charge of want of humility is one frequently brought by weaker and baser minds against the stronger and nobler; not seldom by those who are at once arrogant and indifferent, against those who are in truth as humble as they are zealous. But returning to our immediate subject, we see that the puritans united in themselves two points which gave to their party a double appearance; and at a later period, when the union between the two was no longer believed in, they excited in the very same minds a mingled feeling; admiration as far as regarded one point, alienation as regarded the other. The puritans wished to alter the existing church system for one which they believed to be freer and better; and so far they resembled a common popular party: but inasmuch as in this and all other matters their great principle was, conformity to the Scripture, and they pushed this to an extravagant excess, because their interpretation of Scripture was continually faulty, there was, together with their free political spirit, a narrow spirit in things religious, which shocked not only the popular party of the succeeding age, but many even in their own day, who politically entertained opinions far narrower than theirs. In Elizabeth's reign, however, they had scarcely begun to form a political party; their

views affected the church government only, and contemplated no alteration in the spirit of the monarchy; although it was evident, that if the crown continued to resist their efforts in church matters, they would end by resisting not only its ecclesiastical supremacy, but its actual ascendancy in the constitution altogether.

3rd. The Roman Catholic party could not, as I have said, act openly in their own name, because their system had been put down by law; and, as they were at present regarded as far worse in themselves and far more dangerous than the puritans, all their movements and all expressions of their opinions were restrained with greater severity. Denying like the puritans the royal supremacy, and exposed for so doing to the heaviest penalties, their language sometimes assumed a strong political character, and they spoke freely of the duty of disobeying and deposing those tyrannical princes, on whom the church by the pope's voice had already pronounced its sentence of condemnation. It was the language of the old Guelf party, which some even to this hour regard as popular and liberal. But to oppose a lighter tyranny in the name of a heavier cannot be to serve the cause of good government; and the moral and spiritual dominion of the papacy was now become the great evil of the world, as it was pressing upon those parts of man's nature which were stirring for themselves, and whose silence would be no longer sleep but death.

The language of the Roman catholics did not

mislead the mass of the English nation, but only made themselves more odious. The serpent's wisdom of Elizabeth cannot be denied by the bitterest of her enemies. With incomparable ability she made herself personally the darling of her people from the first year of her reign to the last. Her behaviour when she passed through the city in state on the day preceding her coronation, or when thirty years afterwards she visited and harangued her troops at Tilbury, or when at the very end of her reign she granted so gracefully the petition of the house of commons against monopolies, was all of the same character; the frank and gracious and noble bearing of a sovereign feeling herself at once beloved and respected, knowing the greatness of her place, and sincerely, if not habitually, appreciating its duties. Her personal qualities made her dear to her subjects, and assisted them in seeing clearly that her cause and theirs were one. Conspiracy at home and open war abroad, the excommunications of Rome, the Armadas of Spain, the assassination plots of the catholics, only bound her people's love to her more firmly. Her arbitrary acts, and still more arbitrary language, the severities, illegalities, and cruelties of her government towards the parties who opposed her, the people at large forgot or approved of. Nothing was unjust, nothing was cruel, against the enemies of one whom the nation so loved; the almost universal voice of England called for the death of Mary Stuart, because the people believed her life to be incompatible with the safety of their beloved

queen. Whilst Elizabeth lived, political parties, properly so called, were incapable of existing; it was the whole English nation on one side, and on the other a few conspirators.

But another scene was preparing, and when her successor came to the throne, the state of parties assumed a different aspect; and political elements were added to the religious, rivalling or surpassing them in the interest which they awakened. This later stage of what I have called the religious movement of modern English history will be considered in the following lecture.

LECTURE VI.

Our sketch of the English part of what I have called the religious movement of modern Europe has now arrived at the beginning of the seventeenth century. And I have said that the several parties as hitherto developed have been religious rather than political, but that they were soon to become political also. I have used these words “religious” and “political” in their common acceptation for the sake of convenience ; but it is quite necessary to observe the confusions which attend this use of them, as well as of the kindred words “church” and “state,” “spiritual” and “secular,” confusions of no slight importance, and perpetually tending, as I think, to perplex our notions of the whole matter to which the words relate.

I have called the puritans in the sixteenth century a religious party rather than a political, because it was the government of the church and not of the state, to use again the common language, which they were attempting to alter ; the government by bishops,

archdeacons, &c., under the royal supremacy, not the government by king, lords, and commons. But if we examine the case a little more closely, we shall find that in strictness they were a political party, and that the changes which they wanted to introduce were political; political, it may be said, even more than religious, if we apprehend the distinction involved in these words more accurately than seems to be done by the common usage of them.

I shall not, I trust, be suspected of wishing merely to bring forward a startling paradox, when I say that in speaking of Christianity the word church is rather to be used as distinct from religion than as synonymous with it, and that it belongs in great part to another set of ideas, relating to things which we call political. Religion expresses the relations of man to God, setting aside our relations to other men: the church expresses our relations to God in and through our relations to other men: the state, in popular language, expresses our relations to other men without reference to our relations to God: but I have always thought that this notion is in fact atheistic, and that the truer notion would be that the state at least expresses our relations to other men according to God's ordinance, that is, in some degree including our relation to God. However, without insisting on this, we will allow that the term religion may have a meaning without at all considering our relations to other men, and that the word state may have a meaning without at all considering our relations to God; not its perfect meaning, but a meaning;

whereas the word “church” necessarily comprehends both : we cannot attach any sense to it without conceiving of it as related to God, and involving also the relations of men to one another. It stands, therefore, according to this view of it, as the union of the two ideas of religion and the state, comprising necessarily in itself the essential points of both the others ; and as being such, all church questions may be said to be both religious and political ; although in some the religious element may be predominant, and in others the political, almost to the absorption of the other.

Now questions of church government may appear clearly to be predominantly political ; that is, as regarding the relations of the members of the church to one another, whether one shall govern the rest, or the few the many, or the many themselves : and the arguments which bear upon all these points in societies merely political might seem the arguments which should decide them here. But two other considerations are here to be added ; one, that in the opinion of many persons of opposite parties, all such arguments are barred by God’s having expressly commanded a particular form of government ; so that instead of the general question, what is the best form of government under such and such circumstances, we have another, what is the particular form commanded by God as the best under all circumstances. This is one consideration, and according to this, it might no doubt happen that persons of the most opposite political opinions might concur in

desiring the very same form of church government, simply as that which God had commanded. This is possible, and in individual cases I do not doubt that it has often actually happened. But as the question, what is the particular form divinely commanded, is open to manifold doubts, to say nothing of the farther question, "whether any particular form has been commanded or no;" so practically amongst actual parties, men's opinions and feelings, political and others, have really influenced them in deciding the question of fact, and they have actually maintained one form or another to be the form divinely commanded, according to their firm belief of its superior excellence, or their sense of the actual evils of other forms, or their instinctive feeling in favour of what was established and ancient. And so we really should thus far reclaim questions on church government to the dominion of political questions; political or moral considerations having really for the most part been the springs of the opinions of the several parties respecting them.

But I said that there were two considerations to be added, and I have as yet only mentioned one. The other is the belief entertained of the existence of a priesthood in Christianity, and this priesthood regulated by a divine law, and attached for ever to the offices which exercise government also. And this priesthood being, according to the opinion of those who believe in it, of infinite religious importance, the question of church government becomes in their view much more religious than political;

religious, not only in this sense, that church government, whether we may think it good or bad, must be tried simply by the matter of fact, whether it is the government ordained by God; but in another and stricter sense, that the priesthood implying also the government, and being necessary to every man's spiritual welfare, not through the governing powers attached to it, but in its own direct priestly acts which are quite distinct from government, church government is directly a matter of religious import, and to depart from what God has ordained respecting it is not merely a breach of God's commandments, but is an actual cutting off of that supply of spiritual strength by which alone we can be saved. So that in this view questions of church government, as involving more or less the priesthood also, must be predominantly religious.

Am I then contradicting myself, and were the parties of the sixteenth century purely religious, as I have called them religious in the popular sense of the word, and not at all, or scarcely at all political? I think that the commonest reader of English history will feel that they were political, and that I was right in calling them so; where then are we to find the solution of the puzzle? In two points, which I think are historically certain; first, that the controversy about episcopacy was not held of necessity to involve the question of the priesthood, because the priestly character was not thought to be vested exclusively in bishops, nor to be communicable only by them; so that episcopacy might be after all a

point of government and not of priesthood: and secondly in this, that the reformed churches, and the church of England no less than the rest, laid no stress on the notion of a priesthood, and made it no part of their faith; so that questions of church government, when debated between protestants and protestants, were debated without reference to it, and as questions of government only. Whereas amongst Roman catholics, where the belief in a priesthood is at the bottom of the whole system, questions of church government have had no place, but the dispute has been *De sacerdotio et imperio*, respecting the limits of the church and the state; for the church being supposed identical with, or rather to be merged in the priesthood, its own government of itself was fixed irrevocably; and the important question was, how large a portion of human life could be saved from the grasp of this dominion, which was supposed to be divine, and yet by sad experience was felt also to be capable both of corruption and tyranny. So that there was no remedy but to separate the dominion of the state from that of the church as widely as possible, and to establish a distinction between secular things and spiritual, that so the corrupt church might have only one portion of the man, and some other power, not subject to its control, might have the rest.

Returning then to my original point, it is still, I think, true that the parties of the sixteenth century in England were in great measure political; inasmuch as they disputed about points of church govern-

ment, without any reference to a supposed priesthood; and because even those who maintained that one or another form was to be preferred because it was of divine appointment, were influenced in their interpretation of the doubtful language of the Scriptures by their own strong persuasion of what that language could not but mean to say. But being political even as we have hitherto regarded them, the parties become so in a much higher degree when we remember that according to the theory of the English constitution in the sixteenth century, its church and its state were one.

Whether this identification be right or wrong, is no part of my present business to decide; but the fact is perfectly indisputable. It does not depend merely on the language of the act which conferred the supremacy on Henry the Eighth, large and decisive as that language is. Nor on the large powers, and high precedence, ranking above all the bishops and archbishops, assigned to the king's vicegerent in matters ecclesiastical, such vicegerent being a layman. Nor yet does it rest solely on the fact of Edward the Sixth issuing an office for the celebration of the communion purely by his own authority, with the advice of his uncle the protector Somerset, and others of his privy council, without the slightest mention of any consent or advice of any bishop or clerical person whatsoever; the king declaring in his preface that he knows what by God's word is meet to be redressed, and that he purposes with God's

grace to do it^a. But it is proved by this, that every point in the doctrine, discipline, and ritual of our church, was settled by the authority of parliament: the Act of Uniformity of the first of Elizabeth, which fixed the liturgy and ordered its use in all churches, being passed by the queen, lords temporal, and commons only; the bishops being Roman catholics, and of course refusing to join in it; so that the very preamble of the act omits all mention of lords spiritual, and declares that it was enacted by the queen with the advice and consent of the lords and commons, and by the authority of the same. And it is proved again by the language of the prayer for the church militant, where the king's council and his ministers are undoubtedly regarded as being officers in the church by virtue of their offices in the state. This being the fact, recognised on all hands, church government was no light matter, but one which essentially involved in it the government of the state; and the disputing the queen's supremacy was equivalent to depriving her of one of the most important portions of her sovereignty, and committing half of the government of the nation to other hands. And therefore when James the first used his famous expression of "no bishop, no king," he spoke exactly

^a See Edward the Sixth's "Order of the Communion," "imprinted at London by Richard Grafton, 1547," and reprinted by Bishop Sparrow in his "Collection of Articles, Injunctions, Canons, Orders," &c., and again, lately by Dr. Cardwell as an Appendix to the Two Liturgies of Edward the Sixth. Oxford, 1841.

in the spirit of the notion that an aristocracy is a necessary condition of a monarchy, unless it be a pure despotism, military or otherwise; that where the people are free, if they have rejected an aristocracy, they will surely sooner or later reject a monarchy also.

But still, had Elizabeth's successor been like herself, the religious parties might have gone on for a long time without giving to their opposition a direct political form. Sir Francis Knollys, writing to Lord Burghley in January 1592, (1591, O.S.) wonders that the queen should imagine "that she is in as much danger of such as are called puritans as she is of the papists, and yet her majesty cannot be ignorant that the puritans are not able to change the government of the clergy, but only by petition at her majesty's hands. And yet her majesty cannot do it, but she must call a parliament for it; and no act can pass thereof unless her majesty shall give her royal assent thereto."^a This shews that as yet no notion was entertained of parliament's taking up the cause of itself, and pressing it against the crown; and indeed such was the mingled fear and love entertained for Elizabeth, that the mere notion of a strong party in parliament setting itself in opposition to her was altogether chimerical. But in the meantime the puritan party was gaining ground in the country; its supporters in parliament were continually becoming more numerous; and instead of the

^a Queen Elizabeth and Her Times. Edited by T. Wright, Trinity College, Cambridge. London, 1838. Vol. i. p. 417.

most able, the most respected, and the most beloved of queens, the sovereign of England was now James the First.

At one stroke the crown became placed in a new position. Not less adverse to the puritans than Elizabeth had been, King James met with none of that enthusiastic loyalty from the mass of the people which in the late reign had softened the opposition of the puritans, and if it had not softened it would have rendered it harmless. He abandoned Elizabeth's foreign policy, as he was incapable of maintaining either the dignity or the popularity of her personal character. The spell which had stayed the spirit of political party was broken, and the waters whose swelling had been held back as it were by its potent influence, now took their natural course, and rose with astonishing rapidity.

The most disastrous revolutions are produced by the extreme of physical want; the most happy, by wants of a moral kind, physical want being absent. There are many reasons why this should be so: and this amongst others, that extreme physical want is unnatural: it is a disease which cannot be shaken off without a violent and convulsive struggle. But moral and intellectual cravings are but a healthful symptom of vigorous life: before they were felt, no wrong was done in withholding their appointed food, and if it be given them when they demand it, all goes on naturally and happily. Nay, even where it is refused, and a struggle is the consequence, still the struggle is marked with much less of bitterness, for

men contending for political rights are not infuriated like those who are fighting for bread. Now at the beginning of the seventeenth century the craving for a more active share in the management of their own concerns was felt by a large portion of the English people. It had been suspended in Elizabeth's reign owing to the general respect for her government, and the growing activity of the nation found its employment in war, or in trade, or in writing; for the mass of writers in Elizabeth's time was enormous. But when the government excited no respect, then the nation began to question with itself, why in the conduct of its affairs such a government should be so much and itself so little.

No imaginary constitution floated before the eyes of the popular party in parliament, as the object towards which all their efforts should be directed. Their feeling was indistinct, but yet they seem to have acted on a consciousness that the time was come when in the government of the country the influence of the crown should be less, and that of the nation more. It appears to me that the particular matters of dispute were altogether subordinate; the puritan members of parliament pressed for the reform of the church; men who were keenly alive to the value of personal freedom, attacked arbitrary courts of justice, and the power of arbitrary imprisonment; those who cared for little else were at least anxious to keep in their own hands the control over their own money. But in all the impulse was the same, to make the house of commons a reality.

Created in the midst of regal and aristocratical oppression, and wonderfully preserved during the despotism of the Tudor princes with all its powers unimpaired because it had not attempted to exercise them unseasonably; an undoubted branch of the legislature,—the sole controller by law of the public taxation,—authorized even in its feeblest infancy to petition for the redress of national grievances and to impeach public delinquents in the name of the “Commons of England,”—recognised as speaking with the voice of the nation when the nation could do no more than petition and complain, the house of commons spoke that same voice no less now, when the nation was grown up to manhood, and had the power to demand and to punish.

The greater or less importance of a representative assembly is like the quicksilver in a barometer; it rises or falls according to causes external to itself; and is but an index exhibited in a palpable form, of the more or less powerful pressure of the popular atmosphere. When the people at large are poor, depressed, and inactive, then their representatives faithfully express their weakness; nothing is so helpless as a house of commons, or a chamber of deputies, when their constituents are indifferent to or unable to support their efforts. But under opposite circumstances an opposite result is inevitable; where the people are vigorous, powerful and determined, their representatives, so long as they are believed to represent them faithfully, cannot but wield a predominant influence. Naturally then and unavoidably did the

power of the house of commons grow in the seventeenth century, because, as I have said, they spoke the voice of the nation, and the nation was now become strong.

Under these circumstances there were now working together in the same party many principles which, as we have seen, are sometimes perfectly distinct. For instance the popular principle, that the influence of many should not be overborne by that of one, was working side by side with the principle of movement, or the desire of carrying on the work of the Reformation to the farthest possible point, and not only the desire of completing the Reformation, but that of shaking off the manifold evils of the existing state of things both political and moral. Yet it is remarkable that the spirit of intellectual movement stood as it were hesitating which party it ought to join: and as the contest went on, it seemed rather to incline to that party which was most opposed to the political movement. This is a point in the state of English party in the seventeenth century which is well worth noticing, and we must endeavour to comprehend it.

We might think, *a priori*, that the spirit of political and that of intellectual, and that of religious movement, would go on together, each favouring and encouraging the other. But the spirit of intellectual movement differs from the other two in this, that it is comparatively one with which the mass of mankind have little sympathy. Political benefits all men can appreciate; and all good men, and a great many

more than we might well dare to call good, can appreciate also the value not of all, but of some religious truth which to them may seem all : the way to obtain God's favour and to worship Him aright, is a thing which great bodies of men can value, and be moved to the most determined efforts, if they fancy that they are hindered from attaining to it. But intellectual movement in itself is a thing which few care for. Political truth may be dear to them, so far as it affects their common well-being ; and religious truth so far as they may think it their duty to learn it ; but truth abstractedly, and because it is truth, which is the object, I suppose, of the pure intellect, is to the mass of mankind a thing indifferent. Thus the workings of the intellect come even to be regarded with suspicion as unsettling : We have got, we say, what we want, and we are well contented with it ; why should we be kept in perpetual restlessness, because you are searching after some new truths, which when found will compel us to derange the state of our minds in order to make room for them. Thus the democracy of Athens was afraid of and hated Socrates ; and the poet who satirized Cleon, knew that Cleon's partisans no less than his own aristocratical friends would sympathize with his satire, when directed against the philosophers. But if this hold in political matters, much more does it hold religiously. The two great parties of the Christian world have each their own standard of truth by which they try all things : Scripture on the one hand, the voice of the church on the other. To

both therefore the pure intellectual movement is not only unwelcome, but they dislike it. It will question what they will not allow to be questioned; it may arrive at conclusions which they would regard as impious. And therefore in an age of religious movement particularly, the spirit of intellectual movement soon finds itself proscribed rather than countenanced.

But still there remains the question why it should have shrunk from the religious party which was aiming at reform rather than from that which was opposed to it. And the explanation appears to be this. The reforming party held up Scripture in all things as their standard, and Scripture according to its most obvious interpretation. Thus in matters of practice, such as church government, ceremonial, &c., they allowed of no liberty; Scripture was to be the rule positively and negatively; what was found in it was commanded; what it did not command was unlawful. Again, in matters of faith, what the Scripture taught was to be believed; believed actively, not submissively accepted. I instance the most startling points of Calvinism as an example of this. And this party knew no distinction of learned or unlearned, of priest or layman, of those who were to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God, and of those who were to receive the book sealed up, and believe that its contents were holy, because their teachers told them so. All having the full Christian privileges, all had alike the full Christian responsibilities. I have known a man of science,

a Roman catholic, express the most intolerant opinions as to dissenters from the Romish communion, and yet when pressed on the subject, declare that his business was science, and that he knew nothing about theology. But the religious reforming party of the seventeenth century would allow their men of science no such shelter as this. They were members of Christ's church, and must know and believe Christ's truth for themselves, and not by proxy. With such a party then, considering that the truth for which they demanded such implicit faith, was their own interpretation of Scripture, formed on no very enlarged principles, the intellectual enquirer, who demanded a large liberty of thought, and to believe only what he could reasonably accept as true, could entertain no sympathy.

But with the party opposed to them it was different. To a man not in earnest the principle of church authority is a very endurable shackle. He does homage to it once for all, and is then free. In matters of church government, however, men in earnest no less than men not in earnest found that intellectually speaking the antipopular party dealt more gently with them than the puritans. For Hooker's principle being adopted, that the church had great liberty in its choice of a government, as well as of its ceremonial, the existing church government and ritual rested its claim not on its being essential always, and divinely commanded, but on being established by lawful authority. On this principle any man might obey it, without being at all

obliged to maintain its inherent excellence: his conformity did not touch his intellectual freedom. With respect to doctrines, even to the honest and earnest believer there was in many points also allowed a greater liberty. Where the church did not pronounce authoritatively, the interpretation of Scripture was left free: and the obvious sense was not imposed upon men's belief as the true one. Thus the peculiar points of Calvinism were rejected by the antipopular party, the more readily no doubt because Calvin had taught them, but also by many because of their own startling character. But where there was an indifference to religious truth altogether, there the principle of church authority, and the strong distinctions drawn between the knowledge required of the clergy, and that necessary for the laity, offered a most convenient refuge. It cost such a man little not to attack opinions about which he cared nothing; it cost him little to say that he submitted dutifully to the authority of the church, being himself very ignorant of such matters, and unable to argue about them. His ignorance was really unbelief; but his profession of submission allowed him to enquire freely on other matters which he did care for, and there to assert principles which, if consistently applied, might shake what the church most maintained. But he would not make the application, and like the Jesuit editors of Newton, he was ready if questioned to disclaim it.

Thus up to the breaking out of the civil war in 1642, we find some of the most enquiring and purely

intellectual men of the age, such as Hales and Chillingworth, strongly attached to the antipopular party. And it was his extreme shrinking from what he considered the narrow-mindedness of the puritans, which principally, I think, influenced the mind of Lord Falkland in joining at last the antipopular cause as the least evil of the two. But as the civil war went on, the popular party underwent a great change; a change which prepared the way for the totally new form in which it appeared in Europe in that second period of modern history which I have called the period of the political movement.

Before, however, we trace this change, let us consider generally the progress of the struggle in the first forty years of the seventeenth century. What strikes us predominantly is, that what in Elizabeth's time was a controversy between divines, was now a great political contest between the crown and the parliament. I have already observed that the growing vigour of the nation necessarily gave a corresponding vigour to the parliament: its greater ascendancy was in the course of things natural. And although the nation was growing throughout the forty years and more of Elizabeth's reign, yet of course the period of its after growth produced much greater results: the infant grows into the boy in his first ten years of life; but it is in the second ten years, from ten to twenty, that he grows up into the freedom of manhood. But yet it cannot be denied that had Elizabeth reigned from 1603 to 1642, the complexion of events would have been greatly dif-

ferent. A great sovereign might have either headed the movement or diverted it. For instance, a sovereign who observing the strength of the national feeling in favour of the protestant Reformation had entered frankly and vigorously into the great continental struggle; had supported on principle that cause which Richelieu aided purely from worldly policy; had struck to the heart of Spain by a sustained naval war, and by letting loose Raleigh and other such companions or followers of Drake and Frobisher upon her American colonies; while he had combated the Austrian power front to front in Germany, and formed an army like Cromwell's in foreign rather than in domestic warfare, such a king would have met with no opposition on the score of subsidies; his faithful commons would have supported him as liberally and heartily as their fathers had supported Henry the Fifth's quarrel with France, or as their posterity supported the triumphant administration of the first William Pitt. And puritan plans of church reform would have been cast aside unheeded: the star-chamber would have remained unassailed, because it would have found no victims, or none whom the public mind would have cared for; and Hampden instead of resisting the tax of ship-money, would, like the Roman senators of old, have rather built and manned a ship at his own single cost; and commanding it in person for the cause of God and the glory of England, might have died like Nelson after completing the destruction of the Spanish navy, instead of perishing almost in his own

native county, at that sad skirmish of Chalgrave field.

This might have been, had James the First been the very reverse of what he was; and then the contest would have been delayed to a later period, and have taken place under other circumstances. For sooner or later it could not but come, and the first long peace under a weak monarch would have led to it. For the supposed long course of foreign wars would have caused parliaments to have been continually summoned, so that it would not have been possible afterwards to have discontinued them; and whenever the parliament and a weak king had found themselves in presence of each other, with no foreign war to engage them, the collision was inevitable. We have rather therefore reason to be thankful that the struggle did take place actually, when no long war had brought distress upon the whole nation, and embittered men's minds with what Thucydides^a calls its rude and violent teaching; but in a time of peace and general prosperity, when our social state was so healthy that the extreme of political commotion did not seriously affect it; so that although a three or four years' civil war cannot but be a great calamity, yet never was there any similar struggle marked with so little misery, and stained with so few crimes, as the great English civil war of the seventeenth century.

Meantime, as I said, the character of the popular party underwent a change. For as the struggle be-

^a III. 82.

came fiercer, and more predominantly political, and bold and active men were called forward from all ranks of society, it was impossible that the puritan form of church government, or their system of Scripture interpretation, should be agreeable to all the popular party. Some broke off therefore in one direction, others in another. In times when the masses were no longer inert, but individual character was everywhere manifesting itself, no system of centralization, whether in the hands of bishops or presbyters, was likely to be acceptable. Centralization and active life pervading the whole body are hard to reconcile: he who should do this perfectly, would have established a perfect government. For "*quot homines tot sententiæ*" holds good only where there is any thinking at all: otherwise there may be a hundred millions of men and only "*una sententia*," if the minds of the 99,999,999 are wholly quiescent. And thus the independent principle arose naturally out of the high excitement on religious questions which prevailed throughout the nation; just as the multitude of little commonwealths in Greece, and in Italy in the middle ages, shewed the stirring of political life in those countries. Each congregation was independent of other congregations; each individual in the congregation, according to his gifts real or fancied, might pray, exhort, and interpret Scripture. Men so resolute in asserting the rights of the small society against the larger, and of the individual against the society, could not but recognise, I do not say, the duty, so much as the necessity of toleration;

and thus the independents shewed more mutual indulgence in this matter than any religious party had as yet shewn in England. But such a system, to say nothing of its other defects, had in it no principle of duration ; for it seems a law that life cannot long go on in a multitude of minute parts without union, nay even without something of that very centralization which yet if not well watched is so apt to destroy them by absorbing their life into its own : there wants a heart in the political as in the natural body, to supply the extremities continually with fresh blood.

But I said that the popular party broke off from puritanism partly in one direction and partly in another. Some there were who set the religious part of the contest aside altogether ; esteeming the disputes about church government of no account, holding all the religious parties alike in equal contempt, as equally narrow-minded in their different ways. The good government of the commonwealth was their main object, with a pure system of divine philosophy. The eyes of such men were turned rather to Greece and Rome than to any nearer model ; there alone, as they fancied, was to be found the freedom which they desired. Others, who were incapable of any romantic or philosophical aspirations, desired simply such objects as have been expressed in later times under the terms civil and religious liberty ; they deprecated unjust restraint whether external or internal ; but with this negation their zeal seemed to rest contented. A great and fatal error, and which

has done more than any thing else to make good men in later times stand aloof from the popular cause. For liberty, though an essential condition of all our excellence, is yet valuable because it is such a condition: I may say of it what I have said of actual existence, that the question may always be asked why we are free, and if the answer is, that we may do nothing, or that we may please ourselves, then liberty so far as we are concerned is valueless: its good is this only, that it takes away from another the guilt of injustice. But to speak of religious liberty, when we mean the liberty to be irreligious; or of freedom of conscience, when our only conscience is our convenience; is no other than a mockery and a profanation. It is by following such principles that a popular party justly incurs that reproach of ἀκολασία which the ancient philosophers bestowed especially on democracies.

I have tried to analyze the popular party: I must now endeavour to do the same with the party opposed to it. Of course an antipopular party varies exceedingly at different times; when it is in the ascendant its vilest elements are sure to be uppermost: fair and moderate men,—just men, wise men, noble-minded men,—then refuse to take part with it. But when it is humbled, and the opposite side begins to imitate its practices, then again many of the best and noblest spirits return to it, and share its defeat though they abhorred its victory. We must distinguish therefore very widely, between the antipopular party in 1640 before the Long Parlia-

ment met, and the same party a few years, or even a few months, afterwards. Now taking the best specimens of this party in its best state, we can scarcely admire them too highly. A man who leaves the popular cause when it is triumphant, and joins the party opposed to it, without really changing his principles and becoming a renegade, is one of the noblest characters in history. He may not have the clearest judgment, or the firmest wisdom; he may have been mistaken, but as far as he is concerned personally, we cannot but admire him. But such a man changes his party not to conquer but to die. He does not allow the caresses of his new friends to make him forget, that he is a sojourner with them and not a citizen: his old friends may have used him ill, they may be dealing unjustly and cruelly: still their faults, though they may have driven him into exile, cannot banish from his mind the consciousness that with them is his true home: that their cause is habitually just and habitually the weaker, although now bewildered and led astray by an unwonted gleam of success. He protests so strongly against their evil that he chooses to die by their hands rather than in their company; but die he must, for there is no place left on earth where his sympathies can breathe freely; he is obliged to leave the country of his affections, and life elsewhere is intolerable. This man is no renegade, no apostate, but the purest of martyrs: for what testimony to truth can be so pure as that which is given uncheered by any sympathy; given not against enemies amidst applauding friends;

but against friends, amidst unpitying or half-rejoicing enemies. And such a martyr was Falkland!

Others who fall off from a popular party in its triumph are of a different character; ambitious men, who think that they are become necessary to their opponents, and who crave the glory of being able to undo their own work, as easily as they had done it: passionate men, who quarrelling with their old associates on some personal question join the adversary in search of revenge; vain men, who think their place unequal to their merits, and hope to gain a higher on the opposite side: timid men, who are frightened as it were at the noise of their own guns, and the stir of actual battle; who had liked to dally with popular principles in the parade service of debating or writing in quiet times, but who shrink alarmed when both sides are become thoroughly in earnest: and again, quiet and honest men, who never having fully comprehended the general principles at issue, and judging only by what they see before them, are shocked at the violence of their party, and think that the opposite party is now become innocent and just, because it is now suffering wrong rather than doing it. Lastly, men who rightly understand that good government is the result of popular and anti-popular principles blended together, rather than of the mere ascendancy of either; whose aim, therefore, is to prevent either from going too far, and to throw their weight into the lighter scale: wise men and most useful, up to the moment when the two parties are engaged in actual civil war, and the ques-

tion is, which shall conquer. For no man can pretend to limit the success of a party, when the sword is the arbitrator: he who wins in that game does not win by halves: and therefore the only question then is, which party is on the whole the best, or rather perhaps the least evil; for as one must crush the other, it is at least desirable that the party so crushed should be the worse.

Again, of the supporters of an antipopular party in its ordinary state, before it has received accessions from its opposite, there is also a considerable variety. Walton^a, when describing the three parties of the reign of Elizabeth, speaks of them as “the active Romanists,” “the restless non-conformists,” and “the passive and peaceable Protestants.” This virtue of quietness, meekness, and peaceableness, the ἀπραγμοσύνη of the Athenians, has been ascribed to Walton himself, and is often claimed as the characteristic excellence of an antipopular party, and particularly of the antipopular party of our English contests of the seventeenth century. Now it may be, though I do not think that it is made out clearly, that there existed at Athens a state of things so feverish—that a town life, surrounded by such manifold excitements as was that of the Athenians, had so overpowered the taste for quiet—that the ἀπραγμῶν, or the man who followed only his own domestic concerns, was a healthy rarity. But in general, and most certainly with our country life, and our English constitutions, partaking something of the coldness of our northern

^a Life of Hooker.

climate, it is extraordinary that any should have regarded this *ἀπραγμοσύνη* as a rare virtue, and praised the meekness of those who being themselves well off, and having all their own desires contented, do not trouble themselves about the evils which they do not feel; and complain of the noisy restlessness of the beggars in the street, while they are sitting at their ease in their warm and comfortable rooms. Isaac Walton might enjoy his angling undisturbed in spite of star-chamber, ship-money, high-commission court, or popish ceremonies; what was the sacrifice to him of letting the public grievances take their own way, and enjoying the freshness of a May morning in the meadows on the banks of the Lea? Shew me a population, painfully struggling for existence, toiling hard and scarcely able to obtain necessary food, and seeing others around them in the enjoyment of every luxury, and this population repelling all agitation, and going on peaceably and patiently under a system in which they and they alone are suffering; and I will yield to no man in my admiration, in my deep reverence, for such quietness, or rather for such true meekness, such self-denying resignation. For there is not a living man on whom hunger and cold do not press heavily, if he has to bear them; and he who endures these is truly patient. But are all men keenly alive to religious error? to political abuses which do not touch them? to injustice from which others only are the sufferers? Or are our English minds so enthusiastic, that our most dangerous tendency is to forget our own private and personal con-

cerns, to crave after abstract changes in church and state, and to rail against existing institutions with the certainty of meeting as our reward poverty and a gaol? Generally, then, there is no merit in the acquiescence in existing things shewn by the mass of the population whose physical comforts are not touched, nor their personal feelings insulted. There may be individuals, no doubt, whose submission is virtuous: men who see clearly what is evil, and desire to have it redressed, but from a mistaken sense of duty, and from that only, forbear to complain of it. But where the evil is one which the mass care little for, when to complain of it is highly dangerous, and there is enough of work and enjoyment in their own private concerns to satisfy all the wants of their nature, I know not how the political peaceableness of such persons can be thought in itself to be either admirable or amiable. It seems to me to be in itself neither admirable nor strongly blameable; but simply the following of a natural tendency; and of this sort was the dislike of the popular party entertained by the great majority of their opponents.

Others however there were who were opposed to the popular party, at least so long as it was predominantly religious, on more positive and earnest grounds. A vast multitude of principles and practices had been joined together in the Roman catholic system; not all necessarily connected with each other. Of these some desired to restore all, some loved peculiarly those which were most essential to the system really, though not in the eyes of the

vulgar: others regretted only those which, having no necessary connexion with it, were yet proscribed for its sake. To all of these, and to many more besides which the church of England had actually adopted, the puritans professed the most uncompromising hostility. Not only therefore were all those opposed to them who thought that the Reformation had gone too far; but many of those also who thought that it had gone far enough, and could not bear to go any farther. Men of taste, men who loved antiquity, men of strong associations which they felt almost sacred, were scandalized at the homeliness, the utter renunciation of the past, the rude snapping asunder of some of the most venerable usages, which were prominent parts of the puritan system. But along with these were others whose dislike to puritanism went deeper: some who dreaded their system of Scripture interpretation, and the doctrines which they deduced from it; a large party who believed the government by bishops to be divinely commanded, as firmly as the puritans believed the same of their presbyteries; but many also, and from the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards continually becoming more active, and raised to higher dignities, who in their hearts hated the Reformation altogether, hated especially the foreign protestants, hated the doctrine of justification by faith, loved ceremonies and rites, idolized antiquity, preached up the priesthood; and in the words of Lord Falkland, “laboured to bring in an English though not a Roman

popery;" "I mean," he goes on^a, "not only the outside and dress of it, but equally absolute; a blind

^a The Lord Faulkland's speech, Feb. 9th, 1641. O.S.—(*From Nalson's Collections*):—

" * * * The truth is, Mr. Speaker, that as some ill ministers in our state first took away our money from us, and afterwards endeavoured to make our money not worth the taking, by turning it into brass by a kind of anti-philosopher's stone: so these men used us in the point of preaching: first, depressing it to their power, and next labouring to make it such, as the harm had not been much if it had been depressed, the most frequent subjects even in the most sacred auditories, being the *jus divinum* of bishops and tithes, the sacredness of the clergy, the sacrilege of impropriations, the demolishing of puritanism and propriety, the building of the prerogative at Paul's, the introduction of such doctrines as, admitting them true, the truth would not recompense the scandal; or of such as were so far false, that, as Sir Thomas More says of the casuists, their business was not to keep men from sinning, but to inform them, *Quam prope ad peccatum sine peccato liceat accedere*; so it seemed their work was to try how much of a papist might be brought in without popery, and to destroy as much as they could of the Gospel, without bringing themselves into danger of being destroyed by the law. * * Mr. Speaker, to go yet farther, some of them have so industriously laboured to deduce themselves from Rome, that they have given great suspicion that in gratitude they desire to return thither, or at least to meet it half way; some have evidently laboured to bring in an English, though not a Roman popery: I mean not only the outside and dress of it, but equally absolute; a blind dependence of the people upon the clergy, and of the clergy upon themselves; and have opposed the papacy beyond the *seas* that they might settle one *beyond the water*. [i. e. trans Thamesin, at Lambeth.] Nay, common fame is more than ordinarily false, if none of them have found a way to reconcile the opinions of Rome to the preferences of England; and be so absolutely, directly and cordially

dependence of the people upon the clergy, and of the clergy upon themselves." All these several elements were found mixed up together in the anti-popular party of the first half of the seventeenth century.

Let us now pass abruptly from 1642 to 1660; when the long contest was ended, the old constitution restored, and the first period, which I have called the period of the religious movement, was brought to a close. Let us consider what the object of the movement had been, and what was its success. And first, as religious parties only, we have seen that there had been three, those who wished to maintain the system established at the Reformation, those who wished to alter it by carrying on the Reformation farther, and those who wished to undo it, and return to the system which it had superseded. We have seen that this last party could not act openly in its own name, and its own direct operations were therefore inconsiderable: but a portion of the established church party, in their extreme antipathy towards those who called for farther reform, did really labour in spirit to undo what had been effected already, serving the principles of the Roman catholic party if not its forms. But the result of the contest was singularly favourable to the middle party, to the supporters of the Elizabethan reformation against the Roman catholics on one side, and against the puritans on the other. It was decided that the church of England papists, that it is all that £1,500 a-year can do to keep them from confessing it."

was to remain at once protestant and episcopal, acknowledging the royal supremacy and retaining its hierarchy; repelling alike Romanism and puritanism; maintaining the reform already effected, resisting any reform or change beyond it. This is the first and obvious impression which we derive from the sight of the battle-field when the smoke is cleared away; all other standards are beaten down, the standard of the protestant and episcopal church of England appears to float alone triumphant.

But on examining more closely the state of the conquerors, we find that their victory has not been cheaply won; that they do not leave the field such as they came upon it. And this is the important part of the whole matter, that the original idea of the church of England, as only another name for the state and nation of England, was now greatly obscured, and from this time forward was ever more and more lost sight of. Change in the government of the church had been successfully resisted; there the puritans had done nothing; but changes of the greatest importance had been wrought in the state, not in its forms indeed, for the alteration of these had been triumphantly repealed by the Restoration, but in its spirit: the question whether England was to be a pure or mixed monarchy had been decisively settled; the ascendancy of parliament, which the Revolution of 1688 placed beyond dispute, was rendered sure by the events of the preceding contest; the bloodless triumph of King William was purchased in fact by the blood shed in the great civil

war. It was impossible then that that absoluteness of church government which had existed in the reigns of Elizabeth and her successors should be any longer tolerated ; no high-commission court could be appointed now, nor would the licence of the crown be held sufficient to give the clergy a legislative power, and to enable them to make canons for the church at their discretion. The canons of 1640, passed by Laud in the plenitude of his power, were annulled by the parliament after the Restoration no less than they had been by the Long Parliament ; the writ *De hæretico comburendo* was now for the first time abolished by law. The old forms of church government had been maintained against all change, but being ill suited to the advance which had been made in the spirit of the general government, they were not allowed to possess their former activity.

Whilst the identity of church and state was thus impaired on the one hand, it was also lessened in another way by the total defeat of the puritans, and by the ejection of such a multitude of their ministers by the new oaths imposed by the Act of Uniformity. Hitherto the puritans had been more or less a party within the church ; the dispute had been whether the church itself should be modelled after the puritan rule or no ; both parties as yet supposing that there was to be one church only as there was one nation. But first the growth of independency during the civil war, and now the vehement repulsion by the church of all puritan elements from its ministry, made it but too certain that one church would no

longer be coextensive with the nation. The old idea was attempted to be maintained for a while by force; we had the Five-Mile Act and the Conventicle Act, and such men as John Bunyan and William Penn were subjected to legal penalties; but to maintain an idea which was now contradicted by facts, became as impossible as it was unjust; and the Toleration Act, recognising the legal existence of various bodies of dissenters from the church, was at least a confession that the great idea of the English Reformation could not be realized in the actual state of things; its accomplishment must be reserved for happier and better times.

The church, or religious movement, having thus ended satisfactorily to the principles of neither party, the religious elements on both sides retired as it were into the background, and the political elements were left in the front rank of the battle alone. We cannot wonder, therefore, that the next great period of movement should have been predominantly political. The composition and vicissitudes of parties during this second period will form the subject of the next lecture.

LECTURE VII.

IN attempting to analyze the parties of our history, I have purposely omitted, for the most part, the names of the individuals who headed them. By so doing we keep the subject clear at any rate of mere personalities, and avoid shocking that large portion of our political feelings which consists of personal likings or dislikings. But still how to describe even the abstract principles of two parties without indicating which on the whole we prefer, I confess I know not. For these principles are so closely connected with points of moral character, that I do not see how we can even wish to be indifferent to them. I have endeavoured to shew how in both parties they were mixed up together, partly good and partly evil, and if I have not done this faithfully in point of fact, then my statement is so far partial and unjust. But that certain principles in politics are in themselves good as the rule, and that others are bad as the rule, although not perhaps absolutely without exception, I can no more wish to doubt, than I would

doubt in reading the contest between Christianity and heathenism, on which side lay the truth.

Therefore in speaking of the Revolution of 1688, I can imply no doubt whatever as to its merits. I grant that, descending to personal history, we should find principles sadly obscured; much evil must be acknowledged to exist in one party, much good or much that claims great allowance on the other. But to doubt as to the character of the Revolution itself, is to doubt as to the decision of two questions, which speaking to Englishmen, and to members of the church of England, I have no right, as I certainly have no inclination, to look upon as doubtful. I have no right to regard it as doubtful, whether our present constitution be not better than a feudal monarchy; and whether the doctrine and discipline of our protestant church of England be not truer and better than those of the church of Rome.

We will suppose then the Revolution accomplished. King William and Queen Mary seated on the throne; the Bill of Rights and the Toleration Act passed; England and Scotland mostly at peace under the government of King William; the party of King James still predominant in Ireland. What were now the principal parties in the kingdom, and what were their objects?

With one king on the throne in England and Scotland, and with another ruling in Ireland, and trying to recover the throne of Great Britain also, the main question at issue, and one to which all others were necessarily subordinate, was the main-

tenance or the overthrow of the Revolution. Judging from the extraordinary fact that the Revolution had been effected almost, literally speaking, without bloodshed, we should have expected that the nation would have been almost unanimous in supporting it. But the debates in the convention which had preceded the recognition of William had made it plain that this was not the case; and as every month which James passed in exile weakened the impression of his faults and increased the pity for his misfortunes, so his cause after the Revolution gained strength rather than lost it. The party which had been foremost in placing William on the throne, united in itself all the remains of the ancient puritans, and of all those who had formed the popular party in Charles the Second's time, together with many of those persons who are the great disgrace of this period of our history, persons who joined either party from motives of interest or ambition, when their opinions led them naturally the other way. The motto of all this party may be said to have been civil and religious liberty; their object was the maintenance of the power of parliament and through it of the liberty of the subject; the putting down popery, and the allowing liberty of worship to those dissenters who differed from the church on points of government or discipline. Beyond this, as is well known, the notion of religious liberty was not then carried: and it is remarkable, that at this very time an act of parliament was passed making the profession of unitarianism in all its forms penal; so that

it was not popery only which remained exposed to the severities of the law.

The party opposed to the one just described, contained within itself two remarkable divisions, which practically made such a difference as to constitute rather two distinct parties. For although both divisions looked upon the Revolution with dislike, yet one of them having a sincere love for the real protestant doctrine of the church of England, regarded the return of a Roman catholic king as a greater evil than the maintenance of the Revolution; and besides a large proportion of these, like the better part of the royalists in the civil war, were no friends to absolute monarchy, and wished the parliament to exist, and to be powerful. The other party, or division of the party, whichever we choose to call it, was anxious at any risk to restore James; the nominal protestants among them being in fact at the best such men as Lord Falkland had described in his days, as labouring to bring in an English though not a Roman popery, men whose whole sympathies were with the Romish system in doctrine and ritual, though they had not yet resolved to place the head of their church at Rome. Their political principles were as highly Ghibelin as their religious were Guelf: the divine right and indefeasible authority of kings stood in their belief side by side with the divine right and indefeasible authority of priests; and had these two powers again come into conflict, half of the Jacobites probably would have stood by the one, and half by the other.

Under these circumstances the maintenance of the Revolution was no doubt effected by this, that so far one division of the antipopular party went along with their opponents. But this was not only owing to the sincere and zealous protestantism of this division; it was owing also to another point, which, whether we call it the wisdom or the happiness of the Revolution, is at any rate one of its greatest excellencies and best lessons for all after ages. I mean that the Revolution preserved the monarchy, with all its style and dignity untouched: it made William king and not protector. The great seal was the same, the national colours remained the same, all writs ran in the same terms, all commissions were in the same form; as far as all the common business of life was concerned, it was simply like the accession of a new king in natural succession, whose name was William instead of James. Now this is not a little matter. In France some years since the outward signs of revolution were visible everywhere: old names of streets were hastily painted over, and might still be traced through the new names which had been written upon them: on all government offices, and on many shops and other buildings the fresh colour of the word *royale* shewed that it had been but recently substituted for *imperiale*, as that had a little before succeeded to *nationale*. By all this the continuity of a nation's life is broken, and the deep truth conveyed in those beautiful lines of Mr. Wordsworth,—

“ The child is father of the man,
And I would wish my days to be,
Bound each to each by natural piety,”

a truth almost more important to be observed by nations than by individuals, is unhappily neglected. But it is the blessing of our English history that its days are thus bound each to each by natural piety: the child has been the father of the man. And thus the old loyalist, whose watchword was church and king, saw that after the Revolution no less than before, the church and king were left to him: the church untouched in its liturgy, in its articles, in its government, in its secular dignity and in its wealth: the king sitting on the throne of his predecessors, unchanged in semblance, unchanged in the possession of his legal prerogatives: still the sovereign of a kingdom, and not merely the first magistrate in the commonwealth. Nor can we doubt that this operated powerfully to reconcile men's minds to the settlement of the Revolution, theirs especially who are influenced mainly by what strikes them outwardly, and who found that the outward change was so little.

The outward change was little, and yet what was gained by the Revolution and by the Act of Settlement which was passed a few years afterwards, was in importance incalculable. The reigning sovereign was bound to the cause of free and just government, by the consideration that his title to the crown rested on no other foundation; that there was a com-

petitor in existence whose right on high monarchical principles was preferable to his own. Now, as the whole temptation of kings must necessarily be to magnify their own authority, any thing which counteracts this tendency in them must be good alike for their people and for themselves. And this was the case, except during the reign of Queen Anne, from the Revolution to the middle of the eighteenth century; if the king forgot the principles of the Revolution he condemned himself and denied his own title to the throne. Nor was it a little thing to have established once for all as the undoubted doctrine of the constitution, that the rule of hereditary succession, like all others, admits occasionally of exceptions; rare, indeed,—it is to be desired that they should be very rare,—one or two scattered up and down in the history of centuries,—but yet clear and undoubted, and to the full as legitimate when they do occur as the rule which they set aside. The exception made at the Revolution and confirmed by the Act of Settlement is in force to this very hour; for I need not say that if the rule of hereditary succession be in all cases binding, the house of Brunswick is at this moment usurping the rights of the houses of Savoy or of Modena; for the princes of the house of Brunswick are descended only from a daughter of James the First, and except by virtue of the Act of Settlement they could not succeed to the throne whilst the heirs of a daughter of Charles the First were still living; and such heirs exist, I believe, in more than one royal house in

Italy ; to maintain whose rights to the British crown would be, notwithstanding, treason.

A few years after the Revolution, King James's party was utterly put down in Ireland, and the three kingdoms were united under the authority of King William. The conquest of Ireland, for such it might almost be called, was followed by that famous penal code against the Roman catholics, which was designed to keep them for ever in a state of subjection and humiliation. It is curious to observe one of the most oppressive of all codes enacted by a popular party, whose watchword, as I have said, was civil and religious liberty. It is curious, yet ought not for a moment to puzzle any one who is familiar with ancient history. The democracy of Athens put to death a thousand Mytilenæans of the oligarchical party, and confiscated the lands of the whole people. The injustice of the Athenian dominion over Lesbos may be questioned, or we may complain of the excessive severity of their treatment of the Mytilenæans ; but not surely of its inconsistency with a sincere love of democratical principles of government. For the Mytilenæans in the one case, like the Irish catholics in the other, had been the declared enemies of the popular cause ; the one in Athens, the other in England : and their treatment was that of vanquished enemies and rebels, not of citizens. And as after the Mytilenæan revolt the people of Methymna were alone regarded by the Athenians as the free inhabitants of Lesbos ; so the Irish protestants were regarded by the English as the only Irish people : the

Roman catholics were looked upon altogether as an inferior caste. The whole question, in fact, relates to the treatment of enemies or subjects and not to that of citizens: and unjust wars or conquests or dominions are not more inconsistent with a popular government than with any other: because the popular principle is understood to be maintained only with regard to those within the commonwealth, and not to those who are without. They are not more inconsistent with one form of government than another, but I hope I shall not be supposed, therefore, to deny their guilt; that remains the same, and is not affected by the question of consistency or inconsistency.

Greek history will enable us also to comprehend the feelings with which the popular and antipopular parties respectively regarded the great French war. The popular party felt towards France as the same party in Athens regarded Lacedæmon; not merely as towards a national rival, but as towards a political enemy, who was leagued with their political enemies at home to effect the overthrow of their actual free constitution. And as Thucydides^a says of the aristocratical party of the Four Hundred, that although they would have been glad to have preserved, if possible, the foreign dominion and the political independence of Athens, yet they were ready to sacrifice these to Sparta rather than fall under the power of their own democracy; so we can understand what otherwise would be incredible and monstrous, the desertion of the alliance, the putting Ormond into Marlborough's

^a VIII. 91.

place, and the separate negotiations with France in 1713. And, on the other hand, that the enmity of the popular party was directed not against France nationally, but against the supporter of their domestic enemies, was shewn by the friendly relations which subsisted between the two countries in the reign of George the First, when Philip of Orleans was at the head of the French government, and France was no longer in league with the partisans of James. The war which afterwards broke out in 1740, appears to have arisen solely from national and European causes; and the support which the French then afforded to the insurrection of 1745 was merely given as an effectual means of annoying a foreign enemy, and diverting the attention of the English from the great military struggle in the Netherlands. Accordingly, we do not find that any party in England regarded France with favour in that war, or complained of the government except for a want of vigour and ability in their military and naval operations.

The cause of the Revolution in France never at any time, I believe, was otherwise than popular with the poorer classes; the peasantry no less than the poor of the towns were, with a few local exceptions, such as La Vendee and Bretagne, its zealous supporters. In England it was otherwise; the strength of the friends of the Revolution lay in the middle classes, in the commercial class, and in the highest class of the aristocracy; the lower class of the aristocracy, the clergy, and the poorer classes, were

ranged together on the opposite side. The main cause of this difference is to be found in the fact that the French Revolution was social quite as much as political: ours was political only. The abolition of the Seigniorial dominion in France, and the making all Frenchmen equal before the law, were benefits which the poorest man felt daily: but the English Revolution had only settled great constitutional questions, questions of the utmost importance indeed to good government, and affecting in the end the welfare of all classes of the community, but yet working indirectly, and in their first and obvious character little concerning the poor; while, on the other hand, the wars which followed the Revolution had led to an increased taxation. To this it must be added that the mere populace is at all times disposed to dislike the existing government, be it what it will: and as the popular party retained the government in its hands for many years, the habitual feeling against all governments happened to turn against them. In country parishes the peasantry went along with the country gentlemen and clergy from natural feelings of attachment; feelings which distress had not as yet shaken: while the town populace, and the country populace also, so far as they knew them, disliked the dissenters both socially and morally; socially, from the same feeling which at this moment makes it easier to excite the populace against the great manufacturers than against the old nobility: jealousy, namely, against those nearer to themselves in rank, yet raised by circumstances above them; and morally,

from a dislike of their strictness and religious profession : the same feeling which urged the mob to persecute the first methodists, and which is curiously blended with the social feeling. For religious language, even when amounting to rebuke of ourselves, is borne more readily, to say the least, when it proceeds from those who seem authorized to use it. Thus it gives less offence when coming from a clergyman than from a layman : and to a poor man it comes more naturally from one whom he feels to be his superior in station, than from one more nearly his equal. Partly in connexion with this, is the greater toleration shewn by the Roman world to the Jews than to the Christians ; the Jews seemed to have a right to believe in one God, because it was their national religion ; but what right had one Roman citizen to pretend to be wiser than his neighbours, and to profess to worship one God, because that and that alone was the truth ? From such feelings, good and bad together, the populace in Queen Anne's reign, and in that which followed, were generally averse to the dissenters and the popular party, and friendly to the clergy, and to the party opposed to the Revolution.

Meanwhile years passed on, the house of Hanover was firmly seated on the throne ; on the death of George the First his son George the Second succeeded him without the slightest opposition ; a larger portion of the clergy, and a very large majority of the nation had learnt not only to acquiesce in, but to approve heartily of the principles of the Revolution ;

the victory of civil and religious liberty, as it was called, was completely won. Now then considering, as I have said before, that we have a right to ask for the fruits of liberty, just as we may ask for the fruits of health; (for while we are ill we give up our whole attention to the getting the better of our sickness; and health is then reasonably our great object; but when we are well, if instead of using our health to do our duty, we go on idly talking about its excellence, and think of nothing but its preservation, we become ridiculous valetudinarians); even so, having a right to demand of men, when their liberty is secured, what fruits they have produced with it, let us even put this question to the triumphant popular party of the eighteenth century. And if we hear no sufficient answer, but only a mere repetition of phrases about the excellence of civil and religious liberty, then we shall do well, not indeed to fall in love with the antipopular party, and say that sickness is better than health, but to confess with shame that the popular party has neither practised nor understood its duty; that they laboured well to clear the ground for their building, but when it was cleared they built nothing.

Here seems to me to be the great fault of the last century: as in the eyes of many it is its great excellence; that it was for letting things alone. In some respects, indeed, it stopped its own professed work too soon; for trade was not free, but burdened with a great variety of capricious restrictions: sinecure places, and these granted in reversion, were

exceedingly numerous : the press, had the disposition of the government been jealous of it, was still greatly at its mercy ; for as yet it remained with the judges only to decide whether a publication was or was not libellous : the business of the jury was merely to decide on the fact, whether the defendant had published it. But with regard to institutions of the greatest importance, the neglect was extreme. The whole subject of criminal law and prison discipline was either left alone, or touched only for mischief. The state of the prisons, both physically and morally, was as bad as it had been in the preceding century ; the punishment of death was multiplied with a fearful indifference ; education was everywhere wanted, and scarcely anywhere to be found. Persons are now living who remember the old state of things in this university, when a degree might be gained without any reading at all : and the introduction of Sunday schools is also within living memory. It is not to be wondered at that attention should not have been turned immediately to these and many other points ; but still the principle of the age had no tendency to them : in political and ecclesiastical matters the work had been so long to get rid of what was bad, that it seemed to be forgotten that it was no less important to build up what was good : and men's positive efforts seemed to run wholly in another direction, towards physical and external advancement.

Then there arose in England, for I am now looking no farther, a new form of political party. It is well known that the administration of the first Wil-

liam Pitt was a period of unanimity unparalleled in our annals: popular and antipopular parties had gone to sleep together: the great minister wielded the energies of the whole united nation; France and Spain were trampled in the dust: protestant Germany saved; all North America was the dominion of the British crown; the vast foundations were laid of our empire in India. Of almost instantaneous growth, the birth of two or three years of astonishing successes, the plant of our power spread its broad and flourishing leaves east and west, and half the globe rested beneath its shade. Yet the worm at its root was not wanting. Parties awoke again, one hardly knows how or why, and their struggle during the early part of the reign of George the Third was of such a character, that after studying it attentively, we turn from it as from a portion of history equally anomalous and disagreeable. Yet its uninstruction in one sense is instructive in another; and I will venture to call your attention to that period in which the most prominent names—alas! for the degraded state of English party—are those of John Wilkes and of Junius.

For the first time for nearly fifty years the king was supposed to be disinclined to the principles of the Revolution; the great popular minister, Pitt, had resigned, and the minister who was believed to be the king's personal favourite, was believed also to be strongly attached to the principles of the old antipopular party. These circumstances, together with some dissatisfaction at what were called the inade-

quate terms of the peace with France and Spain, revived party feelings in a portion of the community with much warmth. The press became violent, and Wilkes's famous attack on the king's speech in No. 45 of the North Briton, drew down a prosecution from the government. He happened at that time to be a member of the house of commons; and the house expelled him. I will not detain you with the detail of his case; it is enough to say that having been elected as member for Middlesex after his expulsion, the house of commons would not allow him to sit: and when he again offered himself as a candidate, and had obtained an enormous majority of votes over his competitor, the house of commons nevertheless resolved that his competitor was duly elected, and he took his seat for Middlesex accordingly.

The striking point in this new state of parties cannot fail to have attracted your notice: namely, that the house of commons is no longer on the popular but on the antipopular side; and that the popular party speaks no longer by the voice of any legally constituted authority, but by that of individuals, self-appointed to the service, and through the press. This was a great change, and, as I think, a change in some respects for the worse. But it is very important to dwell upon, because it is the result of a natural law, and therefore is constantly to be looked for, unless steps are taken to prevent it. We have noticed an instance of the same thing in our religious Reformation; no sooner had the leaders of

the English church made good their cause against Rome, than they became engaged in disputes with their own followers who wanted to carry on the Reformation still farther. But what was a reformation yesterday is become an establishment to-day; and the reformer of yesterday is to-day the defender of an establishment, opposed in his turn to those who by wishing for farther reformation necessarily assail the reformation already effected. So when the house of commons had established the ascendancy of parliament against the crown, and through that ascendancy had no doubt secured also the liberties of the nation, they naturally stopped and thought that their work was done. Besides, for the last fifty years the crown had headed the popular party, and the efforts which the popular leaders had made, through the influence of the crown, to secure a majority against the influence of their opponents, had thus been all directed, whatever be thought of the means used, towards securing the triumph of popular principles, the principles, that is, of the Revolution. Things were wonderfully changed, when the crown was supposed to have gone over to the opposite side, and when its influence was acting in concurrence with that very party which it had long been accustomed to combat. The popular party therefore no longer had the majority of the commons in its favour; but on the contrary received from the house of commons its immediate reproof. Now while the house clearly led the popular cause, its acts of authority excited no ill will; soldiers will bear any strictness of discipline from officers

whom they thoroughly trust, and who are in the habit of leading them on to victory. But let it be once whispered that these officers are traitors, or that they are even lukewarm and inefficient merely against the enemy, and any severity of discipline is then resented as tyranny. So it was with the popular party out of doors, when the house of commons, now as they thought inclined to the interest of their opponents, began to set up their power of expulsion as controlling the elective franchise of their constituents. The representatives were thus placed in opposition to their constituents, as the antipopular party opposed to the popular: but the constituents were no legally organized body; they were undistinguished, except by their right of voting, from the whole mass of the nation; nor was there in existence any constitutional power lower than the house of commons, which in this new struggle might be against the house of commons itself what that house had formerly been against the crown. The corporation of London attempted to supply this want, but in vain: it could not pretend to be a national but merely a local body; and London has never exercised such an influence over the country, as that the chief magistrate of London should be recognised as the popular leader of England. The popular party then, as I have said before, having no official organ, spoke as it best could through self-appointed individuals, and through the press.

This changed state of things is one with which we are very familiar: a strong popular party out of par-

liament, and that great power of the public press, which with much truth as well as humour has been called the fourth estate of the realm, are two of the most prominent features of these later times. Both undoubtedly have their evils, but both are the natural and unavoidable consequence of the changed position of the house of commons on one side, and of the growth of the mass of the nation in political activity on the other. For there being, as I have said, no lower constitutional body which could be the heart as it were of the popular party, now that the house of commons had ceased to be so, it was a matter of plain necessity that the opposition should be carried on from the ranks of the people itself, in aid of that portion of the house of commons which upheld the same principles, but was, within the walls of parliament, a minority. And as for the press, reading in our climates so naturally takes the place of hearing, and is so indispensable where the state is not confined within the walls of a single city but is spread over a great country, that it could not but increase in power as the number of those who took an interest in public affairs became daily greater. True it is that its power, as actually exercised, was liable to enormous abuse. The writers in the public journals were anonymous, and although the printer and publisher were legally responsible for the contents of their papers, yet the bad tendencies of anonymous writing are many more than the severest law of libel can repress. The best of us, I am afraid, would be in danger of writing more carelessly without our

names than with them. We should be tempted to weigh our statements less, putting forward as true what we believe indeed, but have no sufficient grounds for believing, to use sophistical arguments with less scruple, to say bitter and insulting things of our adversaries with far less forbearance. But then the writers for the public journals have the farther disadvantage of always writing hastily, and in many instances of writing for their bread, so that whatever other qualities their articles may have or not have, it is necessary that they should be such as will make the paper sell. Again, a journal is a property; like other property it may be bequeathed, bought, and sold, and may thus pass into hands totally indifferent to all political principles, and only anxious to make the property profitable. Instead of guiding public opinion, such a proprietor will think it better policy to follow it and encourage it; well knowing that to praise and agree with a man's opinions is a surer way of pleasing him than to attempt to teach him better. Even where this is not the case, and a journal is honestly devoted to the maintenance of a certain set of political principles, yet the writers in it, over and above the disadvantages already noticed, of haste and of writing anonymously, are many times persons ill fitted by education or by station in society to form the wisest judgments on political questions; they have not knowledge sufficient to be teachers. All this is true; and journalism accordingly has pandered abundantly to men's evil passions, has misled the public mind, many times,

instead of leading it aright. And farther, there is always a danger that popular principles, when advocated spontaneously by individuals, and not by a regular constitutional body, should become somewhat in excess, should respect actual institutions too little, and should savour too much of individual extravagance or passion. So that it would be an enormous evil if ever the popular party in the house of commons was so weak, that the main stress of the contest should be carried on out of parliament, by speakers at public meetings or by the press. There is no question that something of this evil was felt in the latter part of the eighteenth century; too much devolved on the popular party out of doors and on the press, because of the vast superiority of the anti-popular party in parliament. But with all the evils of a political press, the question still recurs, What should we be without it? Or how would it be possible otherwise to satisfy the natural desire of an active-minded people, to know the state of their own affairs? And there is no question that reading is a less exciting process than hearing; sophisms read quietly in our own house are less likely to mislead, than when commended by the eloquence of a popular speaker and the sympathy of a vast multitude, his hearers: what there is of mischief does less harm, while what there is of true information is better digested and better remembered. Again, whatever of sophistry and virulence there is in the public journals, yet this is partly neutralized as to its effects by their opposition to each other; and while we allow

for the existence of those faults, it is impossible to deny that the consequence of the system of extreme publicity is to communicate a great mass of real information, that the truth after all is more widely known and with less scandalous corruptions than it could be under any other system conceivable.

The evil of the public journals of the eighteenth century was that of the political writing of the time generally, and it arose out of that fault to which I have already alluded, when I said that the mere notion of civil and religious liberty was too exclusively worshipped by the popular party to the neglect of the moral end which lay beyond it. And this unhappy separation of politics from morals, and from the perfection of morals, Christianity, was by no means peculiar to the popular party, nor to the eighteenth century; its causes lay deeper, and their consequences have been but too durable. In this respect, the existence of a church which was supposed to include the whole nation within its pale, and to take effectual care of their highest interests, was in some respects absolutely mischievous when that church in practice was inefficient and disorganized. For as if the state were thus relieved from all moral responsibility, it took less care by its own regulations for the moral excellence of its magistrates than was taken by many a heathen commonwealth. The Roman censors expelled from the senate any man of scandalous life: and though their sentence was reversible, yet a *judicium turpe*, or being found guilty by a court of law of any one out of a great variety of specified

disgraceful offences, deprived a man of his political privileges irrevocably: he lost even his vote as a member of the comitia. How different was the state of feeling in England, was but too clearly shewn in the dispute as to the re-election of Wilkes, after the house of commons had expelled him. Politically, the subsequent decision of the house of commons, which is now considered to have settled the question, seems perfectly just: the choice of a representative seems to belong to his constituents, within the bounds fixed by law; and the judgment of his fellow representatives against him is not so much to the purpose as the renewed decision of those who are more immediately concerned, given in his favour. Yet was the scandal extreme when a man of such moral character as Wilkes was made a popular leader, and when a great political principle seemed involved in choosing him to be a legislator. True it is that the opposite party had no right to complain of him, for the candidate whom they supported against him was in moral character nothing his superior: it is a curious fact that both were members together in private life of that scandalous society whose meetings at Medmenham Abbey between Henley and Marlow were the subject at the time of many a disgraceful story. But it was and is one of the evils of our state, that personal infamy is no bar to the exercise of political rights: that a man may walk out of gaol and take his seat in the highest places, even as a legislator. And this same moral insensibility makes us tolerate the defects of the

press in these points, when we sympathize with it politically; because we are all accustomed too much to separate moral and political matters from each other; one party thinking of liberty only, and another of authority; but each forgetting what is the true fruit and object of both.

As Wilkes was one of the worst specimens of a popular leader, so was Junius of a popular political writer. One is ashamed to think of the celebrity so long enjoyed by a publication so worthless. No great question of principle is discussed in it; it is remarkable that on the subject of the impressment of seamen, which is a real evil of the most serious kind, and allowed to be so even by those who do not believe that it is altogether remediable, Junius strongly defends the existing practice. All the favourite topics of his letters are purely personal or particular; his appeals are never to the best part of our nature, often to the vilest. If I wished to prejudice a good man against popular principles, I could not do better than to put into his hands the letters of Junius.

But I have dwelt too long on this period of our history, and must hasten to conclude this sketch. The disputes about Wilkes's election were soon lost in a far greater matter, the contest with America. In that contest the questions of our own former history were virtually reproduced; for it is quite manifest that the British parliament stood to the American colonies in precisely the same relation in which the crown had formerly stood towards the people of England; every argument for or against ship-money

might have been pleaded for and against the Stamp Act. This Lord Chatham clearly perceived, and so far he was in agreement with the rest of the popular party. His opposition to the independence of the colonies belonged to the personal character of the man, to his invincible abhorrence of yielding to the house of Bourbon, to his natural unwillingness to divide that great American empire which his administration had founded. But he struggled against a law altogether distinct from the question about taxation, a law of nature herself, which makes distance an insuperable obstacle to political union ; and when the time arrives at which a colony is too great to be dependent, distance making union impossible with a mother country at the end of the earth, the only alternative is complete separation.

In the various contests which followed, to the end of the century, the character of the popular party remained pretty nearly the same : its object might still be said to be civil and religious liberty ; the difference was that these objects were now often contended for for the sake of others, with whom Englishmen had no personal connexion. And so paramount are political principles, when they seem really at stake, to any national sympathies or antipathies, that at the end of the century the feelings of our two great political parties with regard to France were exactly reversed from what they had been at the beginning of it, because France was become the representative of exactly opposite political principles. With perfect consistency therefore did the popular party deprecate

and the antipopular party support the war with France in 1793, as in 1703 the antipopular party had opposed it, and the popular party had been zealous in its favour.

It marks also the truth of the description which I gave of the later movement of Europe, calling it the political, as distinguished from the religious movement of the preceding period, that political consistency led parties to alter their feelings towards the same religious party; the popular party being zealous to undo that very penal code which their political ancestors had imposed on the Roman catholics of Ireland, the antipopular party on the other hand vigorously maintaining it. Neither party were in the least inconsistent with their inherent political principles; and the religious feelings which in the case of the Roman catholics had a century earlier modified the political feeling, were now on both sides greatly weakened.

The struggle then in this latter period of modern history, so far as England has been concerned, may be called a struggle for civil and religious liberty; understanding liberty in a perfectly neutral sense, and not as a deliverance from evil and unjust restraint, but from restraint simply. And taking the word in this meaning, it seems to me that the statement cannot be disputed, that the object of one party during the eighteenth century was to unloose, the object of the other to hinder such unloosing; it being a distinct question whether the bands thus sought to be taken off or retained, were just or un-

just, useful or mischievous. And I think it is also certain that this object in the preceding period of modern history was combined with another of a more specific character, namely, the attainment of religious truth, which was on both sides a more positive object than the simply unloosing or holding fast, and one more certainly to be called good.

What has been exemplified from our own history, holds true I think no less with respect to Europe at large. Unquestionably whatever internal movement there has been on the continent since 1648, has been predominantly political ; undoubtedly also the object of that movement has been generally to unloose, to remove certain restraints external or internal ; and the object of those opposed to that movement has been to maintain these restraints or to add to them.

It would appear that this view of the question will enable us easily enough to account for the disappointment with which, whatever be our political opinions, we must rise from the study of this period of political movement. Disappointment, because evils great and unquestioned still exist abundantly, evils which both parties have failed to prevent. Those who advocate the side of the movement, when taunted with the little good which has resulted from their political successes, besides being at issue with their opponents as to the amount of good produced, might fairly acknowledge that the movement was essentially defective, that its object ought not to have been merely negative, that although to do away evil and unjust restraints is good, yet that our views

should be carried much farther ; we are unjust to our own work if we take no care that liberty shall be to all men's eyes the mother of virtue. And on the other hand they who sympathize with the party which strove to hold fast the restraints, if they say that the mischief has resulted wholly from their own defeat, are yet required to account for the very fact of that defeat ; and they too may acknowledge that to restrain a child or to confine a lunatic is not all that their cases need : that restraint is but a means no less than liberty ; and that when man exercises it upon man, he is bound to shew that it is a means to work the good of the person restrained, or else it is an injustice and a sin. Now it is past all doubt that the antipopular party, both religious and political, have here greatly failed ; considering the people as children, they have restrained the child but they have not educated him ; considering them even as lunatics, they have confined the lunatic, but have often so irritated him with their discipline as to make his paroxysms more violent and more incurable.

Farther also, as to the judgment we should form of the struggle of the last three centuries, it is manifest that it depends in some measure on our judgment of the centuries preceding them. If all was well in those preceding centuries, the movement, whether religious or political, must have been undesirable ; for certainly all is not well now. If all was ill in those preceding centuries, then certainly the movement has been a great blessing ; for our present state is blessed with very much of good. But it was

neither all well nor all ill ; so much the most superficial knowledge may teach us : the question to decide our judgment is, whether it was ill or well predominantly.

In most other places it would be considered extraordinary to represent such a question as doubtful for a moment. But here there is always a tendency to magnify the past : five-and-twenty years ago I can remember that it was the fashion to exalt the seventeenth century at the expense of the eighteenth : now I believe many are disposed to depreciate both, and to reserve their admiration for times still more remote, and more unlike our own. It is very well that we should not swim with the stream of public opinion : places like this are exceedingly valuable as temples where an older truth is still worshipped, which else might have been forgotten : and some caricature of our proper business must at times be tolerated, for such is the tendency of humanity. But still if we make it our glory to run exactly counter to the general opinions of our age, making distance from them the measure of truth, we shall at once destroy our usefulness and our real respectability. And to believe seriously that the movement of the three last centuries has been a degeneracy ; that the middle ages were wiser, or better, or happier than our own, seeing truth more clearly and serving God more faithfully ; would be an error so extravagant that no amount of prejudice could excuse us for entertaining it.

It has been my object in this and in my last lec-

ture to exemplify from that history which is most familiar to us all, the method of historical analysis; by which we endeavour to discover the key as it were to the complicated movement of the world, and to understand the real principles of opposite parties amidst much in their opinions and conduct that is purely accidental. I believe that the result of the analysis now made, is historically correct; if it be otherwise, I have managed the experiment ill, and it has failed in this particular instance; but the method itself is no less the true one, and you have only to conduct it more carefully in order to make it completely answer. In a brief review of a period of three centuries, I have made so many omissions that my sketch may seem to be superficial; and I grant that this is always the danger to be apprehended in our generalizations, and one which when speaking of a period so busy it is not easy to avoid. To be acquainted with every existing source of information illustrative of the last three centuries is of course physically impossible, while human life is no longer than it is: the only question is, or else all our reading must be useless, whether by a tolerably large and comprehensive study of a variety of sources we may not gain a notion substantially correct, which a still more extensive study, if such were practicable, would confirm and enrich, but would not materially alter.

What I have now attempted to do briefly for a long and very busy period, I shall endeavour to do next year, if God shall permit, at greater length for

a shorter period, namely, for the fourteenth century. Whoever has already made that period his study or shall do so in the course of this year, may find it not uninteresting to compare the result of his enquiries with mine, and if he shall learn any thing from me he may be sure also that he might impart something to me in return, of which I was ignorant. For in this wide field there is full work for many labourers, and it is my hope that many of us may thus co-operate, and by our separate researches collect what no one man could have collected alone. In the mean while, my next and last lecture will be devoted to one or two more general matters; such particularly as the criteria of historic credibility, a question naturally of great importance, because unless we can discriminate between a credible testimony and a suspicious one, we shall never be able to avoid the evil either of unreasonable scepticism or of unreasonable credulity. And the result of such an enquiry will be what we could most wish; that there is an historical truth attainable by those who truly desire it, however easily and indeed inevitably missed by the unfair or even the careless historian, whatever may be his external advantages. This question, with one or two points connected with it, will be almost more than sufficient to occupy the time which we shall be able to afford to them.

LECTURE VIII.

WE have now for some time been engaged in analyzing the statements of history, in order to the more clear understanding of them; and particularly we have been considering the forms of political party in our own country with a view to discover what in them has been accidental and what essential. I have assumed certain facts as unquestionably true and have made them the groundwork of what I have said, either to account for them, or to point out their consequences. But what are we to say, if these facts themselves are disputed: if we are taunted with the known exaggerations and falsehoods of human testimony: with the difficulties surrounding all investigation of human actions, even if most ably and fairly conducted; and with the many defects of individual writers which have made them, as investigators, neither able nor fair? Or are these objections to be met by saying that although the truth relating to past ages be difficult to discover, yet that contemporary history is at any rate entitled to con-

fidence: that men cannot misrepresent in the face of detection: that in this case truth may be discovered and cannot but be declared? Or is any other answer to be given, maintaining any other criterion; or shall we be obliged to confess the unsoundness of all our goodly fabric; and to compare historical deductions, however logical, to the elephant in the well-known apologue, which rested upon a tortoise, and the tortoise rested upon a stone, and the stone rested upon nothing?

The question now before us is clearly of considerable importance. If historical testimony be really worth nothing, it touches us in one of the very divinest parts of our nature, the power of connecting ourselves with the past. For this we do and can do only through knowledge which we must call historical. Without such knowledge, what would the ancient buildings of this place be but monuments more unmeaning than the Pictish towers of Scotland and Ireland? They would not tell their own story alone, they would only shew that they were not new, and by examining their stone we might tell out of what quarries it had been hewn: but as to all that constitutes their real charm, as representing to us first the times of their founders, and then with wonderful rapidity the successive ages which have since passed, amidst how different a world their inmates have generation after generation trod their courts, and studied in their chambers, and worshipped in their chapels, all this would be utterly lost to us. Our life would be at once restricted to

the span of our own memory; nay, I might almost say to the span of our own actual consciousness. For if no other man's report of the past is to be credited, I know not how we can defend the very reports of our own memories. They, too, unquestionably are fallible: they, too, very often are perplexed by vague or conflicting recollections; we cannot tell whether we remember or no; nor whether we remember correctly. And if this extreme scepticism be, as it clearly is, absurd even to insanity, yet we want to know what abatements are to be made from it; where it not only ceases to be insane, but becomes reasonable and true; there being no question at all that we have been often deceived with false accounts of the past: that human testimony is the testimony of those who are often deceived, who often endeavour to deceive, and who perhaps more often still are both in the one predicament and the other; not loving truth sincerely, and at the same time really unable to discern it.

Now in an enquiry into the credibility of history in the largest sense of the word, the first question which we will consider is, whether any composition bearing more or less of an historical form be really historical or no in the intention of its author. For if it be not, then if we accept it ignorantly as such, we are in the condition of those persons on whom a trick has been played: our belief has in it something ludicrous, like theirs who innocently fall into a mischievous boy's snare on the first of April; and although in this case there was probably no mischief

intended, yet that makes our mistake only the more ridiculous, if we went wrong when no one endeavoured to mislead us. Conceive one of the historical novels of Sir Walter Scott surviving alone amongst its companions to some very remote age, when the greatest part of our literature should have perished, and all knowledge of Scott as a novelist should be utterly lost. Suppose that of all his numerous works there should exist only his *Life of Napoleon*, *Paul's Letters to his Kinsfolk*, and his novel of *Woodstock*. Conceive posterity taking all the three works as equally historical; in the one, it might be said, we have an elaborate narrative in a regular historical form of the life of the Emperor Napoleon: in the second we have a most lively account of the principal events of his second reign, given in letters written at the time and from the very scene of action: while in the third we have a narrative, taken probably from some ancient chronicle, and therefore much more dramatic and more full of minute details, of some passages in the life of Charles the Second, including the story of his wonderful concealment and escape after the battle of Worcester. It would then be received as fact, that Charles after his escape from the battle was sheltered and concealed at Woodstock, and that Cromwell himself came down to Woodstock, and, guided by the information of a pretended royalist, had nearly succeeded in surprising him. There is nothing in the book, it would be urged, that declares it to be a fiction; it is a narrative about real historical persons;

why should we doubt its accuracy? So men might argue, and might be led into a mistake which to us appears altogether ridiculous, because we know that Woodstock is a novel; but which is not at all inconceivable in those who centuries afterwards should find it in company with other works of the same author which they supposed equally to be historical, and one of which in fact is so. Now there are times and writings in which all narrative bears more or less the character of an historical novel; it may contain truth and often does so: but this is merely accidental; the writer's object is merely to amuse, and whether his story happens to be authentic or not gives him no sort of concern. Sometimes there seems to be absolutely an intention to mislead the simple reader; not a malicious or fraudulent intention, for any grave ends of falsehood, but, as appears, only for the mere joke's sake: for the pleasure of imposing on the unsuspecting. Now wherever this spirit may at all be supposed to exist, we are completely falling into the writer's trap if we really take him at his word, as if he were in earnest; and our error is not less, if, not understanding the character of narration whether in verse or prose, at the particular period, or in writers of a certain sort, we conceive exactness of fact to be its object, instead of amusement, or possibly some moral or religious lesson which the story was framed to inculcate. And therefore our first question with respect to a story or narrative should be, was the writer in earnest or in jest? and if in earnest, was he in earnest as to the facts or

as to the moral conveyed by the facts? For he may have been very earnest indeed as a poet, or as a moral teacher, or as inculcating some deep religious truth under a symbolical veil, and yet not at all in earnest as a matter-of-fact historian. This question is one of great importance to put, and unhappily it is not always easy to find the answer to it.

You will see where the difficulty lies if you consider the case which I supposed of some future age mistaking Woodstock for an authentic history. We do not mistake it, chiefly I think for certain external reasons; that it is published as a novel, and has always been received as such; and farther because we are familiar with many other works of the same sort, so that the notion of an historical novel is one which readily occurs to us. But ancient books do not tell us the story of their publication: we do not know how they were received by their original readers, nor are specimens of the literature of the time sufficiently numerous to enable us to conceive readily what form they would be likely to assume. It does not seem possible therefore always to have a sure criterion whether a given narrative be historical or no; or at any rate to have such a criterion as may be applied by ordinary readers; such as is palpable and tangible, or to use the German expression, *handgreiflich*. A criterion there is indeed, not of course unerring, yet generally to be relied upon, in the instinctive tact of those who are much conversant with the narratives of early times, and with the character of undoubted history, and who feel at once where

they have history, and where they have poetry, or apologue, or allegory, or a story careless of fact and aiming only at truth, or it may be seeking neither fact nor truth, but simply to amuse and astonish its readers. This feeling in a sensible man is, I believe, very much to be relied upon: but you cannot justify it to those who dispute it: you cannot establish it upon tangible evidence, appreciable by the ignorant no less than by the wise.

For the greater part of modern history, however, the question which we have now been considering will not give us any trouble. Yet it presents itself, I think, in some of the ecclesiastical biographies, where we find not unfrequently grotesque touches, to say nothing of other matters, such as leave great room for doubting whether their authors ever meant them to be taken as simple matter-of-fact narratives. The human mind so shrinks from undisguised and unpalliated falsehood, that it is generally safer as well as more charitable, when we are reading a narrative which it is impossible to believe, to suppose that the writer himself did not mean it to be taken seriously; regarding the facts at best as the ornament, or, if you will, as a sort of conventional expression of what he did believe to be a truth, namely, the sanctity of the subject of his biography. We may call this, if we will, a species of pious fraud: but at any rate its guilt is much less than it would be now, inasmuch as it would not be equally regarded as a bringing forward false evidence to establish a conclusion. The moment that facts come to

be regarded in the light of essential evidence, without which our conclusion falls, then all tampering with or exaggerating them is a gross fraud, to be condemned with no qualification whatever. But I should doubt whether the spirit of the well-known story of the man who when told that the facts were wholly at variance with his theory replied, *Tant pis pour les faits*, was not very generally prevalent before the time of Bacon in more matters than in natural philosophy. Principles of science were assumed on *a priori* reasoning; and opinions in theology were held in the same manner, not indeed upon reasoning of any kind so much as upon authority, but yet independently of any supposed proof to be looked for from particular miracles. This consideration is perhaps worth attending to, as it may in some measure account for a carelessness as to the truth of facts which otherwise would be merely scandalous; and allows us to qualify as fictions what we otherwise should be obliged to call falsehoods.

Passing on then to narratives which propose to be historical, that is, where stress is understood to be laid upon the facts, and it is the writer's avowed object to represent these faithfully, and we ask under what circumstances and to what degree can we maintain their credibility. And first let us consider what are the claims of a writer upon our belief, merely on the strength of his being contemporary with the events which he relates.

That a contemporary writer cannot avoid giving us some correct and valuable impressions of his times,

is evident. For such points of detail as an antiquarian delights in he may be fully relied upon; and he himself is at any rate an authentic portrait; his own mind with its peculiar leanings, his own language with its peculiar style and forms of words, these must certainly be drawn faithfully because drawn unconsciously; and we cannot doubt their witness. But beyond this, and for historical facts properly so called, the value of a contemporary historian is often greatly overrated. No man sees the whole of his own times, any more than an officer in action sees the whole of the battle. Some are too busy to contemplate society in all its relations; others are too abstracted from it altogether. With regard to public events, ordinary men are but in a very slight degree witnesses of them: the councils of governments, the secret springs of parties, are known only to a few; military and naval events take place publicly indeed, but often at a great distance, and though they may happen in our time, yet our knowledge of them only comes from the reports of others. Again, it should be remembered, that many things which we have seen and heard we forget afterwards: that although we were contemporary with the events which took place ten years ago, yet that we are not perhaps contemporary with them when we relate them; even what we ourselves said and did is no longer present to us; our witness is that of one living after the event. To this must be added disadvantages which are generally recognised: the livelier state of passion to which a contemporary is liable,

the veil hanging over many characters and over the causes of many actions, which only after-ages will see removed. So that on the whole, it is by no means sufficient to know that a history was written by a contemporary: it may have been so, and yet may be of very little value; full of idle reports and unexamined stories, giving the first obvious view of things, which a little more observation would have shewn to be far from the true one.

Ascending a step higher, and supposing an historian to be not merely contemporary with the events which he relates, but an actual witness of them, his credibility no doubt becomes much greater. We must distinguish, however, between what I may call an active and a passive witness. I call a passive witness one who was present, but took no part in the actions described; as for instance, Edward the Fourth's chaplain, who has left us an account of King Edward's landing in England after Warwick had obliged him to fly, of his march towards London, and of the decisive battle of Barnet. This is a witness in the lowest degree, from which we ascend, according as the direct interest and share in the transactions related is greater, up to the highest sort of witness; namely, the main agent and director of the actions. Here we have knowledge as nearly perfect as possible; a full understanding of the action in all its bearings, a view of its different parts in connexion with each other; and a clear perception and recollection of each, because our knowledge of one helps us to remember another, and

because we ourselves directed them. And thus in the case of Cæsar and the Emperor Napoleon we have witnesses, to whose knowledge of the actions which they relate nothing, as it seems, could be added. Yet we should not be justified in viewing the Commentaries of the one or the Memoirs of the other as perfectly trustworthy histories; on the contrary, few narratives require to be read with more constant and vigilant suspicion. For unhappily a knowledge of the truth does not imply an intention of uttering it; it may be, on the contrary, that he who knows perfectly the real state of the case should find it to his interest to represent it altogether differently, and his knowledge then does but enable him to misrepresent more artfully. And as in the infirmity of human nature no man's actions are always what he likes to look back upon, as there are points in which he would wish that he had acted otherwise; so every man who tells his own story is under a temptation more or less to disguise the truth: and the more, in proportion as his actions have been upon a larger scale, and his faults or mistakes therefore have been more flagrant. Yet do we not lose entirely the benefit of a writer's knowledge, even when his honesty is most questionable. He who always can tell the truth when he has a mind to do so, will tell it very often, because in a great many instances he has no conceivable interest in departing from it. Thus Cæsar's descriptions of countries have always been held to be of high value; for in them we have all the benefit of his intelligence, with nothing to be

deducted on account of his want of principle. And so again in relating his own military conduct, as it was mostly so admirable that to relate it most truly was to praise it most eloquently, his knowledge gives us every thing that we can desire. The same may be said of Napoleon: his sketch of the geography of Syria, and of that of Italy, his account of Egypt, and his detail of his proceedings at the siege of Toulon, are all most excellent. The latter in particular, his account of the siege of Toulon, is a complete specimen of what is valuable and what is suspicious in his narratives. His description of the topography of Toulon, and of his own views in recommending the attack on fort Malbosquet, as the point where the enemy's operations might be impeded most effectually, is all clear and admirable; but his statement of the enemy's force in fort Malbosquet, and of the assault itself, is to be regarded with suspicion; because his object not being truth but his own glory, he never puts himself for an instant in the place of an impartial spectator, to consider what were the disadvantages of his enemy, but rather is inclined to exaggerate and multiply all his advantages, in order to represent the victory over him as more honourable.

Thus neither is perfect knowledge a guarantee for entire trustworthiness. Still let us consider for how much it is a guarantee, namely, for truth in all indifferent matters, indifferent I mean to the writer or to his party; and for much truth easily to be discerned from its colourings, in matters that concern him nearly. And so again, a writer's nearness to the

times of which he treats is a warrant, not for his complete trustworthiness, but yet for accurate painting of the outsides of things, at any rate; he cannot help telling us much that we can depend on, whatever be his own personal qualifications. So in all historians, the mere outline of events is generally credible, and speaking of modern history, we can always also, or almost always, trust to the dates. We get everywhere therefore a certain portion of truth, only more or less corrupted; but what we want to know is, whether there be any qualification in an historian which will give us more than this; which will enable us to trust to him all but implicitly; without any one positive deduction from his credibility, but merely with an acknowledgment that being human he is therefore fallible, and that if sufficient reasons exist for doubting his authority in any one point, we should not insist at all hazards on maintaining it.

Now this one great qualification in an historian is an earnest craving after truth, and utter impatience not of falsehood merely but of error. This is a very different thing, be it observed, from a mere absence of dishonesty or partiality. Many minds like the truth a great deal better than falsehood when the two are set before them; they will tell a story fairly with great pleasure, if it be told fairly to them. But not being impatient and intolerant of error, they suffer it to exist undiscovered when no one points it out to them: not having a deep craving after truth they rest easily satisfied with truth's counterfeit.

This is the ἀταλαιπωρία πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν τῆς ἀληθείας of which Thucydides complains so truly, and which, far more than active dishonesty, is the source of most of the error that prevails in the world. And this fault in some degree is apt to beset us all; for it is with truth as with goodness, none of us love it so heartily as to be at all times ready to take any pains to arrive at it, as to question its counterfeit when it wears an aspect of plausibility. For example, there is a story which has become famous all over Europe, repeated from one historian to another, and from one country to another, which is yet totally untrue. I mean the famous story of the crew of the French ship *Le Vengeur* in the action of the first of June 1794 refusing to strike their colours, and fighting their ship till she went down, and at the very moment that she was sinking shouting with one voice, *Vive la Republique!* Even Mr. Carlyle repeated this story in his history of the French Revolution, and I have seen it within the last month in a very able German^a work published only last year, given as a remarkable instance of the heroism of the French sailors no less than of their soldiers during the war of the Revolution. Not for one moment would I deny the conclusion; the heroic defence of the *Guillaume Tell* against a British squadron off Malta in 1800, and of the *Redoubtable* in the battle of Trafalgar, throw a glory on the courage of French seamen, which needs not to be heightened by apocryphal instances of their

^a Der zweite Punische Krieg und der Kriegsplan der Carthager. Von Ludwig, Freiherrn von Vincke. Berlin, 1841.

self-devotion. But when Mr. Carlyle's book appeared, one of the surviving British officers who were in the action of the first of June wrote to him to assure him that the story was wholly without foundation. Upon this Mr. Carlyle commenced a careful enquiry into it, and the point which is encouraging is this, that although the story related to an event nearly fifty years old, still the means were found, when sought, of effectually disproving it; for the official letter of the French captain of *Le Vengeur* to the Committee of Public Safety still exists, and on reference to it, it appeared that it was written on board of a British ship; that the *Vengeur* had struck^a, and that her captain and some of her men had been removed out of her, and some British seamen sent on board to take possession. She sank, it is true, and many of her crew were lost in her; but she sank as a British prize, and the British party who had taken possession of her were unhappily lost in her also. The fictitious statement was merely one

^a It so happened that I had been myself aware of the falsehood of the common story for many years, and was sorry to see it repeated by Mr. Carlyle in his *History of the French Revolution*. It is more than thirty years since I read a MS. account of the part taken by H. M. S. *Brunswick*, Captain John Harvey, in the action of the first of June. The account was drawn up by one of the surviving officers of the *Brunswick*, Captain Harvey having been mortally wounded in the action, and was in the possession of Captain Harvey's family. It was very circumstantial, and as the *Vengeur* was particularly engaged with the *Brunswick*, it necessarily described her fate, and effectually contradicted the story invented by Barrere.

of Barrere's accustomed flourishes, inserted by him in his report of the action, and from thence copied by French writers first, and afterwards by foreigners. Now here was a case where the truth was found with perfect ease as soon as it was sought after; and the story might have been suspected from the quarter in which it originally appeared, as also from its internal character; for although cases of the most heroic self-devotion in war are nothing strange or suspicious, yet there was a theatrical display about this story which did call for examination. And as in this instance^a, so it is I think generally: that where there is not merely a willingness to receive the truth, but a real

^a The interest which we all feel in every thing relating to Nelson will be a sufficient excuse for my inserting in this place a correction of a statement in Southey's Life of him, which, as there given, imputes a very unworthy and childish vanity to him, of which on that particular occasion he was wholly innocent. It is said that Nelson wore on the day of the action of Trafalgar, "his admiral's frock coat, bearing on the left breast four stars," that his officers wished to speak to him on the subject, but were afraid to do so, knowing that it was useless; he having said on a former occasion, when requested to change his dress or to cover his stars, "In honour I gained them, and in honour I will die with them." The truth is, that Nelson wore on the day of Trafalgar the same coat which he had commonly worn for weeks, on which the order of the Bath was embroidered, as was then usual. Sir Thomas Hardy did notice it to him, observing that he was afraid the badge might be marked by the enemy; to which Nelson replied, "that he was aware of that, but that it was too late then to shift a coat." This account rests on the authority of Sir Thomas Hardy, from whom it was heard by Captain Smyth, and by him communicated to me.

earnest desire to discover it, the truth may almost surely be found.

I suppose then that what is wanted to constitute a trustworthy historian, is such an active impatience of error and desire of truth. And it will be seen at once that these qualities are intellectual as well as moral, and are as incompatible with great feebleness of mind as they are with dishonesty. For a feeble mind, and the same holds good also of an ignorant mind, is by no means impatient of error, because it does not readily suspect it; it may reject it when it is made to notice it, but otherwise it suffers it patiently and confounds it with truth. Now if this love of truth will make a trustworthy historian, so it will enable us no less to judge of what is trustworthy history; and to suspect error on the one hand, and to appreciate truth on the other; and if it will not enable us to discover what the truth is, supposing that it has nowhere been given, for then it can only be discovered by direct historical researches of our own, yet to miss the truth where it really is not, is in itself no mean knowledge, and the same power which enables us to do this will enable us also, to a considerable degree, to discern where the truth lies hid, if we have not ourselves the time or the opportunity to bring it to light.

First of all then, in estimating whether any history is trustworthy or no, I should not ask whether it was written by a contemporary, or by one engaged in the transactions which it describes, but whether it was written by one who loves the truth with all

his heart, and cannot endure error. For such an one, we may be sure, would never attempt to write a history if he had no means of writing it truly; and therefore although distant in time or place, or both, from the events which he describes, yet we may be satisfied that he had sources of good information at his command, or else that he would never have written at all.

Such an historian is not indeed infallible, or exempt from actual error, but yet he is deserving of the fullest confidence in his general narrative; to be believed safely, unless we happen to have very strong reasons for doubting him in any one particular point. But such historians are in the highest degree rare; and the question practically is, how can we supply their want, and by the same qualities of mind in ourselves can extract a trustworthy history from that which in itself is not completely trustworthy; setting aside the rubbish and fastening upon the fragments of precious stone which may be mixed up with it. Let the historian be whoever he may, and if he does not appear to belong to the class of those who are essentially trustworthy, let us subject him to some such examination as the following.

His date, his country, and the circumstances of his life, may be easily learned from a common biographical dictionary; and though these points are not of the greatest importance of all, yet they are useful as intimating what particular influences we may suspect to have been at work upon his mind, and where therefore we should be particularly upon our guard.

But the main thing to look to is of course his work itself. Here the very style gives us an impression by no means to be despised. If it is very heavy and cumbrous, it indicates either a dull man, or a pompous man, or at least a slow and awkward man; if it be tawdry and full of commonplaces enunciated with great solemnity, the writer is most likely a silly man; if it be highly antithetical, and full of unusual expressions, or artificial ways of stating a plain thing, the writer is clearly an affected man. If it be plain and simple, always clear, but never eloquent, the writer may be a very sensible man but is too hard and dry to be a very great man. If, on the other hand, it is always eloquent, rich in illustrations, full of animation, but too uniformly so, and without the relief of simple and quiet passages, we must admire the writer's genius in a very high degree, but we may fear that he is too continually excited to have attained to the highest wisdom; for that is necessarily calm. In this manner the mere language of an historian will furnish us with something of a key to his mind, and will tell us, or at least give us cause to presume, in what his main strength lies, and in what he is deficient.

The style of a book impresses us immediately; but proceeding to the matter, it is of importance to observe from what sources the historian has derived his information. This we ought always to be able to discover, by looking at the authorities referred to in the margin or at the bottom of the page; it is a most unpardonable fault if these are omitted. We should

consider these authorities as to quantity and quality ; as to quantity, for if they are but few, we may feel sure that the historian's knowledge is meagre : the materials for modern history are ample, and if only a few out of so many have been consulted, the historian is not equal to his task. Consider the richness and variety of Gibbon's references, and of Niebuhr's even more, when we know how few the obvious sources were for the period with which he was engaged. Then as to quality, we should observe, first, whether they consist of writers of one country or of several, of all the countries, that is, to which the history directly relates ; secondly, whether they consist of historians only, or whether more miscellaneous sources of information have been referred to ; thirdly, what is the character of the authorities most relied on. Are they really the best that could have been found or no ? and if they are, then what are their particular qualities and tendencies ? was the historian aware of these and on his guard against them, or no ? By this process we shall be enabled to estimate the depth and richness of our historian's knowledge, and also in some measure his judgment as shewn in the choice of his authorities, and in his appreciation of their just value, knowing where they might be trusted implicitly and where suspected.

We may now carry our judgment a little farther, by examining an historian in greater detail ; by observing him as a military historian, we will say, as an historian of political contests, as an historian of church matters, and so on. In military history,

for instance, there is first the question, Is he a good geographer? for if not, he cannot be a good military historian. Next let us observe his temper; Does he love exaggerations, does he give us accounts of a handful of men defeating a multitude; is one side always victorious and always heroic, is the other always defeated, always cruel, or blundering, or cowardly? Or is he an unbeliever in all heroism, a man who brings every thing down to the level of a common mediocrity; to whose notions, soldiers care for nothing but pay or plunder, and war is an expensive folly, with no fruit but an empty glory? Depend upon it that the truth has not been found by writers of either of these two classes. And so in political history. Is the historian a master of his science, can he separate the perpetual from the temporary, the essential from the accidental; in the strife of parties, does he understand the game or describe the moves at random? Party partialities, if they do not agree with our own, we are apt enough to suspect, and even to exaggerate; but do we rightly know what partiality is? Do we confound a decided preference for one cause above another, with a misrepresentation of the acts and characters of the men engaged; and think that a writer cannot be impartial unless he is really ignorant or indifferent? It is partiality if our love of the cause blind us to the faults of its supporters, or our hatred of the cause make us unjust to the virtues of its advocates. But it is not partiality to say that the support of a bad cause is itself evil, the support of a good cause is it-

self good. It is not partiality to say, that the self-same political acts, as for example acts of sovereign power exercised beyond the ordinary law, are, according to the cause for which they are done, either to be justified or condemned; and the actor is to be justified or condemned personally, according to the cause for which he acted, and the purity of his own motives in acting, as shewn by his subsequent conduct. Of course this does not in the least degree apply to actions morally wrong, such as falsehood, or individual injustice or cruelty; for to make the end justify such, were to hold that evil may be done that good may come. But in political actions the moral character of the act depends mainly on the object and motive of it; the written law may yield to the higher unwritten law, but not to selfish tyranny or injustice. Undoubtedly in such cases the temptations to the actor and to the historian are obvious; injustice in deed and in judgment lie with both close at the door. Nevertheless if there be such a thing as political truth, a good and an evil in the internal contests of parties, it seems certain that what would pretend to be impartiality is very often ignorance or indifferentism, and that an historian may be called partial by the vulgar, when he is in fact only seeing more clearly and weighing more evenly the respective claims of truth and falsehood, good and evil.

Such an examination will enable us, I think, sometimes to discover with certainty, and always to suspect with probability, where an historian's narrative is untrustworthy. And where it seems to be so,

there we should compare it with some other narrative, written, if it may be, by an author of opinions very unlike those of our first historian. If the suspected defect relate to some particular matter of fact, then to check it is of course easy; if it consist in general meagerness or poverty of information, another history by a different writer will most probably make up its deficiencies; if it consist in a wrong and narrow judgment of the whole state of things described, an opposite view may in part at least correct this also. But it should be remembered that for the mere outline of events, which is all that we need for many portions of history, all historians are trustworthy; the difficulty does but relate to details, and occurs therefore but rarely; for, as I have said before, it is absolutely impossible to study the mass of history in detail, we must be contented to know the mere heads of it, and to reserve minute enquiries into it for the time when we shall have some particular call to study it.

After all, history presents to many minds an unsatisfactory aspect, because it is a perpetual study of particulars, without any certainly acknowledged law; and though our knowledge of general laws may here, as well as in natural science, be drawn from an induction of particular instances, yet it is not in natural science required of every student to go through this process for himself; the laws have been found out for him by others, and to these his attention is directed. Whereas in history, the laws of the science are kept out of sight, perhaps are not known, and he

is turned adrift, as it were, on a wide sea, to navigate it as he best can, and take his own soundings and make his own surveys.

Now allowing the great beauty and interest of history as a series of particular pictures, not by any means barren in matter for reflection, but in the highest degree rich and instructive ; transcending all the most curious details of natural history, in the ratio of man's superiority over the brute creation ; yet I think that we must confess and deplore that its scientific character has not been yet sufficiently made out ; there hangs an uncertainty about its laws which to most persons is very perplexing. Why is it for example that we here, holding in common, as we certainly do, our principles of religious and moral truth, should yet regard political questions so differently ? that the history of our own great civil war, for instance, reads to different persons so different a lesson, so that we cannot touch upon it without being sure to encounter a strong opposition to whatever opinions we may maintain respecting it ? It is very true that some of this opposition may arise from simple ignorance, and then the study of the history may modify or remove it ; but let a man read, if it be possible, every existing document relating to the facts of those times, and is it quite certain that his conclusions will be precisely the same with those of another man who may have gone through the same process ? History, therefore, does not seem to be sufficient to the right understanding of itself ; its

laws, which, as it seems, ought to be established from its facts, appear even with a full knowledge of the facts before us, to be yet infinitely disputable.

I confess that if I believed them to be as really disputable as they have been disputed, the pain of such a conviction would be most grievous to bear. I am firmly persuaded, on the contrary, that setting out with those views of man which we find in the Scriptures, and with those plain moral notions which the Scriptures do not so much teach as suppose to exist in us, and sanction; the laws of history, in other words, the laws of political science, using “political” in the most exalted sense of the term, as expressing the highest *πολιτικὴ* of the Greek philosophers, may be deduced, or, if you will, may be confirmed from it with perfect certainty, with a certainty equal to that of the most undoubted truths of morals. And if in this or in any former lectures I have seemed to express or to imply a very firm conviction on points which I well know to be warmly disputed, it is because these laws being to my own mind absolutely certain, the lessons of any particular portion of history, supposing that the facts are known to us, appear to be certain also; and daily experience can scarcely remove my wonder at finding they do not appear so to others.

That they do not appear so, however, is undoubtedly a phenomenon to be accounted for. And hard as it is, almost I think impossible, to doubt conclusions which seem both in the way by which we arrived at them originally, and in their consistency

with one another, and in their offering a key to all manner of difficulties, and in their never having met with any objection which we could not readily answer, to command absolutely our mind's assent ; still I allow, that if they convinced no minds but ours, or if being generally disputed or doubted we could in no way account satisfactorily for the fact of such a doubt respecting them, we should be driven to the extremity of scepticism ; truth would appear indeed to be a thing utterly unreal or utterly unattainable. Now on the contrary, what appear to me to be the laws of history, contain in them no single paradox ; there is no step in the process by which we arrive at them which is not absolutely confirmed by the sanction of the highest authorities ; and the doubt respecting them appears to arise partly because men have not always viewed them in combination with one another, in which state one modifies another, and removes or lessens what might appear strange in each separately ; and partly because in regarding any one period of history, our perception of the general law is obscured by circumstances which interfere with its regular operation, and thus lead many to doubt its existence.

But in speaking of the certainty of the laws of political science, I mean only that there are principles of government, undoubtedly good in themselves, and tending to the happiness of mankind ; and that whenever these principles appear not to have produced good, it is owing to some disturbing causes which may be clearly pointed out, or to the absence of

something which was their proper consequence, and the omission of which in its season left them without their natural fruit; but that although the principles may thus be impeded by untoward circumstances, or fail to bring forth their consequences in any given case, as it is not every blossom which is succeeded by its fruit, yet they are an essential condition of the birth of fruit, and to oppose them, instead of furthering and perfecting their work, and helping to make them fruitful, is merely to uphold what is bad; so that there is on one side, it may be, an ineffectual, or even an abused good, on the other hand there is a positive evil.

But one great question still remains; if history has its laws, as I entirely believe; if theoretically considered it is not a mere aggregation of particular actions or characters, like the anecdotes of natural history, but is besides this the witness to general moral and political truths, and capable, when rightly used, of bringing to our notice fresh truths which we might not have gained by *a priori* reasoning only; still, it may be asked, is this theoretical knowledge available? Can the truths which it teaches us to value be really carried into effect practically, or are we rather cursed with that bitter thing, a powerless knowledge, seeing an evil from which we cannot escape, and a good to which we cannot attain; being in fact embarked upon the rapids of fate, which hurry us along to the top of the fall, and then dash us down below; while all the while, there are the banks on the right and left close in sight, an assured and visible safety

if we could but reach it, but we try to steer and to pull our boat thither in vain ; and with eyes open, and amidst unavailing struggles, we are swept away to destruction ? This is the belief of some of no mean name or ability ; who hold that the destiny of the present and future was fixed irrevocably by the past, and that the greatest efforts of individuals can do nothing against it, nay, that they are rather disposed by an overruling power to be apparently the instruments in bringing it to pass. While others hold that great men can control fate itself, that there is an energy in the human will which can as it were restore life to the dead ; and snap asunder the links of the chain of destiny, even when they have been multiplied around us by the toil of centuries.

Now practically there is an end of this question altogether, if the power of this supposed fate goes so far as to make us its willing instruments ; I mean, if the influences of our time, determined themselves by the influence of a past time, do in their turn determine our characters ; if we admire, abhor, hope, fear, desire, or flee from, the very objects and no others which an irresistible law of our condition sets before us. For to ask whether a slave who loves his chains can break them, is but an idle question ; because it is certain that he will not. And if we in like manner think according to a fixed law, viewing things in our generation as beings born in such a generation must view them, then it is evident that our deliverance must proceed wholly from a higher power ; before the outward bondage can be broken, we must

be set at liberty within. The only question which can be of importance to us is this, whether, if our minds be free, our actions can compass what we desire; whether, perceiving the influence of our times, and struggling against it, we can resist it with success; whether the natural consequences of the misdoings of past generations can be averted now, or whether such late repentance be unavailing.

And here surely the answer is such as we should most desire to be the true one; an answer encouraging exertion, yet making the responsibility of every generation exceedingly great, and forbidding us to think that in us or in our actions is placed the turning power of the fortunes of the world. I do not suppose that any state of things can be conceived so bad as that the efforts of good men, working in the faith of God, can do nothing to amend it; yet on the other hand, the evil may be far too deeply rooted to be altogether removed; nor would it be possible for the greatest individual efforts to undo the effect of past errors or crimes, so that it should be the same thing whether they had ever been committed or no. It has been said, Conceive Frederick the Great in the place of Louis the Sixteenth on the morning of the 10th of August, 1792, and would not the future history of the Revolution have been altogether different? But the more reasonable case to conceive would be rather, that Louis the Sixteenth had been endowed, not on that one day of the 10th of August, but from his early youth, with the virtue and firmness of Louis the Ninth, together with the genius of

Frederick or of Napoleon. What would have been the difference in the history of France then? That there would have been a great difference I doubt not, yet were the evils such as no human virtue and wisdom could have altogether undone. No living man could have removed that deep suspicion and abhorrence entertained for the existing church and clergy which made the people incredulous of all virtue in an individual priest, because they were so fully possessed with the impression of the falsehood and evil of the system. Nor, in like manner, could any one have reconciled the peasants throughout France to the landed proprietors; the feeling of hatred was become too strong to be appeased, because here too it was mixed with intense suspicion, the result inevitably of suffering and ignorance, and nothing but the overthrow of those against whom it was directed, could have satisfied it. Yet high virtue and ability in the king would have in all probability both softened the violence of the convulsion, and shortened its duration; and by saving himself from becoming its victim, there would have been one at hand with acknowledged authority and power to reconstruct the frame of society not only sooner but better than it was reconstructed actually; and the monarchy at least, among the old institutions of France, would have retained the love of the people, and would have been one precious link to connect the present with the past, instead of all links being severed together, and old France being separated by an impassable gulf from the new.

A greater accuracy as to the determining of this question does not seem to be attainable. We know that evil committed is in certain cases, and beyond a certain degree, irremediable; I do not say, not to be palliated or softened as to its consequences, but not to be wholly removed. And we know also that the blessing of individual goodness has been felt in very evil times, not only by itself, but by others. What, or what amount of evil is incurable, or how widely or deeply individual good may become a blessing amidst prevailing evil, we are not allowed to determine or to know. God's national judgments are spoken of in Scripture both as reversible and irreversible; for Ahab's repentance the threatened evil was delayed, yet afterwards the cup of Judah's sin was so full, that the reward of Josiah's goodness was his own being early taken away from the evil to come, not the reversal nor even the postponement of the sentence against his country. Surely it is enough to know that our sin now may render unavailing the greatest goodness of our posterity; our efforts for good may be permitted to remove, or at any rate to mitigate, the curse of our fathers' sin.

Here then the present introductory course of lectures shall close. There is in all things a compensation whether of good or evil; and as the subject of modern history is of all others to my mind the most interesting, inasmuch as it includes all questions of the deepest interest relating not to human things only, but to divine, so the intermixture of evil is,

that for this very reason it is of all subjects the most delicate to treat of before a mixed audience. Sharing thus much in common with religious subjects, that no man feels himself to be a mere learner in it, but also in many respects a judge of what he hears, it has this farther difficulty, that the preacher speaking to members of the same church with himself speaks necessarily to men whose religious opinions in the main agree with his own; but he who speaks on modern history, even to members of the same nation and commonwealth, speaks to those whose political opinions may differ from his own very deeply, who therefore are sure not only to judge what they hear, but to condemn it. And however much, when provoked by opposition, we may even feel pleasure in stating our opinions in their broadest form, yet he must be of a different constitution of mind from mine, who can like to do this unprovoked, who can wish in the discharge of a public duty in our own common University, to embitter our academical studies with controversy, to excite angry feelings in a place where he has never met with anything but kindness, a place connected in his mind with recollections, associations, and actual feelings, the most prized and most delightful. Only, it must be remembered, that if modern history be studied at all, he who speaks upon it officially, must speak as he would do on any other matter, simply and fully; expounding it according to his ability and convictions; not disguising or suppressing what he believes to be

necessary to the right understanding of it, although it may sometimes cost him a painful effort. But in the lectures which I would propose to deliver next year, our business will be less embarrassing. We shall then be engaged with a remote period, where the forms of our present parties were unknown; and our object will be to endeavour to represent to ourselves the England of the fourteenth century. To represent it, if we can, even in its outward aspect; for I cannot think that the changes in the face of the country are beneath the notice of history: what supplied the place of the landscape which is now so familiar to us; what it was before five hundred years of what I may call the wear and tear of human dominion; when cultivation had scarcely ventured beyond the valleys, or the low sunny slopes of the neighbouring hills; and whole tracts now swarming with inhabitants, were a wide solitude of forest or of moor. To represent it also in its institutions, and its state of society; and farther in its individual men and in their actions; for I would never wish the results of history to be separated from history itself: the great events of past times require to be represented no less than institutions, or manners, or buildings, or scenery: we must listen to the stir of gathering war; we must follow our two Edwards, the second and third, on their enterprises visited with such different fortune; we must be present at the rout and flight of Bannockburn, and at the triumph of Crecy. Finally, we must remember also not so to

transport ourselves into the fourteenth century as to forget that we belong really to the nineteenth ; that here, and not there, lie our duties ; that the harvest gathered in the fields of the past, is to be brought home for the use of the present : avoiding the fault of that admirable painter of the middle ages, M. de Barante, who, having shewn himself most capable of analyzing history philosophically, and having described the literature of France in the eighteenth century in a work not to be surpassed for its mingled beauty and profoundness, has yet chosen in his history of the Dukes of Burgundy to forfeit the benefits of his own wisdom, and has described the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries no otherwise than might have been done by their own simple chroniclers. An example, one amongst a thousand, how men in their dread of one extreme, the extreme in this case of writing mere discussions upon history instead of history itself, are apt to fall into another not less distant from the true mean.

The experience of this year has given me the most encouraging assurance that the subject of modern history is felt to be full of interest. Those who study it for themselves, will certainly find its interest grow upon them ; it will not then be perilled, to apply an expression of Thucydides^a, upon the capacity of a lecturer, according as he may lecture with more or less of ability and knowledge. For we here are not

^a II. 35.

likely to run away with the foolish notion, that lectures can teach us a science without careful study of our own. They can but excite us to begin to work for ourselves; possibly they may assist our efforts; they can in no way supersede them.

THE END.

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
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